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Japan has been a major actor in the field of development cooperation for five decades, 
even  holding  the  title  of  largest  donor  of  Official  Development  Assistance  (ODA)  
during the 1990s. Financial flows, however, are subject to pre-existing paradigms that 
dictate both donor and recipient behaviour. In this respect Japan has been left wanting 
for more recognition. The dominance of the so called ‘Washington Consensus’ 
embodied in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank has long 
circumvented any indigenous approaches to development problems.  
 
The Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is a 
development cooperation conference that Japan has hosted since 1993 every five years. 
As the main organizer of the conference Japan has opted for the leading position of 
African development. This has come in the wake of success in the Asian region where 
Japan  has  called  attention  to  its  role  in  the  so  called  ‘Asian  Miracle’  of  fast  growing  
economies. These aspirations have enabled Japan to try asserting itself as a major player 
in directing the course of global development discourse using historical narratives from 
both Asia and Africa. 
 
Over the years TICAD has evolved into a continuous process with ministerial and 
follow-up meetings in between conferences. Each conference has produced a 
declaration that stipulates the way the participants approach the question of African 
development. Although a multilateral framework, Japan has over the years made its 
presence more and more felt within the process. This research examines the way Japan 
approaches the paradigms of international development cooperation and tries to direct 
them in the context of the TICAD process. Supplementing these questions are inquiries 
concerning Japan’s foreign policy aspirations. 
 
The research shows that Japan has utilized the conference platform to contest other 
development actors and especially the dominant forces of the IMF and the World Bank 
in development discourse debate. Japan’s dominance of the process is evident in the 
narratives found in the conference documents. Relative success has come about by 
remaining consistent as shown by the acceptance of items from the TICAD agenda in 
other forums, such as the G8. But the emergence of new players such as China has 
changed the playing field, as they are engaging other developing countries from a more 
equal level. 
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Japanese foreign policy since the Second World War has been influenced by two inter-
related  phenomena.  Under  the  U.S.  security  umbrella  Japan  adopted  the  so  called  
'Yoshida doctrine' enabling it to concentrate on economic development and relying on 
its ally for military protection. Complementing this arrangement is Article 9 of the 
Japanese constitution that prohibits the use of military force outside Japan and thus 
prevents Japan from participating in peacekeeping operations or interventions in a 
military capacity.1  
 
This has created a situation where instead of military power, foreign aid has become a 
cornerstone of Japanese foreign relations. Naturally Japan’s history with its neighbours, 
especially with China, has mandated the reliance on economic power.  Japan was one of 
the original members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) at the time of its 
founding in 1961.2 During the 1990s Japan became the largest donor of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) only to sink back to the fourth or fifth largest in the 
2000s. 
 
The explanations for Japan's preference for economic, rather than military power are 
quite obvious. Other than the restrictions imposed by the constitution, any sign of a 
militarily more assertive Japan would ignite a backlash from the country's immediate 
neighbours. Instead, the country has opted for a more subtle approach into international 
affairs that includes among other things a reliance on economic power. The seminal 
work in Japan's use of foreign aid for foreign policy goals has been done by Alan Rix. 
Already in the early 1990s, Rix concluded that foreign aid played an important part in 
Japan's aspirations for a top position on the stage of international relations.3 Hook et al. 
have dubbed the subtle approach as 'quiet diplomacy', a term that encompasses not only 
                                               
1  Green 2001 pp. 272. 
2  Hook et al. 2005 pp. 230. 




the tools available but also the domestic political processes that have necessitated 
Japan's unique approach to international relations.4 
 
Beyond the numbers, Japan has taken an active role in redefining the way development 
and the related discourses are understood. This has come in the wake of continued 
criticism targeted at Japan's use of economic aid as either a tool for promoting the 
country's export-driven economy or simply as a way to offset its account surplus during 
the peak years of the 1980s.5 The brunt of criticism has revolved around the fact that 
Japan has not come up with a clear philosophy to guide its behaviour as a foreign aid 
donor, opting instead for furthering domestic economic performance through request 
based large-scale infrastructure projects in developing countries.6 In essence, this has 
meant the creation of a system where Japanese businesses advice aid receiving countries 
in how to apply for Japanese aid money that is then used by Japanese companies to 
implement the planned projects in those countries. 
 
I  argue  that  by  following  the  evolution  of  Tokyo International  Conference  on  African  
Development (TICAD) insights can be made into Japanese foreign political aspirations.7 
Although historical ties between Japan and Africa are minimal, the simple fact that 
Japan has taken on the challenge of African development is more than enough of a 
reason to inquire what the country hopes to gain from the endeavour. More than this, by 
interpreting the way Japan reacts and participates in the global discourse on foreign aid 
and development cooperation through the declarations issued by TICAD, this research 
will attempt to carve out the nature of Japanese agency within that discourse. 
Declarations and policy statements coming forth from the proceedings resonate not only 
within the donor community but also among the ranks of developing countries. 
 
                                               
4  Hook et al. 2005. 
5  Green 2001 pp. 229-30. 
6  Hatakeyama 2008 pp. 345. 
7  TICAD in a nutshell: The conference is co-organized by Japan, United Nations Office of the 
Special Advisor on Africa (UN-OSSA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
has thus far taken place four times in 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008. The conference is a non-pledging forum 





Although sometimes only a marginal segment of global foreign relations, foreign aid 
discourse is nonetheless an intricate and commonly acknowledged part of how a global 
community is being constructed. The flow of foreign aid from the rich North to the poor 
South is considered to be a mutually beneficial arrangement. Multinational 
organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiaries create forums where 
commonly shared goals are discussed and put into practice. David Leheny and Kay 
Warren present an interesting idea of how the relationship between China and Japan has 
shaped Japan's internal aid politics.8 Similar  transnational  currents  can  be  seen  in  the  
global aid debate where converging aid preferences shape the actions and behaviour of 
all  global  aid  donors.  Arguing  on  the  lines  of  Frank  et  al.,  who  propose  that  the  
responsibilities of the modern nation-state concerning environmental protection are 
increasingly formulated in a global setting,9 I intend to elaborate on a global 
developmentalist agenda as part of the creation of a world society. The process of 
creation is a battlefield of competing narratives and motives where active stakeholders 
participate in defining how to best approach the question of development. As Japan has 
had to struggle with its past, it has found it hard to participate fully in the creation 
process.10 
 
Foreign aid is understood through different development paradigms, some of which 
form dominating regimes. In recent years one such has been the free market oriented 
model of the ‘Washington Consensus’ originating from the international financial 
institutions involved in development cooperation. Challenging this paradigm is hard as 
most of the actors involved in development cooperation have accepted the underlying 
ideology of minimal state interference and market dominance. Japan treads a different 
path in this respect but success in introducing a new paradigm has been hard to come by 
as will be seen.  
 
My thesis will consist of two intertwining parts. First, it will map out the evolution of 
the TICAD process from its humble beginnings to its current stage as one of the main 
forums for African development issues. This part of the thesis will take on the guise of 
                                               
8  Leheny & Warren 2010 pp.16. 
9  Frank et al. pp. 97. 




historical  reconstruction.  Second,  I  will  examine  the  distinct  patterns  of  
developmentalism proposed by Japan during the process. My thesis will rest on the 
assumption that a global discourse on developmentalism emerged during the turn of the 
millennium. This discourse has been made apparent in the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) that have come to guide global development efforts.  
 
Within this discourse on developmentalism, Africa and especially Sub-Saharan Africa is 
the epicentre where efforts for a better world converge. The aforementioned MDGs are 
a clear indication of this. Any progress that has occurred during the first decade of the 
new millennium has for a great extent been due to positive developments in China and 
India.11 This has created a situation where the Sub-Saharan Africa looms in the global 
developmental consciousness as an eternal black hole where all those who enter it end 
up abandoning all hope for a better tomorrow.  
 
The Asian experience on development achievements has both shown the viability of 
foreign aid interventions but also made it painfully clear how similar developments 
have been lacking in other parts of the world, especially in Africa. Japan has garnered 
some credit for Asian development as the region has been the major destination for 
Japanese aid distributions since the Second World War. This experience has even been 
recorded in the first declaration coming out of TICAD in 1993 and has since been 
reiterated in subsequent documents. The development history of Asia, called the 'Asian 
miracle' epitomizes the creation of narratives for development discourse purpose and 
Japan has been active in utilizing this set of paradigms for furthering its own agenda. 
 
The materials used in this thesis are not unproblematic. The world of development 
discourse is formed by declarations and accords coming out of international 
conferences. During these conferences, large numbers of participants have to come to an 
agreement on what constitutes the right approaches for achieving development. As de 
Waal points out, the dominant discourse on aid prevents us to a large degree from 
taking an outside look. Aid becomes the only solution to the prevailing problems,12 but 
                                               
11  UN 2010 pp. 7. 




within the dominant discourse, diverging debates are initiated by active parties. I claim 
that Japan has found a way to promote a distinct view on development and this view can 
be accessed through careful examination of the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development. This development view in itself is not contested but rather the 
way Japan has utilized a multilateral platform for directing the aid debate. The question 
of whether or not Japan has been successful in promoting its own vision will also be a 


























1. Japanese Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy 
 
1.1 From humble beginnings 
 
ODA has become one of the cornerstones of Japanese foreign policy. This has been 
necessitated by restrictions imposed by the country's constitution that prevent Japan 
from participating in military operations beyond its national borders. In practice this has 
meant that Japan hasn't been able to contribute fully to United Nations peacekeeping 
operations, a matter that has affected Japan's aspirations for a United Nations Security 
Council permanent membership. 
 
After its inception in 1954 as a part of the Colombo Plan13 and the country's integration 
into the global aid community as a part of the Development Assistance Committee of 
the OECD in 1961, development co-operation has been a cornerstone of Japanese 
foreign policy. These humble beginnings soon evolved into an orchestrated effort for 
Japanese economic recovery. In aid receiving, war torn countries the financial 
distributions were seen as war reparations but they worked to advance Japan’s economic 
presence in the region. The oil shock of 1973-74 helped to bring new focus into aid 
policy as the resource-dependant nation had to expand its aid programme to include 
vital producers of raw materials. During the 1980s, with the increase of the aid budget, a 
more conscious effort was made for utilizing the available resources as diplomatic tools. 
The importance of foreign aid has been iterated by Kent E. Calder in his article on 
Japanese foreign policy behaviour. In it the author distinguishes the foreign aid arena as 
the sole forum where Japan has been able to exert some sort of leadership role that 
hasn't been subject to the same kind of domestic and international forces as other policy 
forums.14 
 
                                               
13 The Colombo Plan was set up in 1950 by the Commonwealth countries to promote economic and social 
development in the Asia-Pacific region through foreign aid and technical assistance. Non-Commonwealth 
countries were soon able to join and Japan did this on October 6, 1954. The government of Japan fixed 
this date as the beginning of Japan’s ODA. 




The peculiarities of post-war Japanese history created a situation for the nation in which 
the normal way of diplomacy was made difficult. Diplomacy, in a very general sense, is 
a world of self-interested actors who employ a set of tools available for them in order to 
gain some sort of upper hand in relation to their competitors. For Japan these tools were 
severely restricted as a result of the U.S. occupation. The 1947 constitution put together 
by mainly U.S. input prohibited the use of armed forces as a state policy as outlined in 
Article 9. This necessitated a close alliance with the former occupier as, after 1949, 
Japan was surrounded by a socialist bloc. Under prime minister Yoshida Shigeru Japan 
adopted the so-called 'Yoshida Doctrine'. According to this doctrine Japan should 
concentrate on economic and national rebuilding under the security umbrella of the 
United States.15 The benefits were obvious: Japan could use resources normally 
allocated to defence for recovery. However, the arrangement wasn't without its 
drawbacks. Japan had to relinquish a part of its foreign political independence as it had 
to conform to U.S. pressure in geostrategic terms. These terms included the use of 
foreign aid in securing alliances with the poor countries of the Third World. 
 
The Cold War saw little change in the basic set-up of a bilateral U.S.-Japan security 
alliance. The post-war decades were a triumph of Japanese economic development. As 
the country was integrated into the Western bloc, it was able to not only access the 
markets there but also extend its influence in the neighbouring regions of South East 
and South Asia. Dennis T. Yasutomo has identified the main stages of Japanese 
economic diplomacy until the 1990s.16 In the first stage war reparations paved the way 
for an economic expansion into Asian markets. Motives for distributing aid were purely 
economic and dictated on domestic needs for resources and export markets.17 During 
this stage the distribution of aid was susceptible to U.S. pressure. As Orr has noted, for 
the United States strategic considerations came before those of economic security.18 
Under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japan had to concede in terms of aid allocation, 
although this was more evident in the cases of Latin America and the Caribbean.19 
 
                                               
15  Hook et al. 2005 pp. 32-33. 
16  Yasutomo 1989. 
17  Ibid. pp. 491-92. 
18  Orr 1988 pp. 755. 




The first oil shock of 1973-74 marked a turning point in Japanese aid policy. The 
geographic scope of aid had to be expanded to include other regions besides Asia, as 
Japan sought new sources for importing energy and other resources. This had the added 
effect of imbuing the distribution of aid with a political agenda.20 Expectations 
concerning a more visible agenda began to emerge as Japan's contribution to 
international financial institutions and foreign aid grew during the 1980s.21 
 
The role of aid as a diplomatic tool grew alongside the expansion in both geographic 
and financial terms. As Japan gave public pledges to double its ODA beginning in 
197722 aid began to take on a much more central role in diplomatic efforts. Helping to 
speed up this process were the disapproving voices from the international aid 
community that questioned the way Japan was using foreign aid for domestic gains as a 
way to ease the expansion of Japanese companies. By the end of the 1980s, Japan had 
begun to take its first steps in formulating an aid philosophy that would not only act as a 
guideline for aid policy but would also answer the criticism of an ambiguous 
international actor.23 
 
The emergent aid philosophy that Japan began to pursue was based on two principles: 
efforts of self-help and its own legacy as the only non-Western developed nation. The 
first principle drew heavily from the latter as Japan had had to develop its economy 
from the wreckage of the Second World War Although Japan had, in 1954 through the 
Colombo Plan, helped to induce economic growth in the South East Asian region, the 
country had had to simultaneously rely on economic aid in the form of loans from 
international financial institutions, namely the World Bank (WB). The last repayment of 
these loans, borrowed between 1953 and 1966, was paid in 1990, coinciding with 
Japan's rise as the foremost donor of ODA.24 
 
                                               
20  Yasutomo 1989 pp. 492-93. 
21  Green 2001 pp. 229-30. 
22  MOFA 1977 ”Diplomatic Bluebook”, found on the MOFA website   
(http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/index.html). 
23  Yasutomo 1989 pp. 495. 





Since the first attempts at formulating an aid philosophy Japanese foreign aid policy has 
gone through a maturation process during the 1990s and 2000s. The first clear 
indication of this was the 1992 ODA Charter adopted by the Japanese government. In 
the charter Japan laid out, for the first time, guidelines for aid distribution. Although 
drawn with a rough brush, the charter nonetheless lays out some conditions for recipient 
country behaviour. This qualitative change had the added effect, in addition to the 
guidelines, of eroding the tradition of a request based aid distribution.25 Despite its 
name, this tradition had relied on Japanese expertise within the recipient country. 
Referring to a often iterated ideal of promoting self-help efforts by developing 
countries, Japan had preferred projects that originated from the receiving side. With the 
limitations  of  a  poor  country,  the  recipient  had  to  rely  on  Japanese  consulting  
companies to design projects that would be taken on by Japanese firms.26 The ODA 
Charter was revised and updated in 2003. 
 
The new millennium has brought with it challenges to Japan's foreign aid. The 
qualitative improvement in aid has come on the footsteps of a declining aid budget. 
Japan maintained its top donor position throughout the 1990s, finally giving it up in 
2001  to  the  United  States.  As  a  top  donor  Japan  was  unable  to  exert  the  kind  of  
ideological leadership that was expected, although it wasn't for lack of effort. While 
writing cheques, Japan attempted to influence the course of aid debate, at times re-
conceptualizing existing discourse, at others taking a stab at establishing new 
approaches. The most serious effort has been targeted at gaining recognition for the so 
called ‘Asian Miracle’ narrative that emphasis the key role states have in inducing 
development. This has flown in the face of the free-market ideology emanating from 
Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Having 
failed to change the existing discourse in this respect, Japan has reverted to towing the 
line to a large degree.27 
 
 
                                               
25  Katada 2002 pp. 331. 
26  Kawai & Takagi 2004 pp. 266-67. 




1.2 Japan as an aspiring global power 
 
Japan’s status as an economic giant rather than a political force has come about due to 
the country’s close alliance with the United States. On one hand this close relationship 
has ensured stability for Japan to build its economy but at the same time it has 
circumvented any attempt by the Japanese to assert them on the international stage. 
However, as Japan’s economic cooperation policies in the Asian region have garnered 
praise especially among aid receiving countries it has bolstered the country’s confidence 
in extending its influence beyond the economic sphere. 
 
The nature of Japan's international role has been the subject of an extensive debate. 
Mainly the debate has centred on how Japan's economic performance could or should 
place the country on a path to global leadership. Potter and Sueo conclude in their 
review of current literature on the nature of Japanese foreign policy that Japanese 
foreign political activism does indeed follow the dictates of an economic agenda while 
decreasing in intensity outside the East Asian region.28 Thus the use of foreign aid as a 
central pillar of foreign policy for Japan shows no signs of decreasing in validity. 
 
The  new  development  regimes  of  the  21st century  have  offered  Japan  ways  out  of  its  
geoeconomic approach to ODA as they have expanded the field of development 
cooperation. This expansion has enabled Japan to situate itself among the other donors 
at the OECD. Adhering to common causes has been necessary for Japan as resistance 
for a development paradigm coming outside of the conventional regime has been 
extensive. At the same time however, domestic constraints have inhibited the full use of 
Japanese ODA for foreign political gains. Economic stagnation has brought back the 





                                               
28  Potter & Sueo 2003 pp. 329-30. 




1.3 Japan-Africa relations in brief 
 
Interpreting the significance of the TICAD process necessitates examining Japan's 
evolving relations with the African continent before the 1990s. On top of this, the nature 
in which Japan interacts with African nations has to be clarified. On the latter the 
numbers speak for themselves: the share of total ODA directed toward the continent has 
remained in the region of 10 % throughout the evolution of the TICAD process. With 
the absolute numbers of foreign aid dropping during the turn of the millennium, Japan's 
financial involvement took a turn for the worse. 
 
The low level of foreign aid flowing from Japan to Africa reflects the lack of historical 
ties these two share. Quite naturally, before the first oil crisis of the 1970s, Japan had no 
real interest in the region. But as economic necessities sparked the initial diplomatic 
interest in African affairs, the lack of historical ties was brought up as a strength rather 
than  an  inhibiting  factor.  As  Japan  had  not  been  a  major  power  in  the  region  it  didn't  
have the colonial burden shared by the European powers that had dominated the region 
well into the 20th century.  
 
Japan's  entrance  to  the  African  region  on  a  major  diplomatic  level  occurred  during  a  
time when the problems plaguing the continent were in danger of being sidelined by 
major geopolitical events. Although unburdened by a colonial past, Japan's relative 
unfamiliarity with the region meant that it opted for a multilateral approach, engaging 
both institutions such as the UN and other donors.30 Thus from the start, Japan has 
somewhat unwillingly distanced itself from the very issues it has stated pursuing. This 
is best evident by the fact that it was only in 2001 that the first incumbent prime 
minister of Japan visited the continent. However, nearly two decades of engaging the 
issues  of  African  development  and  the  region  have  created  strong  ties  that  Japan  will  
have a hard time of severing even in the face of a more serious economic downturn.31 
 
                                               
30  Ampiah 2008 pp. 2. 




The TICAD process has become to embody the relationship between Japan and Africa 
during the past two decades. On rhetorical level Japan has likened itself as initiating a 
similar kind of development that had occurred in the Asian region since the end of the 
Second World War32 Emphasis  was  put  on  economic  self-reliance  that  would  be  
brought about through investment in infrastructure and human capital. On top of this, 
Japan took on the task of tackling specific issues such as infectious diseases. Both of 
these approaches are integral parts of the conference series. 
 
The reasons for a continued Japanese involvement in the African continent are made 
poignantly clear by the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), the 
successor  of  the  Export-Import  Bank  of  Japan  (JEXIM)  whose  main  function  was  to  
help Japanese companies into new markets. Africa has reserves of rare metals that are 
required in Japan's high technology industries and the low-level infrastructure offers an 
opportunity for Japanese companies to continue exporting a development model that has 














                                               
32  MOFA 2001a pp. 137-38. 




2. Modelling Development 
 
2.1 Global construction of development models 
 
As foreign aid has become a staple of international relations, a series of models, 
describing preferred action donor countries should take, have emerged. These models 
encompass various development paradigms from a focus on economic output of the 
receiving country to what kind of an impact aid would have on the social sector (health, 
education etch.) Before the end of the Cold War, geostrategic interests dictated the 
behaviour  of  donor  countries  to  a  large  extent.  The  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  was  
seen  as  heralding  a  new  age  not  only  in  global  politics  but  also  in  the  foreign  aid  
community. The hegemony of the capitalist West now undisputed, development models 
arising  from  the  premises  of  a  market-based  system  soon  emerged  to  take  the  centre  
stage. 
 
Development  cooperation  has,  since  the  early  days  of  the  Marshall34 and Colombo 
plans, been a playing field of vested political interests. Disguised as either humanitarian 
intervention or poverty reduction strategy, development has had to succumb to 
interpretations arising from politically charged agendas promoting either a market-
oriented or a state-led approach. Another field of contention has the focus of 
development: fulfilment of the so-called 'basic human needs' or economic growth. This 
roughly laid out fourfold table of market versus the state and the social versus the 
economic has come to embody the conflicting development paradigms found in the 
field of development cooperation. 
 
The models arising from the twin dichotomies described above have obvious 
consequences depending on how they are applied. Using discursive tactics, 
development models create narratives that deny agency and, on the surface, remove any 
endogenous inhibiting factors, such as unyielding geography or social resistance.35 
                                               
34 The Marshall Plan was an American program that was designed to prevent the spread of communism in 
Europe by providing economic assistance to countries after the Second World War. 




Likewise, the motives behind promoting one approach on the expense of another have 
had their integrity questioned by voices arising from both within the developing world 
as well as among the ranks of the members of the OECD. One such notable example is 
Japan. Although part of the so-called first world of developed economies, Japan has 
emerged as an opponent of the institutional hegemony on development discourse 
imposed by the IMF and World Bank. Japan’s critique is aimed at the vision of a 
“stageist teleological conception of development”36 promoted by the aforementioned 
institutions in the form of free market capitalism with a minimal state presence. In this 
vision there is only one path to development: a step-by-step eradication of intervening 
policies to let the free market run its course. Japan’s suggestion has been to accept the 
distinct characteristics of aid receiving countries and design development cooperation 
along those terms, thus diminishing the deterministic aura found in the prevailing 
discourse. 
 
Kenichi Ohno makes an interesting observation when discussing the role and 
significance of ODA in global development efforts. The new millennium has witnessed 
the emergence of a poverty reduction agenda where eradicating poverty should require 
more than the one-stop-shop solutions of the past. Still, as Ohno notes, the only remedy 
that everybody can agree on is increasing the global ODA budget.37 This  kind  of  
approach forces the recipient countries in the margin as their own agency is neglected. 
Worse than this, according to Ohno, is the fact that poverty reduction is in danger of 
becoming yet another quick fix scheme in a long line of trial-and-error solutions. The 
need for taking into account the unique background and capabilities of each developing 
country should be the starting point of every development effort. 
 
2.2 The cycle of development models  
 
Prescriptions for development problems have been varied and numerous. A good 
example  is  the  rise  and  decline  of  the  structural  adjustment  programmes  (SAP)  of  the  
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These programmes were designed to 
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tackle the macroeconomic issues endemic in developing economies in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s.38 Intended  as  a  short-term  
solution, targeted at ensuring stable macroeconomic conditions, the SAPs soon ran into 
trouble. Reforms undertaken by developing economies, in order to be eligible for 
adjustment loans, hit those most vulnerable. Denied agency was another contributing 
factor as adjustment was to be carried out according to what the North deemed 
appropriate.39 What made matters worse was the fact that these adjustment interventions 
quickly became a staple of international aid efforts, the duration of which was counted 
in years rather than months.40 
 
Under criticism from participating governments and voices within the foreign aid 
community, among them Japan, the financial institutions accepted a more broad vision 
on development that focused on poverty reduction, rather than on macroeconomic 
austerity. The end result of this shift in focus was the adoption of the so called “poverty 
reduction agenda” embodied in the IMFs Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
and the UNs Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Thus the last two decades of the 
20th century had witnessed two major shifts in aid vision that not only affected the 
modality of aid given but also the way development was understood by the global aid 
community. 
 
These shifts occurred both out of necessity and due to changes in global politics. 
Decline of the socialist block enabled the spread of development ideals based on market 
forces to penetrate the aid community. As mere fiscal output was not able to capture the 
whole phenomenon, social and institutional aspects were elevated into the centre stage. 
In recent years, economic growth has once again returned as a point of interest, 
providing Japan with an opportunity for showing leadership capabilities.41 
 
The importance of understanding the on-going cycle of development cooperation 
discourse is not only a question of finding the parameters with which foreign aid is 
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distributed. When a new approach emerges on the stage of foreign aid, those promoting 
it  try  to  assert  it  as  a  dominant  regime  whose  priorities  should  be  adhered  by  all  aid  
actors. The success of a new regime is dependent upon those found in its background, 
such as powerful financial institutions and governments. For example, the World Bank 
and the IMF have been successful in initiating a new drive for poverty reduction as of 
1999, based on their Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).42 
 
2.3 Japan's participation in the global development cooperation debate  
 
Although for  the  most  part  aligned  with  the  major  economic  powers  found in  the  G8 
and the DAC of the OECD, Japan has nonetheless carved out a distinct position within 
the foreign aid community. The country's own experience in developing its economy in 
the post-war years imbued it with not only a sense of  the extraordinary regarding the 
so-called 'East Asian Miracle' but also with an awareness on how to approach the 
question of development. As a development actor, Japan has been somewhat 
marginalized throughout the post-war history. The success story that is Japan's post-war 
economic growth became a staple of Japanese aid interventions. At the core was the 
notion  of  mobilizing  resources  for  growth  with  the  state  playing  a  key  part.  The  goal  
was always to achieve a self-reliant status as an equal to the modernized nations of the 
world.43   
 
The  Japanese  development  view  draws  heavily  from  the  experience  of  East  Asian  
nations, including its own. Starting from similar backgrounds in the 1960s as 
contemporary African countries, East Asian countries focused mainly on improving 
economic performance and output. Reduction of poverty occurred as a consequence of 
development and growth, not the other way around. The state structures and economic 
conditions in the region during the start of East Asia's catch-up process were as varied 
as they are today in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is against this background that Japan 
promotes a new way of achieving regional development in Africa. 
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As Japan entered the ranks of the economic powers and began participating in the 
formation of global development discourse, major points of contention emerged. These 
contentions manifested themselves in the two dichotomies described above. The “East 
Asian Miracle” was adopted by parties promoting a neoclassical agenda of market 
supremacy while economists recognizing the importance of government involvement in 
the process tried to upturn their dominance.44 
 
The culmination of this was the study done by the World Bank in 1993, requested by 
the government of Japan that examined the extent to which government intervention 
had  benefited  the  Newly  Industrialized  Countries  (NIC)  of  East  Asia.45 As  will  be  
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.2.4 the study, although acknowledging some 
contribution made by government involvement, it didn't stray far away from the Banks 
neoclassical interpretation of post-war economic success of the region. 
 
In recent years, as interest in reanimating the growth agenda has emerged, Japan has 
found itself in an advantageous position. Although Japan has incorporated prevailing 
discourses into its own aid policies, such as the MDGs, it has nonetheless maintained a 
position  that  draws  heavily  on  its  own experiences.  One  of  the  more  visible  ones  has  
been the promotion of projects and programmes that enable economic growth. This 
approach has been criticised for its narrow scope as for measurements used for 
evaluating success or failure include household income levels and growth of GNP. 
These indicators have failed to capture the complexity of poverty as a phenomenon.46 
The distinction from this usual approach in the Japanese one has been to include the 
country’s own experience in developing its economy. This experience includes the 
recognition of guided industrial policy that would benefit the receiving country as a 
whole.47 
 
                                               
44  Akiyama, Akiyama & Minato 2003 pp. 26. 
45  Ibid. pp. 53. 
46  Ranis & Stewart 2000 pp. 198. 




Japan has also been active in promoting new ways of understanding the way poverty 
and deprivation affect the most vulnerable. The most visible push has been made for the 
concept of “human security”.48 The vague nature of the concept has made it possible to 
make it a ubiquitous part of Japanese foreign policy. Human security has found its way 
into places such as Japan's ODA policy and dialogue within the G8. 
 
Japan's  aspirations  for  the  recognition  of  a  distinctly  Japanese  development  model  are  
not only tied to the intricate play of international relations. Recognition of Japan as a 
formidable development policy formulator is considered a step necessary in the 
country's advance on the ladders towards a great power status. Complementing this is 
the nature of Japan's own development history and its position as the first non-Western 
developed nation. Similar nationalistic drive that fuelled the development process 
during the post-second World War period can be found behind Japan's more and more 
outspoken views. Nation-building achieved, Japan is carving out a distinct place within 
the international community all the while yearning for recognition. Africa is in this 
respect a testing ground for home-grown theories that Japan has already utilized in its 















                                               




3. TICAD: Formation of a process 
 
3.1 In Brief 
 
Foreign aid had its origins in the aftermath of the Second World War A devastated 
Europe had to be rebuilt and in the Asia-Pacific, similar arrangements were carried out 
by relevant parties. The East-West divide meant the use of aid for garnering 
unabashedly selfish foreign political gains. The end of the Cold War was seen in the 
foreign aid community as heralding a new dawn for global aid allocations without 
political motives. At the centre of this new global environment for foreign aid is Africa 
and its decades long stagnation in terms of economic, human and social development. 
 
Japan's relations with the African continent before the first TICAD can be characterized 
as following the dictates of economic and security interests. Historically, Japan didn't 
suffer from a colonial burden and its ties to the continent were limited in number. Under 
the 'Yoshida Doctrine' Japan followed the lead of the United States in foreign politics on 
the continent. This meant for example quietly condoning the actions of undemocratic 
regimes as dictated by Cold War realities. One notable example was a distinct pro-
Pretoria policy of Japan.49 Still, as Ampiah notes, Japan had taken part in the 1955 
Afro-Asian Bandung Conference seeking neutralism and decolonization thus 
establishing a connection with the continent.50  
 
At the same time, economic recovery and growth within Japan necessitated the 
extraction of resources and discovery of new markets for Japanese products. Within this 
framework, Africa played a secondary role against East and South East Asia for a long 
time.  But  after  the  oil  crisis  of  1973  a  more  expansive  diplomatic  thrust  for  new  
resource providers was carried out.51 These series of diplomatic missions found their 
way  to  a  number  of  African  countries  that  hitherto  had  remained  outside  of  Japanese  
interests. 
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TICAD came into being during a time when the world was starting to emerge from the 
bipolar order of United States and the Soviet Union. The collapse of the latter at the turn 
of the 1990s meant that the number of nation states increased dramatically. Emerging 
from the economic stagnation of a   planned socialist economy meant that these new 
members of the global community were in dire need of assistance. As the world rallied 
behind them the African continent was in danger of disappearing from the global aid 
agenda. 
 
The first TICAD convened in 1993 for the purpose of turning the worlds gaze on the 
problems still endemic in Africa. The 1980s were deemed as a 'lost decade' in Africa, 
due  to  the  failings  of  economic  development  and  slow  speed  of  democratic  reforms.  
From  the  start  the  Asian  experience  was  hailed  as  a  shining  example  of  what  
international cooperation can achieve. Utilization of this ‘Asian Miracle’ narrative was 
especially appealing to Japan as it had been Japanese involvement in the region that had 
engendered positive results. 
 
3.1.1 TICAD I: Setting the agenda 
 
The first conference came into being amidst worries of a global donor fatigue. The 
structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s had taken their toll on both donors and 
recipients and disillusionment towards foreign aid had descended on the global stage.  
 
It was in this atmosphere that Japan took the initiative on African development issues. 
In the aftermath of the 46th General Assembly of the United Nations, Japan announced 
that it would hold an international conference focusing on African development 
problems.  During  the  UN  session,  the  assembly  adopted  The  United  Nations  New  
Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF).52 The agenda called 
for a renewed interest in the continent, especially in the fields of ODA, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), trade and debt cancellation. Sustained economic growth became one 
of  the  central  pillars  for  a  successful  African  recovery.  In  the  resolution  this  was  
                                               




translated as requiring an annual economic growth rate of 6 per cent during the course 
of the 90s.53 This emphasis on economic development would later come to penetrate the 
whole of the TICAD process. 
 
From the start, the first conference aimed at producing a joint declaration that would 
testify to the dedication of all partners involved and serve as a guideline for future 
endeavours.54 It  was  made  clear  that  TICAD would  not  be  a  forum for  additional  aid  
pledges. Instead, the conference would strive to deepen international cooperation and 
create a space for dialogue between development partners from the North and South. 
More importantly, the conference took on the task of promoting an agenda based of 
African  ownership  of  the  continent's  development.  Providing  assistance  for  African  




The first conference produced the “Tokyo Declaration”. In this document were set the 
general principles for a continued international cooperation for African development. 
These principles were the product of a joint discussion carried out in preparatory 
meetings and the two-day conference. The importance of sustained economic growth 
was advocated as well as possible lessons to be learned from the Asian experience of 
development. 
 
The Declaration consisted of six parts. Starting with the need for political and economic 
reforms, the declaration goes on to stipulate the importance of including the private 
sector in development efforts. The importance of regional cooperation and integration 
for improved trading conditions as well as ensuring a stable environment through 
disaster relief are made apparent. Lastly the declaration points out the lessons to be 
learned from the Asian development experience while stressing the need for 
international cooperation where African countries strive for self-reliance and their donor 
partners offer support. 
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Within these different sectors distinct patterns emerge. The sought after economic 
growth is tied to reforms in politics and society. Keywords are of liberalization and 
integration into the global economic community. However, the declaration does note the 
individual characteristics of African countries, allowing some room for initiatives 
emerging from the region.55 This point is further extrapolated in relation to structural 
adjustment programs (SAP). The participants acknowledge the shortcomings in the 
areas of human capital, social services and access by the poor that SAPs had had. 
 
The first conference ended on a more or less abstract note. The declaration states that 
the participants intend to hold a conference similar in scale before the turn of the 
century.56 Clear commitment to a continuous TICAD process didn’t emerge. The review 
of the promises made in the declaration was taken up by the three main co-organizers.  
 
3.1.2 TICAD II: Moving on to action 
 
The aftermath of the first TICAD left a clear need for a more concrete approach to the 
problems faced by Africa. The second conference took on the task of formulating a plan 
of action that would face Africa's problems head-on instead of remaining on a 
theoretical level. 
 
If the first conference had to carry the burden of a dissipating Cold War mentality the 
second TICAD was not without its own overbearing shadow. In 1997 the Asian 
financial crisis had turned the world's gaze on that region and its immediate problems. 
Although, as the 1999 DAC Development Co-operation Review notes, since Japan 
acted  on  the  crisis  with  considerable  response,  the  country  was  also  able  to  move  the  
TICAD process to the next phase.57 It is notable that in the 1999 DAC Peer Review the 
Asian financial crisis and TICAD II appear in connection as notable Japanese foreign 
aid efforts of that year. 
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The preparatory process for TICAD II was initiated at the Ninth session of the United 
Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD  IX)  in  Midrand,  South-
Africa in 1996. Already in 1994 the government of Japan, the UN and Global Coalition 
for Africa (GCA) had held the first Asia-Africa Forum as a follow-up for TICAD I. The 
forum embodied the need for deeper South-South co-operation especially between Asia 
and Africa. This process was continued in 1997 when the second Asia-Africa Forum 
was held in Thailand. 
 
For  TICAD  II  the  goal  from  the  beginning  was  to  come  up  with  an  action  plan  that  
would produce action-oriented results.58 Yet  again,  emphasis  was  put  on  the  fact  that  
TICAD II would be a non-pledging conference but that it would build upon the results 
of the first conference. The first signs of an evolving process within the TICAD 




The immediate result of the second TICAD was the adoption of the “Tokyo Agenda for 
Action” by all the participants of the conference. Compared to the declaration that came 
from the first conference this agenda included an 'Action Plan'. This plan contained 
specific goals to be achieved in a number of human and social fields. The problems 
faced by the African continent were divided into concrete categories ranging from 
education and health to lack of private sector development and agriculture.59 
 
Under the primary theme of 'Poverty reduction and integration into the global economy' 
are found the underlying principles of 'ownership' and 'global partnership'. The primary 
theme iterates the first goal to be reached by 2015: reducing the proportion of the 
population living in extreme poverty by at least one-half. Reduction will be achieved 
primarily through economic growth that should exceed 5 per cent annually.60 In this 
respect the agenda echoes the conclusions made already in 1991 in the  UN-NADAF. 
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Furthermore, this intended growth should come through investments in infrastructure 
and social services while maintaining sound macroeconomic policies.  
 
The primary theme and its relevant courses of action reveal how Japan intended to 
promote development efforts within the African context. Ownership of the process is 
put  into  African  hands  by  demanding  the  countries  of  the  region  to  establish  and  
maintain critical infrastructure and political stability.61 Development partners from the 
North on their part work within the free market economy by promoting trade, 
investment and technology transfer. 
 
The action plan adopted in the agenda was a significant step forward in pushing the 
TICAD process towards concrete measures for enabling development. Drawing lessons 
from the East Asian development experience, the action plan sets targets to be reached 
by 2005 or 2015 in three different fields:  
 
1) Social development and poverty reduction 
2) Economic development 
3) Basic foundations for development 
 
What is notable about these targets is the fact that they promote the concepts of 
'ownership' and 'partnership' by assigning different responsibilities to African countries 
and their development partners. Although this division can be seen as exemplifying the 
Japanese insistence on 'self-reliance' and thus removing donor accountability it is also a 
sign  of  evolving  North-South  relations  within  the  framework  of  global  
developmentalism. One of the major shifts that occurred in this framework in the 1990s 
was the emphasis put on development co-operation instead of distribution of aid. Catch 
phrases such as 'empowerment' and 'participatory approach' signalled the increasing 
involvement of people from the South in their own development efforts. 
 
 
                                               




3.1.3 TICAD III: A Look Back 
 
The  end  result  of  TICAD  II  came  out  at  a  pivotal  time  in  global  aid  discourse.  Four  
decades of foreign aid distribution had not solved the world's problems. A new 
approach was needed. The turn of the millennium gave incentive to come up with a 
global-level initiative that would bring the less-developed nations into a prosperous 21st 
century. Manifested in the Millennium Development Goals this global effort has special 
significance for Japan as within the goals there is an unspoken acknowledgement of a 
special interest in Sub-Saharan Africa.62 More importantly, the goals adopted in the UN 
initiative more than echo those put forth in the Tokyo Agenda for Action coming out of 
TICAD  II.  Setting  goals  to  be  reached  by  2015  in  fields  such  as  poverty  eradication,  
education and disease control the MDGs overlap significantly with TAAs promotion of 
an African led development agenda.63 
 
During the period between TICAD II and III Japan took initiative on African issues 
outside the conference framework. Japan invited the presidents of Algeria, Nigeria and 
South Africa to attend the Okinawa G8 Summit in 2000.64 The Okinawa Communiqué 
produced by the summit concluded that the inclusion of non-G8 countries is essential 
for solving the problems of ever-intensifying globalization,65 thus rewarding Japanese 
efforts. The next year marked the first occasion that an incumbent prime minister of 
Japan visited the African continent.66 Prime Minister  Yoshiro  Mori  travelled  to  South  
Africa, Kenya and Nigeria during 2001 diverging from the contemporary climate of 
disinterest in African affairs.67 The visit came at a time when Japan had been forced to 
cut its ODA budget due to persistent economic stagnation during the 90s. The visit can 
thus be seen as reassuring Japan's African development partners that Japan will stay 
committed to their cause. 
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Global changes during the first years of the new millennium had a profound effect on 
Japanese development policy guidelines. As a response to the 9/11 attacks the U.S. 
initiated 'war on terror'. This meant that Japan had to adapt its foreign policy to meet the 
needs of its ally. This is reflected in the revised ODA Charter that Japan adopted in 
2003. The charter takes note of the ever frequent occurrence of terrorism and conflict 
and how they pose a threat to the international community.68 These changes had cast a 
shadow on global efforts for African recovery. The call for another conference focused 




The shift that had occurred in the global development discourse marked the proceedings 
of the third TICAD. The expansion of dialogue between the rich industrialized countries 
of the North and their African development partners was noted from the very 
beginning.69 More  concretely,  the  ownership  of  the  development  process  by  African  
countries promoted by the previous conferences had manifested itself in ”The New 
Partnership for Africa's Development” (NEPAD) created a year before.70 Adopted as an 
official programme of newly formed African Union (AU), NEPAD was quickly 
acknowledged by the G8 at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit.71 
 
One  of  the  major  goals  for  TICAD  III  was  to  integrate  NEPAD  into  the  existing  
conference process.72 The Japanese view of an African ownership of its own 
development process had now a solid form accepted by the global development 
community at large. On the Japanese side the emergence of NEPAD signalled a 
possible alternative to the ”Washington Consensus”.73 Furthermore, the partnership 
forged  at  TICAD  III  between  the  conference  and  NEPAD  gave  Japan  an  official  
recognition as one of the leading development partners of Africa.74 
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Besides integrating an African approach into the conference proceedings, TICAD III 
marked a new beginning in other ways as well. Previous conferences had been called 
forth  almost  on  an  ad hoc basis with little reference to a continuous process.75 At 
TICAD  III  there  emerged  for  the  first  time  an  official  acknowledgement  that  TICAD  
had found its own momentum within the global development community. The tenth 
anniversary of the process was thus seen as an opportunity to take stock of past efforts 
and embark upon a new path. To this end a review of the TICAD process until the third 
conference was carried out by Ambassador Rasmus Rasmusson of Sweden. The review, 
not surprisingly, acknowledged the role TICAD had played in promoting the twin 
concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' as well as the significance of opening up new 
venues for South-South cooperation within the Asian-African context.76 
 
As mentioned above, the turn of the millennium had witnessed the emergence of a 
number of development initiatives such as MDGs and the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, South Africa. These initiatives 
among a plethora of others had created an environment of developmentalism where 
efforts  related  to  Africa  stood  at  the  foreground.  TICAD III  came about  at  a  moment  
where well established practices carried a lot of weight.77 
 
TICAD  III  also  became  a  venue  for  promoting  the  concept  of  'human  security'.  This  
concept had its origins in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report in which an 
attempt was made to broaden the field of security issues.78  In the report security meant 
not only the security of a nation and its borders but also the security of an individual in 
terms of livelihood, environment and health. Japan had become an ardent advocate of 
this term during the 1990s. At the UN Millennium Summit in 2000 prime minister Mori 
proposed the establishment of an international commission on human security.79 The 
commission, headed by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, produced a final report Human 
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Security Now during the first half of 200380, well before the third conference. The report 
noted the active involvement of Japan in the cause to promote human security as a 
mainstream approach to development.81 
 
3.1.4 TICAD IV: A show of force 
 
The TICAD process had all but been formalized in the third conference so a fourth 
TICAD was expected within the international community by 2008.82  That year Japan 
would host a G8 Summit in Hokkaido and these two major international events were 
quickly linked together in preparation for the conference.83  Results from the conference 
proceedings would be conveyed to the G8 Summit. Japan thus reinforced its role as a 
link between Africa and its partners from the North.  
 
The fourth conference came about at a time when Japan had answered to global calls for 
more visible aid effort. Japan had transformed its commitment to the African cause into 
concrete measures well before by announcing in 2005 the doubling of ODA to the 
continent within three years.84 
 
The fourth conference was called forth in a positive atmosphere regarding African 
development, especially in fields of economy and governance.85 Already in 2003 an 
African  Peer  Review  Mechanism  (APRM)  had  been  adopted  within  the  NEPAD  
framework to help countries monitor governance performance. In economic terms, the 
continent had experienced impressive growth rates of more than 5 per cent. Although 
dark clouds were gathering in the form of rising food and oil prices, the conference 
nonetheless adopted the subtitle ”Towards a Vibrant Africa”. 
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The preparatory proceedings leading up to the May conference included reiterations on 
familiar topics of boosting economic growth, ensuring human security through 
achievement of MDGs and striving towards good governance. In addition, the parties 
involved discussed the importance of climate change as this debate had gained 
momentum in relevant international conferences.86 During these proceedings, voices 
from the civil society were also heard but their participation remained on a superficial 
level. Attempts to influence the content and output by civil society organizations (CSO) 
had increased during the TICAD process but official status as a participant had been 




TICAD IV adopted  the  ”Yokohama Declaration:  Towards  a  Vibrant  Africa”.  In  it  the  
participants identify three pillars of African development for the consequent five 
years.88 Those pillars were: 
 
 Boosting economic growth 
 Ensuring human security through MDGs and good governance 
 Addressing environmental issues and climate change 
 
For the first time the TICAD process established a formalized follow-up process in line 
with the ”Yokohama Action Plan” adopted simultaneously with the declaration. The 
plan further elaborated on the three pillars and was the latest testament to a Japanese 
view on what engenders development.89 Infrastructure was once again put on the fore as 
a prerequisite for economic growth and efficiency and innovation in agriculture were 
promoted as solutions for solving the hunger problem. 
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Civil society organizations had been involved in the TICAD process since the beginning 
but remained only in the margins during the first three conferences.90 Civil  society  
participants had been allowed to observe and speak but they were removed from the 
planning and decision making procedures.91 The Yokohama Declaration takes note for 
the first time of the need to engage civil society in Africa, Japan and on the international 
stage. CSOs and the academia are also mentioned within the action plan as needing 
inclusion within the participatory approach of the process. 
 
The Yokohama Declaration can be said to have been a success for both Japanese 
diplomatic efforts and development agenda. Not only had Japan managed to incorporate 
African issues into high-level summits of the new millennium92 but it had also been 
persistent in bringing a distinct view on development into the global stage. This 
emphasis on state-aided economic growth enabling poverty reduction deviated from the 
stance within the ”Washington Consensus” of market liberalization and poverty 
reduction based on the IMF supported Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).93  
 
More significantly, the declaration notes the need for reform in the United Nations 
system and especially regarding the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Japan 
has insisted that the UNSC needs to be reformed to match the change in global politics 
since WWII.94 This has more or less implied increasing the number of permanent 
members to include, among others, Japan. 
 
TICAD IV enabled Japan to showcase initiative on global development issues and reach 
out to its African partners through dialogue and new promises for doubling of ODA to 
the continent by 2012.95 It had been partly due to lack of African support that Japan, 
along with Brazil, India and Germany, in 2005 had failed to win enough votes for 
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UNSC reform.96 TICAD  IV  gave  new  momentum  for  Japanese  diplomatic  efforts  as  
high-level policy dialogue was complemented with generous aid pledges. 
 
 




Since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War,  foreign  aid  has  come  to  define  Japanese  
involvement in international relations. The adoption of a 'peace constitution' under the 
U.S. controlled occupation regime meant that Japan had to rely on economic rather than 
military might in solidifying a global presence. Under the U.S. security umbrella, Japan 
was able to build up its economy but at the same time it relinquished a part of its 
international agency. Engaging the global community through a diplomacy of economy 
has not been without controversies. A painful reminder of Japan's uneasy position 
within the international community was the 1990-91 Gulf War. During the operation, 
Japan resorted to so called 'checkbook diplomacy'. Instead of sending military troops, 
the country financed the coalitions actions with a total sum of 13 billion USD.97 
 
The need for a much more clearly defined international role had emerged by the 1980s 
in  Japan.  The  reason  for  this  was  the  growth  of  the  country's  economy to  become the  
second largest in the world behind the United States. In tandem with the growth of 
domestic economy, Japan had increased its Official Development Aid (ODA) by leaps 
and bounds, starting in 1978.  The first of the Medium-Term Targets for development 
aid adopted that year aimed at doubling Japanese ODA within the next three years and 
subsequent targets followed the same line of thinking.98 These developments expanded 
Japan's involvement with international affairs not only economically and politically but 
also geographically. Although Asia remained the number one region for Japanese 
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financial contributions, by the 1980s Africa had emerged in the Japanese aid 
consciousness through improvements in both quality and quantity of foreign aid.99 
 
Economic considerations related to resource scarcity within Japan and the political 
realities still remaining in the final years of the Cold War had also directed Japanese aid 
behaviour. Still, in the circles of developed nations contributing to global development, 
namely the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Japan stood out in the way the 
country used its foreign aid. Characteristics of Japanese foreign aid before the 1990s 
consisted  of  a  high  proportion  of  loans  compared  to  grants,  the  share  of  grants  being  
around 40-50 % in the early 1980s, regional concentration on Asia and a focus on 
economic infrastructure rather than on the then contemporary aid trend of basic human 
needs.100 These characteristics were explained by the regional concentration as Asian 
countries were interested in building their infrastructure and Japan was looking for ways 
to improve both economic and political relations with its neighbours after a devastating 
war.101 
 
It was with the emergence of a global development agenda that Japan moved towards 
the African continent. Beginning in the 1970s, Japan came under pressure to become 
more involved with African affairs. This  pressure was related to the general criticism 
voiced against Japan's aid during the 1980s: issues such as tying of aid to Japanese 
economic interests,  the ratio of ODA compared to Gross National Product (GNP) and 
the regional imbalance as Asia received the bulk of Japanese aid compared to other 
regions.102  More importantly, the pressure to increase the grant element of Japan's ODA 
was connected to the global effort of satisfying basic human needs.103 Rather than 
focusing on improving economic output of aid receivers, this approach aimed at 
providing the people of the developing world basic services, such as education, health 
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and clean water through wealth redistribution. As such, this approach conflicted with 
Japan's own methods of promoting economic growth through infrastructure 
development. 
 
3.2.2 Finding a form 
 
During the Cold War, foreign aid had been subject to geopolitical strategic 
considerations. Aid was used quite unscrupulously to further ideological goals both 
within the Western and Soviet blocks. The dominant aid discourse during the 1980s, in 
line with the economic policies of Reagan and Thatcher, had been that of structural 
adjustment (SA). Structural adjustment conditioned aid receivers to processes of 
privatization and free market policies. Countries receiving aid were subject to World 
Bank (WB) and IMF policies that dictated how the country's economies should be 
reorganized according to neoliberal ideals. These included the liberalization of trade, 
devaluation  of  national  currency,  removal  of  subsidies  and  the  deregulation  of  prices  
and interest rates to name a few.104 As de Waal points out, this created a system where 
governments within the developing world had to answer to international funding 
agencies rather than their constituency.105 Budgets were drawn up based on fiscal 
responsibilities towards donors and lenders rather than on socio-economic realities 
within the respective countries.  
 
It  was within this kind of climate that Japan emerged as a major donor of foreign aid.  
By the end of the 1980s Japan had claimed the status of an economic giant and 
accordingly had begun to utilize its vast economic resources as a foreign policy tool in 
the form of foreign aid. The history of Japan's foreign aid dates back all the way to the 
1950s when Japan joined the Colombo Plan designed to promote social and economic 
development in the Asia-Pacific region. Since then the main focus of Japan's foreign aid 
contributions has been East Asia. The region has received approximately 60 % of 
Japan's bilateral aid donations annually. In the early years Japan's aid philosophy was 
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wrapped around the idea of furthering domestic exports but the geographic expansion of 
its aid program put the country under pressure to adapt to prevailing aid discourses. 
 
Japan entered the new aid regime after a sharp increase in its ODA budget. The energy 
crises of the early 1970s had prompted Japan to increase its foreign aid spending to 
ensure more stable resource flows from developing countries. At the 1978 G7 Bonn 
Summit Japan had pledged to double its ODA within three years by adopting its first 
Medium-Term Target in ODA.106 During the summit, special attention was given to the 
world’s poorer countries, namely the countries of Africa. It was expected that this 
would increase the overall share of aid distributed to the Least Developed Countries 
(LDC). In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa this had a profound effect on the amount of 
aid targeted to the region by Japan: by the beginning of 1990s the amount of aid 
directed to the region had grown almost five-fold from 200 million USD to nearly one 
billion USD.107 
 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union the WB and IMF led aid regime relying on 
privatization and liberalization seemed to have emerged victorious. At the same time 
however, impeded by the growing economic power of Japan, expectations for a more 
active role in international affairs had emerged both within the country as well as 
outside. Responding to these expectations, Japan, besides expanding its foreign aid 
programme, took on the task of formulating a distinct aid philosophy. One of the more 
visible results of this process was the 1992 ODA Charter that, for the first time, laid out 
rough guidelines for Japan's aid disbursements. But more significant had been the 
adoption of SA programmes within the WB – IMF aid discourse. All of these 
developments would be featured in the first of a series of conferences related to African 
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3.2.3 Conference diplomacy 
 
The first conference on African development (TICAD I) was a manifestation of a subtle 
process that had been going on in the background of Japanese foreign politics since the 
middle of the 1980s. Hosting an international conference related to development 
cooperation meant that Japan had a forum for articulating its own views on the matter. 
The 1980s had witnessed major changes in the field of development aid that had left 
Japan somewhat uneasy as to its  role as a major donor.  Hosting the conference was at  
once a culmination of Japan's involvement with the African continent until that point 
and at the same time the beginning of a redefinition in Japanese involvement in the 
development aid debate. Japan's entry on the stage of international development 
cooperation had come about more on the premises of an increasing aid budget reflecting 
the  size  of  the  country's  economy rather  than  through a  conscious  effort  to  promote  a  
distinct development agenda. Questions of 'aid leadership' had sprung up as the 
country's aid budget grew.108 
 
The immediate result of the conference, the Tokyo Declaration109, encompasses the 
ambiguous nature of Japan's aid philosophy in the African context: detachment guided 
by an Anglo-Saxon agenda and foreign political aspirations emanating from a leading 
position  within  the  East  Asian  sphere  of  influence.   The  first  can  be  seen  in  the  way  
Japan incorporates the debate on structural adjustment into its overall development 
policy while the latter brings forth the question of the 'East Asian Miracle'. These topics 
are found among the six priority areas included in the document: 1) political and 
economic reforms, 2) economic development through activities of the private sector, 3) 
regional cooperation and integration, 4) emergency relief and development, 5) Asian 
experience and African development and 6) international cooperation.110 Structural 
adjustment is discussed under the first while the 'Miracle' is touched upon in the fifth 
section. These two themes illuminate the way Japan was trying to manoeuvre within a 
world order that demanded conformity, in the form of adhering to the 'Washington 
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Consensus'111, while at the same time encouraged a more affirmative leadership role in 
line with the size of the country's economy and ODA disbursements.112 
 
The detachment of Japan is apparent already in the formation of the conference. 
Alongside Japan, the conference was co-organized by the UN and GCA. This 
multilateral approach was in line with Japan's foreign political experience with the 
continent. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, Japan's relations with Africa, excluding 
South Africa, had been almost non-existent before the turn of 1990s. As Japan's colonial 
reign  had  only  extended  to  its  immediate  neighbours,  it  didn't  have  the  same  kind  of  
incentive felt in Europe and the US for African development. One major exception to 
the rule was Japans trade relation with the apartheid regime of South Africa. 
 
The declaration espouses an agenda set forth by the leading actors in world 
development during the 1980s and 1990s.The beginning of the 1990s saw great changes 
in the world in ways unimaginable just a few years earlier. The collapse of the Soviet 
bloc meant that the U.S. led Western order had emerged victorious from the Cold War. 
The superiority of a market-driven ideology was thus established as a norm both within 
interstate  politics  and  in  the  field  of  development  cooperation.  Changes  of  this  
magnitude in international relations had their impact also within Japanese discourse on 
development aid and on the role of ODA as a tool of foreign policy.113 
 
Adherence to structural adjustment policies penetrates the declaration, even receiving a 
mention of their own under the heading 'Political and Economic Reforms'. What is 
interesting, though, is that the rigid nature of SA programmes is acknowledged in the 
document. The declaration suggests that more emphasis should be placed on the distinct 
nature of each country participating in SA programmes. This echoes the opinion held in 
Japan that development cannot be achieved through a one-size-fits-all solution. Another 
point of contest is the way SA programmes are dictated from the outside, thus 
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effectively removing recipient agency. Japan had promoted the idea of 'self-help' in its 
relations  with  aid  recipients  in  the  Asian  region.  Nonetheless,  a  clear  sign  of  Japan's  
involvement in SA was given by the Deputy Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata in his policy 
speech during the conference. According to him, countries accepting the necessary 
reforms would be applicable to non-project type grant assistance totalling in the region 
of 700 million USD.114 
 
3.2.4 Approaching development 
 
The significance of structural adjustment regime for Japan's aid to Africa has been 
demonstrated by Howard Stein. In his study on structural adjustment programmes in 
Sub-Saharan Africa Stein showed how Japan reacted to the emergence of a U.S. led aid 
regime on the continent. By analysing the statistical data on aid disbursements Stein 
concluded that, since its adoption, SA policy-based funding featured quite vividly in 
Japan's total aid spending during the latter half of the 1980s and early 1990s.115 The 
analysis revealed not only the emergence of SA policy based funding but also its effects 
on Japan's aid contributions to countries participating in structural adjustment. Rather 
than directing more aid to countries with closer economic ties to Japan, more emphasis 
was put on whether or not a country had accepted the SA mechanisms.  
 
The paradigm shift, from the basic human needs approach to the need for structural 
adjustment that occurred in mid-1980s, came about due to concerns over the ability of 
the governments of the developing world to pay the debts incurred during the previous 
decade. According to a WB report, developing countries found themselves in dire 
economic straits that had their origins in poor internal macroeconomic policies and 
external shocks. The first included overvalued exchange rates and increased spending, 
while the latter was embodied primarily in the 1970s energy crises that necessitated 
increased lending from financial institutions and other nations.116 The idea behind 
structural adjustment policies was to move away from centralized economies by 
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privatizing government owned companies and services while getting rid of price control 
mechanisms and letting a free market system to set in. 
 
The SAPs necessitated for the first time Japan to take a stand on development policy. 
The basic question was the role of the state in inducing or inhibiting development. 
According to the WB and the IMF, the role of the state should be minimal: guaranteeing 
a stable environment for private sector operators and ensuring the best possible 
conditions for investment both from domestic and international sources. Although Japan 
had gone along with the multinational financial institutions plans, by the early 1990s it 
had done so increasingly grudgingly. A study by Rie Taniguchi and Sarah Babb 
illustrates Japan's growing discontentment towards the  'Washington Consensus' and the 
country's efforts of promoting an alternate view on development.117  Among the  main  
points in Japan's opposition were the factors that had contributed to the so called 'East 
Asian Miracle'.  This miracle was in essence the ability of Japan, as well  as the newly 
industrializing countries of the region, to maintain high figures of growth while 
simultaneously providing basic social services on an increasing scale. 
 
Japan's take on the issue was that the government played a significant role in guiding 
the industrial growth and subsequent increase in living standards in the East Asian 
region. However, the 1993 East Asian Miracle Report, published by the World Bank 
did not arrive at the same conclusion. Although funded by the Japanese government and 
including contributions from high-ranking Japanese scholars, the overall findings were a 
let-down as they did not deviate from the neo-liberal agenda put forth by the financial 
institution.118 The key issue, according to Robert Wade, was the question of whether or 
not development aid in the form of direct-credit programmes to selected key industry 
sectors could engender positive results in the economies of developing countries.119 
 
Within this context the Declaration's promotion of a possible connection between East 
Asia's  success  and  Africa's  future  comes  to  life.  Timing  also  plays  an  important  role.  
The report had been published already in September of that year so the contents and the 
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view of the World Bank on the matter had been available to the organizers. The fact that 
the declaration takes up the question of an East Asian economic miracle is a testament 
to Japan's global aspirations for a strengthened role in the field of development aid.  
 
Japan being one of the co-organizers contrasts the segment with prevailing development 
prescriptions. Although not directly challenging the Anglo-Saxon model of free market 
idealism,  this  part  of  the  declaration  nonetheless  questions  the  validity  of  a  single  
transferable model, even going so far as casting doubt on whether or not Asia's 
experiences can be used as examples. Still, the fact remains that the inclusion of an 
'Asian experience' narrative within the document is an attempt at widening the scope of 
discussion. Conference proceedings and documents offer a way of  reaching consensus 
and bringing about new norms and policies.120 The first TICAD was a proving ground 
for Japan's aspirations for a more clearly defined international role. The country had to 
balance between the demands of dominant aid regime and a sense of purpose 
engendered  by  the  success  of  an  East  Asian  development  model,  whether  or  not  the  
premise for this had been proven. 
 
3.2.5 Something to prove 
 
At the time of the first conference, Japan was still in the process of defining its role in 
the overall context of international development co-operation. The beginning of a new 
decade had brought forth intensified criticism towards the way Japan operated within 
the international community. The most obvious example had been the Gulf crisis where 
Japan had been accused of 'checkbook diplomacy', meaning the use of economic 
resources rather than human and military capabilities. A sense of urgency for Japan's 
international role matching that of its economic prowess had appeared and this urgency 
found  willing  actors  within  the  development  aid  forum.  The  first  TICAD  came  about  
during a time of reconfiguration and readjustment of Japanese development policy. It 
was  at  once  a  testament  to  the  number  one  donor  status  that  Japan  had  gained  a  few  
years  earlier  and  an  attempt  by  the  country  to  display  what  it  had  to  offer  to  the  
international development cooperation community. 
                                               




3.3 TICAD II 
 
3.3.1 Refining aid 
 
The five years between the first and second TICAD witnessed a Japan that was starting 
to come to terms with a changed world order and its own role in it. Harsh lessons had 
been learned when the apartheid regime of South Africa was overturned, leaving Japan 
for a while in a confused state regarding the nature of the bilateral relation.121 The end 
of the Cold War meant a drastic reduction in gaiatsu, or foreign pressure, on Japanese 
foreign policy, as geopolitical considerations gave way to promotion of free market 
idealism and democracy movements.122 The confusion felt in Japan was in part due to 
unclear nature of the country's ODA, or more specifically, the lack of guiding 
principles. This was before the adoption of the first ODA Charter in 1992.  
 
The charter, adopted already before the first conference, laid out the basic philosophy 
for Japanese ODA (self-help efforts by developing countries), principles by which ODA 
should be distributed (sustainable development, monitoring trends in military spending 
of recipient countries, pro-democracy and free market systems) and priority areas of 
ODA (focus on Asia, ensuring basic human needs and supporting the building of 
infrastructure).123 However, the charter also laid out a path for the coming decade. 
Although, as the charter admits in the very first lines, the document had come about due 
to foreign pressure on clear aid policy guidelines, it nonetheless cemented the attitude of 
Japanese officials concerning the priorities, form and model foreign aid should take. 
Asian experience was tied intricately with the promotion of self-help, as this had been 
the recipe for success for Japan. 
 
Japan's redefinition of its aid policy did not end here. Coming in the wake of planned 
cuts in the ODA budget, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs set up a council on ODA 
reform in 1997 with the task of improving transparency and effectiveness of foreign aid. 
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More importantly, reform was needed as the field of foreign aid had exploded into a 
plethora of approaches: some insisting on environmental issues to be given centre stage 
while others emphasized the need for improved gender sensitivity.124 Among the 
findings were the definitions for Japanese involvement in African development. Since 
the realities in Africa, especially the Sub-Saharan region, consisted of a stagnated 
economy and high levels of absolute poverty, Japanese ODA would be needed and 
essential in helping the region's countries achieve development.125 
 
3.3.2 On precarious grounds 
 
The first conference had ended on an ambiguous note. Although international attention 
for the African dilemma had been achieved, the question remained what, if anything, 
would come next? The most tangible contribution for an intensified African recovery 
coming  out  of  the  conference,  on  the  Japanese  side,  was  the  promise  of  grant  aid  for  
potable water projects totalling from 250 to 300 million USD in the next three years.126 
The  non-pledging  nature  of  the  conference  cast  a  shadow of  doubt  on  whether  or  not  
any actual results would be forthcoming. This critique stemmed from the same 
frustration that had been prevalent since the 1970s: the unwillingness of major donors, 
including Japan, to reach the 0.7% target of aid when compared to GNP127. On average, 
the major donors had reached a level of 0.3%, with only a select few going as high as 
1%.128 Also, the fact that TICAD I didn't include actual projects mandated by the 
proceedings was taken as a sign that the international community wasn't serious about 
the issue of African development. This, according to Rasmusson, is a misinterpretation 
of the purpose of TICAD: the process should not be seen as a forum for additional aid 
pledges but rather as a venue for engaging African countries and their development 
partners.129 The concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' are key in unlocking the 
purpose of the process. 
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The second conference did however start to build up speed already in 1994, when Japan, 
together with the government of Indonesia, the UN Secretariat, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and GCA, organized the first Asia-Africa Forum 
(AAF) in Bandung, Indonesia. Held as a follow-up to TICAD I, the AAF continued on 
the path laid out in the Tokyo Declaration.130 These included the sharing of experiences 
by Asian development partners on issues ranging from structural adjustment to 
agriculture and economic infrastructure. The Bandung Framework for Asia-Africa 
Cooperation adopted at the forum mentions the pragmatic relationship between 
government and the private sector in Asia and urges the African participants to follow a 
similar path. This pragmatism in the Japanese case can be interpreted as a somewhat 
closer relationship between the public and private than free market ideologists would 
agree on. The second Asia-Africa Forum in Bangkok, Thailand, continued on these 
lines while at the same time putting emphasis on the importance of agricultural 
development.131 
 
3.3.3 Stepping up to the plate 
 
TICAD  II  was  organized  at  a  time  when  Japanese  prominence  on  the  field  of  
development cooperation was at its peak. The number one donor status the country had 
taken at the turn of the decade had only been strengthened during the first half of the 
1990s. The status reached its peak in 1995 when Japan's ODA disbursements totalled 
14.5 billion USD or ¼ of the global ODA.132 More importantly, Japan had shown that it 
was  willing  and  capable  to  assume  a  role  suited  for  that  position.  ODA  had  been  
recognized as a central pillar of Japanese foreign policy, made more important by the 
signs of 'aid fatigue' shown by other DAC countries.133 Japan had made a point of not 
only maintaining high levels of ODA disbursements but also having an active role in 
various international forums on development issues. Although Japan came under 
criticism in terms of aid quality, for example focusing on higher education rather than 
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on primary134, it gained praise for stepping up its international role, especially during 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997. But during this time Japan didn't rely solely on its 
vast  economic  resources.  The  country's  profile  as  a  foreign  aid  power  house  was  
confirmed on numerous occasions as it took charge of directing the course of 
development discourse, finally bringing them all together for the second conference. 
 
The outcome of the second conference, the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA)135, 
solidified Japan's take on development. Like its predecessor, the document is a 
testament to its time by declaring as the primary theme poverty reduction but with a 
Japanese twist. The shift towards an approach that would emphasize more than a 
restructuring of a recipient country's economy had begun already in the early 1990s. 
Development professionals and scholars had noted that the most vulnerable groups were 
left outside when deciding on a particular course of action.136 Pro-growth policies were 
supplemented by a more 'human centred approach' that took into consideration for 
example the state of a country's social sector. During the conference, under Japan's 
guidance, the participants agreed on an approach that could be labelled as 'poverty 
reduction through economic growth'. Japan's input can be seen in the way infrastructure 
was named as one priority area, in line with Japan's aid priorities laid out in the 
country's ODA Charter. 
 
Compared to the first conference, the end result had some meat over its bones. Not only 
did the document reaffirm the international community's resolve to the challenge of 
African development, but it took a clearer stance on what that challenge meant in 
concrete terms. What was remarkable about the document is how it formulated the 
complex questions of development into clearly defined goals. These goals were laid out 
in the Action plan of the declaration. Section 1, under the heading Social development 
and poverty reduction: promoting human development, included targets to be achieved 
by either 2005 or 2015 in education, health and gender issues. The targets widened the 
scope of poverty from the norm of per capita income to questions of livelihood, 
education and participation in mutual matters. 
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There is an obvious reason for this approach: a few years earlier Japan had been an 
active force in formulating the DAC report on how the global community should tackle 
development issues in the 21st century.  The  report,  Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation,137 which was also welcomed at the next G7 
meeting in Lyon,138 laid out for the first time concrete and measurable targets for 
different developmental issues such as hunger, poverty and education. These 
International Development Goals (IDGs) would later be adapted as the Millennium 
Development Goals.139 The DAC report had a profound impact on the development 
debate and Japan was acknowledged as a significant part of the overall proceedings. The 
forum for the debate could not have been more opportune for Japan. The DAC consists 
of all the major donors of foreign aid with the World Bank, IMF and UNDP taking an 
observatory role. Although not guiding the disbursement of foreign aid of its members 
directly, the DAC nonetheless operates as a discussion forum where aid policies come 
under a critical light. The mechanisms for this are the periodical peer reviews.140 More 
than the targets, Japan had emphasized the role of developing countries in engendering 
positive results, solidifying its own approach of 'ownership in the South, partnership 
globally'.141 
 
On the surface these two documents, the DAC report and TAA, read as if written using 
the same template. The goals for eradicating extreme poverty, improving access to 
education and health services, reducing the death rate of infants and children and 
ensuring environmental sustainability are almost word for word identical. This is not 
surprising as Japan had been very active in the DAC, suggesting the inclusion of 
specific goals into the report on a new development strategy.142 These goals were then 
easily brought into preparatory discussions on the next TICAD.143 A notable exception 
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is made by TAA in the role of ODA. While the DAC report made a reference to the UN 
target of 0.7% of GNP as a part of the responsibility of the donor community, the TAA 
only mentions “adequate levels of ODA” or how it is essential to “optimize the use of 
ODA resources that are available”.144 This is in line with the non-pledging nature of the 
conference, placing more emphasis on creating a more efficient environment for 
existing aid levels. 
 
The TAA however goes into more detail in how poverty reduction, the main agenda for 
the 21st century, should be pursued by African countries. Agriculture is named as a key 
sector in a number of fields: improving livelihoods, ensuring sustainable development 
and gender issues. By picking up agriculture, the participants acknowledged the realities 
of the continent and how improvements in one specific sector could act as a catalyst for 
other developments. At the same time, a focus on agriculture was a sign of Japan's 
approach to the continent. Efficiency could be brought about by improving the technical 
side of cultivation, focusing on new crops such as a new variety of rice and agriculture 
would be yet another field where African partners could benefit from Asian 
experiences. 
 
But what stands out the most from the TAA is the emphasis on private sector 
development and especially the role industry should play in Africa. Here Japan had 
most to offer, since the country had been basing its aid philosophy on promoting the 
improvement of economic performance and creating an export-oriented economy in the 
Asian region. Dialogue both within Africa between government and the private sector 
and inter-regionally based on the experience of NICs was named integral in creating a 
vision for African development. 
 
3.3.4 From forum to forum 
 
Japan's prominence on the field of development cooperation was noticeable between the 
first  two  conferences.  The  two  forums,  the  DAC  of  the  OECD  and  G7,  had  offered  
Japan an opportunity to show off its capabilities in directing the foreign aid debate. The 
                                               




African question was brought forth again in 1997 at the G8 Denver Summit where a 
partnership for African development was endorsed by the participants.145 The United 
Nations had also been a venue for Japanese initiatives: in 1995, the minister for foreign 
affairs, Yohei Kono, had addressed the 50th General  Assembly  with  the  objective  of  
urging the adoption of a 'new development strategy' where a “comprehensive approach” 
including ODA, trade and macro-economic policies would be complemented by an 
“individual approach” that would take into consideration the distinct characteristics of 
each developing country.146 The adoption of international development targets was also 
brought  forth  by  the  Japanese  representative  thus  heralding  the  eventual  rise  of  a  new 
aid regime in the beginning of the 21st century.  
 
This was a natural evolution of Japanese aid philosophy. Although the debate on the 
'East Asian Miracle' had ended on a stalemate, it had nonetheless helped mature Japan's 
agency among other major donors. The positive feedback from the first conference had 
encouraged Japanese officials to take the African issue into other forums where the 
country's position could be reiterated, thus creating an environment more susceptible for 
further policy suggestions. At the same time Japan could use these opportunities to hone 
its own national interest in the African context. Besides the often cited need to procure 
energy and mineral resources, the African continent had offered very little in the way of 
political or economic gains.147 The chance to appear as a leading proponent of African 
development, on the other hand, could prove to be a stepping stone in “globalising its 
[Japan's] foreign policy”.148 This meant complying to international practices in aid 
policy while at the same time asserting a distinct identity by reiterating the 'Asian 
miracle' narrative. 
 
The incorporation of the International Development Goals was not the only noteworthy 
item on the TAA. Tied to them were the twin concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' 
that  Japan  had  been  promoting  since  the  end  of  the  first  TICAD.  Again,  Japan  shows 
consistency by adhering to the guidelines found in the ODA Charter. In essence, 
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ownership means the active involvement of aid receiving countries and their attempts at 
achieving a 'take-off' through self-help measures. This basic philosophy has its roots in 
Japan's own history of managing to build a ruined nation into one of the most powerful 
economies in the world in only a few decades. In the TAA this philosophy is 
painstakingly made clear as every goal is accompanied by a division of labour between 
African countries and their donor partners in the conference. Thus for example, African 
countries are encouraged to establish time-bound strategies for assisting the most 
vulnerable while the development partners will actively monitor these poverty-reduction 
programmes under the heading '1.3 Other measures to assist the poor'. 
 
The detailed distinction between the responsibilities of African countries and their 
international partners reflects a shift in the global aid debate during the 1990s. 
Development cooperation had been a testing ground for donor driven solutions, mainly 
dictated by the international financial institutions.149 These solutions included the SAPs 
and other free market approaches that were aimed at integrating developing countries 
into a global economy. However, after two decades of implementing these processes the 
donor community had to come to terms with the negligible results. A pressing issue was 
the lack of agency on the recipient side, as having to accept foreign intervention in the 
form of economic assistance maintained a relation based on unequal terms. Tomohisa 
Hattori has shown that this inequality doesn't go away even when with the increase of 
grant  aid  on  the  expense  of  loans.150 What was needed was an approach that would 
allow the recipient to have more control over aid allocation and as a result would 
engender domestic solutions to pressing issues.151 
 
3.3.5 A waning champion  
 
Yet again, as was the case with TICAD I, the second conference can be seen as a 
culmination of a period in Japanese aid history. By seizing the opportunity of heralding 
African development in various international forums, Japan was able to promote itself 
as a conscientious and active member of the global aid community and therefore worthy 
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of its number one position in terms of aid distributed. The Tokyo Agenda for Action 
reiterated the same principles and course-of-action found in the DAC report for the 21st 
century, thus solidifying Japan's status as a major player in the foreign aid debate.152 
Japan's active involvement in the various international forums mentioned above helped 
give prestige to the same issues discussed by African countries themselves, as Japan 
emphasized at every turn the need for African ownership of the continent's 
development. This sentiment can be found in the way TAA refers to the 1995 Cairo 
Agenda for Action that had laid out a path for African development.153 
 
By championing the concepts of 'ownership' and 'partnership' Japan not only helped to 
formulate an international development strategy but it was also responding to domestic 
pressures brought about by fiscal restraints. The delegation of responsibility to recipient 
countries was at once a healthy adjustment towards empowerment and agency but it 
could also be seen as a sign of Japanese donor fatigue. Going from 'quantity to quality' 
was a nice way of rephrasing the cutbacks in foreign aid disbursements as 
improvements in quality had already been under way in the form of an ODA Charter. A 
new development strategy heralded by the Japanese government through its twin 
concepts laid down a foundation for a more reciprocal relationship between North and 
South.  This  relationship  would  find  its  way  into  the  emerging  aid  regime  of  the  new  
millennium embodied in the PRSPs and MDGs. 
 
 
3.4 TICAD III 
 
3.4.1 Domestic constraints and global revitalization 
 
Coming into the third conference of 2003, Japan had had to come to terms with a 
decade of stagnated domestic economic development. Throughout the 1990s, Japan had 
been able remain as the number one donor of ODA, although the absolute amount had 
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started to decline after 1995. Japan lost the number one position to the United States in 
2001.154 The fiscal structural reform enacted in 1997 had solidified the decline of the 
country's ODA budget coinciding with administrative reforms in the corresponding 
ministries.155 
 
Internationally, the global aid community had witnessed the emergence of a new aid 
regime, embodied in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Building on the 
work of the DAC, the international community had convened the Millennium Summit 
in 2000. The end result, the Millennium Declaration, reaffirmed the international 
community's commitment for development efforts and established the goals to be 
reached by 2015.156 The document also put the question of African development into 
limelight as the continent had not been able reproduce the positive results achieved in 
the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America. 
 
Alongside  the  MDGs,  the  international  aid  community  had  adopted  another  set  of  
policies designed to facilitate a more efficient and productive development cooperation 
process. Responding to a call for more equal and participatory approach, the 
international financial institutions had come up with the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) and the overall Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). While 
the former laid out the actions a participating country would have to take in order to 
achieve poverty reduction, the latter was a document in which a developing country 
defined the priorities and programmes needed to reach the goal through a domestic 
consultative process.157 The CDF thus incorporated the idea of 'ownership' in a very 
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3.4.2 The rocky road to TICAD III 
 
The third Asia-Africa Forum (AAF III) was convened in May of 2000 as a follow-up 
activity  to  TICAD  II.  Focusing  on  the  two  productive  sectors  found  in  the  TAA,  
agriculture and private sector, the forum produced the Kuala Lumpur New Millennium 
Statement  that  continued  on  similar  lines  as  the  previous  ones,  promoting  the  
incorporation of Asian experiences into African development practices.158 However, the 
ministerial-level meeting held in December of 2001 in Tokyo provided Japan a head 
start in paving the way for an international recognition of a development vision 
emanating from Africa.159 The African countries had agreed on a programme for the 
continent's future called the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and 
this document would soon start its tour on the international stage. At the meeting it was 
confirmed that for the TICAD to efficiently support NEPAD, the process should be 
strengthened. The participants also noted the importance of a continued process in the 
face of new challenges emanating from international terrorism. Thus one of the central 
pillars in TICAD, keeping African development as a priority in the international 
community, was agreed on.  
 
One of the most important diplomatic events in Japan-Africa relations occurred in 
January 2001, when the first incumbent Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshiro Mori, visited 
the continent. In a speech given at Midrand, South Africa, Mori reiterated Japan's 
commitment to the African cause and announced that TICAD III would be held in the 
future.160 The trip to Africa was as much about reaching out diplomatically beyond the 
Asian region as it was about reassuring Japan's development partners of the country's 
continued dedication for their cause in the face of domestic changes. 
 
These changes, as already mentioned, were due to the fact Japan had had to come to 
terms with its low-performing economy. In 2001 the US had reclaimed the top position 
as a donor of ODA, while Japan had continued the cuts in its own aid budget. A decade 
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of aid leadership had brought about 'aid fatigue', a condition most visible in the decline 
of aid disbursements. Adding insult to injury, during the period of stagnation, the aid 
fatigue had affected also the general public in Japan, turning their attitudes towards 
ODA relatively negative.161 Internationally the turn of the new millennium had brought 
about a new drive for development efforts that had materialized in expanding ODA 
budgets. Japan was thus cast into an unflattering light, compelling the country to seek 
out new ways of remaining in the ODA game.162 
 
In order to answer to both the international concerns and the change in domestic 
attitude, Japan turned to a solution that had proven its usefulness in the past. A focus on 
aid quality rather than quantity was seen as a way to reassert Japan's position. Within 
the donor community, this meant a re-examination of development priorities and 
philosophy. The ODA Charter, embodying these aspects of Japanese foreign policy, had 
come under scrutiny as well, as the world faced new challenges in the form of 
international terrorism. The fiscal restraints put on ODA had necessitated the relevant 
stakeholders to examine the way available resources could be used to maximum 
efficiency. The end result of this process was a revised ODA Charter adopted in 2003 
The charter announced the objective of Japan's ODA was to “contribute to the peace 
and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's 
own security and prosperity”.163 Japan could thus relate to the world a renewed 
commitment to the common cause.164 
 
3.4.3 Changes in the international development regime 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the period from 1980 until the first half of the 1990s can be 
described as an era of adjustment in the global foreign aid debate. The period was 
dominated by IMF and WB led policies requiring aid receiving countries to adhere to 
strict macroeconomic conditions. A change in policies started becoming apparent during 
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the second half of the decade, as even strict adherence to adjustment policies had not 
yielded expected results.165 
 
The adoption of the Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and especially its 
operative part, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), was on the one hand a 
reaction to poor performance under the 'structural adjustment' regime. At the same time, 
the 1990s had witnessed the emergence of a plethora of development paradigms. From 
human rights to disease control all the way to access to basic services, different 
stakeholders were promoting different approaches. Added to this, the increase in aid 
budgets and donors, governments in the South were struggling between donor demands 
and suggestions and their own claim to sovereignty.166 Dependence on aid did not 
alleviate the problem. 
 
With  the  adoption  of  the  PRSPs  an  effort  was  made  to  incorporate  those  stakeholders  
that had been left outside of previous paradigms and as a consequence had suffered 
more than mere deprivation. The concept of 'ownership' was thus expanded beyond the 
governmental institutions to include those stakeholders of development that had been 
denied participation, such as women.167 
 
Ownership was not only handed down from above but was complimented by fact that 
the countries of Africa had taken an initiative at the turn of the century. By first 
establishing  the  African  Union  (AU)  and  secondly  adopting  the  NEPAD  as  its  
development  arm,  African  countries  had  indicated  to  the  rest  of  the  world  that  the  
continent was willing, if not able, to carry its share of the load. The predecessor of AU, 
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), had been criticized as being inflexible and 
weak in the face of continuing human rights abuses and conflict since its inception in 
1963 and so a new body for a unified Africa, one that would rise to meet the challenges 
of the 21st century, was needed.  
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NEPAD was coined as a linkage that would facilitate international donor activity in the 
African context. As Africa had been pinpointed as one key area of the Millennium 
effort, there was a need for an African counterpart for integrating the practices of the 
donor community.168 The link was confirmed in the implementation declaration handed 
to  the  UN  in  2002  where  the  participants  of  NEPAD  promise  to  adhere  to  the  newly  
emerging practices of CDF and PRSPs.169 This constituted a return to the mainstream of 
contemporary development regime as poverty reduction through the mechanisms 
described above had become the norm.170 
 
3.4.4 A decade of processing 
 
Ten years of TICAD related activities and developments in the international arena had 
accumulated into recognition of a shared African agenda by donors and recipients alike. 
This sentiment was not without its challenges. Since the previous conference, the world 
had once again gone through a tumultuous period, much like in the early years of 
TICAD.  On  the  negative  side,  the  9/11  attacks  on  the  twin  towers  in  New  York  had  
made it painstakingly clear what rising inequality and persistent poverty could produce. 
Regional conflicts brought on by scarcity and deprivation could, in a global world, 
extend beyond national borders in the form of international terrorism.171 Development 
efforts thus incorporated within them the concept of security, as improving livelihood 
standards and increasing access to both services and decision making bodies were seen 
as diminishing the chance of conflict.  
 
On the other hand, the period between the second and third conferences had been a time 
of intensifying interest in African affairs, heralded to a large extent by Japanese 
initiative.  In  addition  to  extending  the  first  PM  visit  to  the  continent,  Japan  kept  the  
momentum going in a number of venues. In 2000 Japan started a practice in the G8 that 
has been maintained since. At the request of the hosting government, leaders from three 
African nations, South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria, were invited to attend the Okinawa 
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summit, thus extending the reach of the forum outside the economic giants.172 Carrying 
on the torch of Africa within the G8, Japan found its efforts bearing fruit when, in 2002 
the participants announced the adoption of the 'Africa Action Plan' at the Kananaskis 
summit. The plan included a strong commitment by the G8 for an African owned vision 
for development.173 Japan could thus claim a small victory in its pursuit towards a broad 
acceptance for the concept of 'ownership' by aid receiving countries. 
 
The G8 plan was more than complimented with the adoption of the Johannesburg 
Declaration Sustainable Development, coming from the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, held in South Africa 26th August-4th September the same year. The Plan 
of Implementation following the declaration affirmed the emergence of Africa as an 
assertive partner. The document also acknowledged the contribution of the TICAD 
process in engendering an environment for a global African agenda.174 Coming into the 
third conference, an international agenda for developmentalism had emerged, based on 
the common drive for poverty reduction. The twist for the new millennium was the 
emergence  of  active  participants  in  the  South.  The  challenge  for  TICAD III  was  thus  
how to incorporate these new frameworks into the existing process. 
 
The Tenth Anniversary Declaration175 of TICAD III  was a chance for the participants,  
and  especially  Japan  to  take  stock  of  the  past  decade.  What  had  started  as  a  single  
diplomatic event brought on by a shift in the geopolitical atmosphere had by the new 
millennium evolved into a process with regular post-conference proceedings and a 
distinct message. The legacy of the previous two conferences was transformed into a 
vehicle for a deeper cooperation as the parties involved acknowledged the unique nature 
of TICAD: that of not a series of conferences but an evolving process that aimed at 
increasing the ownership of African countries in their own development paths.176  
 
The overarching theme for the third conference was to respond to Africa's own efforts at 
integration into the global aid community. As the TICAD process had carried the torch 
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of  African  ownership,  it  was  only  natural  that  it  would  adopt  a  development  strategy  
originating  from  the  continent.  Coming  into  TICAD  III,  NEPAD  had  already  been  
circulated in other major international arenas where reception had been enthusiastic and 
positive. This tour was in part organized for raising awareness for an indigenous 
framework. Donor conditioned development had failed the continent so more space for 
policy guidelines thought of by recipients themselves was in call. Besides awareness, 
there was a calculated effort to exhort additional assistance as ownership without 
resources was not enough.177 
 
The tenth anniversary of the TICAD process offered an opportunity for Japan to solidify 
the conference process as a staple in the field of international summits. Building around 
the body of material that had been produced since the last conference, Japan situated 
itself,  as  the  host  of  the  process,  at  the  centre  of  the  emergent  African  agenda.178 The 
narrative was built around the central pillar of “awareness raising”, following a dramatic 
arch from crisis to resolution. According to the narrative, in 1993 Japan was compelled 
to act, as the rest of the world was walking by Africa. Five years later as the world 
trembled under the economic quake emanating from Asia, Japan once again stepped up 
and convened the second conference. All the while in the sidelines Japan continued to 
press for the acknowledgement of the core principles needed for a genuine push for 
development, those of the frequently mentioned 'ownership' and 'partnership'.179 The 
result, from the Japanese perspective, was quite impressive. By the third conference, a 
de facto African agenda had emerged, embodied on the African side by the adoption of 
NEPAD and the subsequent successful recognition tour it was taken on in the major 
international forums from the UN to the G8.180  
 
The twin concepts that had originated ten years previously, had found their way into not 
only declarations coming from the TICAD process but also other major international 
forums, the latest of which had been the G8 Summit in Evian in June of that year.181 
The consistency shown by Japan in bringing its views under public scrutiny had been 
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made possible in part by the way TICAD had been organized since the beginning. 
Although hosted by Japan, the conference had as its co-organizers the UN, GCA and the 
World Bank. This multilateral approach, while dividing some of the authority between 
the different parties, nonetheless enabled Japan to present its own ideas as more 
universal than it would have been able to do alone. But as the process was refined with 
each conference and the preparatory meetings between them, the nature of Japan's 
involvement began to grow in prestige. By drawing a parallel between Africa's past 
inability to determine its own faith and that of Asia's success on its own terms, Japan 
was able to validate its own activity within the development aid community. At the 
same time however, by emphasizing the 'Asian way' as a solution to Africa's problems, 
Japan inadvertently eroded African agency. By denying the existence of a universal 
development model, while at the same time insisting on the applicability of the Asian 
experience in the African context, Japan painted itself in an ideological corner.182 
 
Building on this development vision, Japan had taken an initiative in importing a new 
concept into the global aid debate. As mentioned in Chapter 3.1.3, the 1994 UNDP 
Human Development Report had first introduced 'human security' to the global aid 
community. The idea had been to expand not only on the definition of traditional 
security from military perspectives to an individuals capabilities and possibilities but 
also on what constituted development. Overconsumption of resources that the North had 
based its success on would not yield positive results if applied worldwide.183 As Japan's 
foreign policy had rested on the country's economic shoulders, it needed something else 
to carry the weight. Lessons learned from 'chequebook diplomacy' had been put to use 
in drafting and revising the country's ODA policy. Human security offered yet another 
chance for Japan to show its peers how it could assume ideological leadership.184 
 
Major diplomatic manoeuvrings had accompanied Japan's embracing of this new 
concept. Already in 1999 the UN Secretariat and the Japanese government had 
established the Trust Fund for Human Security (TFHS). Financed solely from Japan, the 
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TFHS soon became a vehicle for projects that MOFA had the last say in.185 The TFHS 
acted as a stepping stone for Japan into promoting the new concept on a global scale. 
After announcing the establishment of a commission on human security at the UN 
Millennium summit in 2000, Japan could claim to be on the forefront of the 
international development debate. Confirmation for this came in the aftermath of the 
release of the report on human security by a commission headed by Japan's Sadako 
Ogata and the Nobel laureate Amartya Sen in 2003. The concept was referred to, for 
example,  at  the  G8  Summit  in  Evian  of  that  year.186 Naturally, the concept found its 
way into the anniversary declaration. Junichiro Koizumi, the Prime Minister of Japan, in 
his keynote speech also referred to Japan's commitment of 'human security' in the 
African context.187 Emphasizing the devastation infectious diseases and conflict cause 
the people of Africa, Koizumi used the TICAD platform to announce a 1 billion USD 
grant assistance over the next five years, making a reference to a similar pledge made at 
TICAD II. 
 
3.4.5 New kids on the block 
 
Japan's interest in promoting the concept of 'human security' can be viewed as a 
response to the lack of recognition the country suffered with the MDGs. Japan had been 
a major contributor to the formation of IDGs, the predecessors of the millennium goals 
and had, since the first TICAD, eagerly promoted the attainment of these goals, both 
within and outside the process188. Although highly supportive of the development 
paradigm coming from the Millennium Declaration, there still remained some doubts in 
Japan to the extent poverty reduction could be achieved by focusing solely on increased 
aid commitments at the expense of growth promotion.189 This sentiment reflected the 
sense of loss felt in Japan over the fact that Japan's financial contributions have not been 
met with the appropriate level of recognition regarding ideological leadership.190 The 
ambivalent nature of 'human security' made the concept easy to introduce in various 
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forums but at the same time removed any concrete meaning from it.191 The concept was 
a pragmatic solution to pressing issues of Japanese aid agency. 
 
Even more significant than the stock-taking and incorporation of the concept of 'human 
security' during TICAD III was the recognition that the initiative had become a staple of 
the international development regime focused on Africa. Realizing this, it would be 
important to maintain the momentum and continue to develop relationships in a more 
institutionalized manner.192 In the emergent 'millennium agenda' the centrality of the 
African question had empowered Japan into pursuing a more active role in relation to 
the development debate. By tying the TICAD process intricately with its counterpart in 
Africa, NEPAD, Japan secured a confirmation for its efforts in the past ten years.  
 
After jump-starting the debate on African development, Japan began to pursue its own 
course  within  the  overall  framework,  while  it  gained  momentum.  But  the  new  
millennium brought with it not just a renewed interest in the world's poor that had had 
its origins in the new security regime that tied terrorist threats with their socio-economic 
origins.193 Development  actors  outside  the  privileged  club  of  the  DAC  began  their  
emergence on the international stage, China being the most prominent of them. For 
Japan this meant a serious challenge as not only did China begin to approach the 
African continent from a more equal position as it still remained a developing nation 
itself but also the form of China's aid closely resembled that of Japan's with similar 
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3.5 TICAD IV 
 
3.5.1 When opportunity knocks 
 
The institutionalization of the TICAD process during the previous conference had 
meant that the African partners and the international development community could rely 
on a future conference to be held sometime before the turn of the decade. However, 
despite the high spirits at the end of TICAD III there still remained a lingering doubt 
whether or not Japan would be able to host a fourth conference.195 These doubts were 
finally alleviated in 2005 when Koizumi announced on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the Asian-African Summit in 1955 that Japan would host TICAD IV in 
2008.196 
 
The timing of the fourth conference offered a unique opportunity for Japan. Japan was 
in  line  to  host  the  years  G8 Summit  in  Hokkaido.  These  two major  diplomatic  events  
were quickly linked together with the intention of bringing the results from TICAD to 
the attention of the major economic powers.197 Priority areas for the fourth conference 
had been drafted during preparatory meetings, as had been the case throughout the 
process. These included 1) boosting economic growth, 2) ensuring 'human security', 
including the achievement of MDGs and 3) addressing environmental issues and 
climate change.198 Thus,  the  fourth  TICAD  had  from  the  get-go  a  distinctly  Japanese  
agenda as both economic growth and 'human security' had been associated with Japan's 
approach to development in the past. 
 
These priorities had emerged first during the TICAD Asia-Africa Trade and Investment 
Conference (AATIC) held in Tokyo in November of 2004. AATIC had been convened 
in order to raise awareness on the potential of trade and investment between Asia and 
Africa and had been supported by both TICAD stakeholders and NEPAD. The 
conference produced a joint declaration that outlined  the way for Africa to reach 
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prosperity, that of pursuing poverty reduction through economic growth.199 Attaining 
and maintaining growth was even placed as a prerequisite of achieving the MDGs and it 
was recognized that the sentiment had been growing in popularity in different 
international forums. 
 
The period leading from TICAD III to the fourth conference had been marked with a 
definite increase internationally in interest towards Africa. This had offered Japan ample 
opportunities  to  promote  its  continuing  commitment  to  the  TICAD process.  The  2005 
Asian-African Summit held in Bandung had granted Japan the opportunity to once 
again identify itself as a major partner of African development. Prime Minister Koizumi 
used this opportunity to announce the doubling of ODA to Africa within three years as 
well as reiterating the need for allowing African states to determine themselves 
appropriate courses of action, in line with Japan's development philosophy.200 In 
addition, Koizumi referred to the fact that for Japan the year 2005 had been celebrated 
as the “Year of Africa” in which the TICAD process had been utilized for increased 
international cooperation for Africa. 
 
3.5.2 A year of hosting 
 
Africa had remained a high priority also on the G8 forum. The 2005 Summit in 
Gleneagles had prioritized the continent in its communiqué under the headline “A 
historic opportunity”. The same kind of positive sentiment would carry on into the next 
TICAD. The 2005 communiqué not only confirmed the central position held by the AU 
and NEPAD in fostering African ownership and their responsibility in ensuring good 
practices but also emphasized the centrality of private sector development and economic 
growth through investments in infrastructure as essential for reaching goals of poverty 
reduction.201 Supplementing the communiqué, the Africa Personal Representatives had 
produced a progress report on the 2002 Africa Action Plan adopted at the Kananaskis 
summit.  The  report  noted  the  strong  connection  between  TICAD  and  Africa's  own  
efforts manifested in NEPAD and the AU and its contribution in enhancing African 
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ownership and international partnership.202 Thus, both on the level of development 
paradigms as well as international relations Japan had been able to penetrate the 
development community. 
 
As the MDGs had become the central focus of development efforts after their launch in 
2000, it had become necessary for TICAD and Japan to situate themselves more 
profoundly within this framework. For this purpose, MOFA had requested an evaluation 
to be made of the process. The evaluation was carried out under the themes of 
“relevance of policy”, “effectiveness of results” and “appropriateness of processes”.203 
The main findings of the evaluation, carried out by third parties, was that Japan had 
been able, through the TICAD process, to situate itself within the global aid community 
in terms of adhering to MDG guidelines on policy level.204 The evaluation also urged 
Japan to put more effort into areas where it had an advantage when compared to other 
donors, such as infrastructure. The results were thus highly positive for Japan as they 
confirmed the validity of the TICAD process while encouraging the country to take a 
more affirmative stance. 
 
TICAD had also continued to make progress as a major partner of the African continent. 
At the Tenth Ordinary Session of the AU in January of 2008 in Addis Ababa, the AU 
assembly had made a decision to strengthen cooperation with the process in preparation 
for the fourth conference.205 The assembly acknowledged the role of Japan in “sustained 
efforts to promote peace and prosperity in Africa”.  
 
The agenda for TICAD IV had also accommodated the rise in global environmental 
consciousness that had occurred in the wake of the recognition of dangers posed by 
climate change. In the preparatory proceedings, a ministerial conference had been held 
in Nairobi, Kenya in March of 2007 that had focused on energy and sustainable 
development. In the Chair's Summary, the participants once again iterated the 
importance of 'ownership', this time emphasizing the diverse nature of African 
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countries.206 This emphasis can be seen as echoing the insistence for a case-by-case 
approach that would undermine the hegemony of Washington Consensus one-stop-shop 
solutions.  As  the  African  continent  is  among  the  most  vulnerable  regions  in  terms  of  
climate change, the question of tying environmentalism and sustainability with 
development was taken up by the conference. Japan's experience in building its 
economy while facing the environmental consequences stemming from uncontrolled 
industrialization was referred to as a platform for cooperation. 
 
As already mentioned, for Japan 2008 was a year for major diplomacy. Already in 
January, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Prime Minister had seized the 
opportunity and announced the Japan's plan to start a “Cool Earth” initiative, which 
would include a partnership mechanism in line with the country's development 
philosophy. The partnership would involve setting up a 10 billion USD fund for 
combating climate change in developing countries through green technology, energy 
efficiency and mitigation.207 It was a strong start for the year as the same themes would 
be carried over to May and June, TICAD and G8 Summit respectively.  
 
Coming into the fourth conference, Japan could feel secure about its prominent position 
in directing the aid debate. At the G8 Development Cooperation Minister's Meeting in 
April that year, the first that Japan had hosted, the agenda read like it was taken out of a 
Japanese foreign aid manifesto. The participants emphasized the importance of boosting 
economic growth to ensure the achievement of MDGs, reducing poverty and enabling 
self-reliance in developing countries. Human security was recognized as a key concept 
in defining the way global aid efforts should be coordinated in order to not only 
alleviate people's suffering but also to empower them to “fulfill their potential.”208 
 
3.5.3 Yokohama Declaration 
 
The participation numbers of TICAD IV were impressive. With 3000 participants, 
including representatives from 51 African states, 41 of which were state-level, 34 
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development partner countries and 77 international organizations plus others from the 
private sector and civil society, the conference could undeniably claim to have been a 
major platform for raising awareness on African development.209  
 
The  “Yokohama  Declaration:  Towards  A  Vibrant  Africa”  was  compiled  according  to  
the aforementioned priority areas of boosting economic growth, 'human security' and 
climate change.210 The positive developments on the African continent had contributed 
to the participants adopting the declaration with a forward-looking theme. This impetus 
was transcribed in the text. Although being mindful of the amount of challenges, the 
document remarked on numerous occasions the potential and untapped resources, 
natural and human, available in Africa.  
 
The declaration was a celebration of Japanese aid leadership. The document yet again 
commended the African countries on their continued pursuit of 'ownership' in their 
development  through  the  establishment  of  the  AU  and  its  programme  arm,  NEPAD.  
'Partnership' was tied not only to the dedication of the G8 powers and the international 
aid community but also to Japan's commitment through the TICAD process. Japan's 
exceptional position was even marked by the acknowledgement made in the 
introduction when the participants placed Japan at the “center” of promoting the twin 
concepts in the African development context.  
 
The priority areas of the declaration were expanded on familiar lines that adhered to 
qualifications found in Japanese aid philosophy. In the area of economic growth, the 
participants recognized the importance of both industrial development and infrastructure 
on a regional scale. These sectors, along with increased output from the agricultural 
sector, were deemed as necessary for sustained economic growth that the continent had 
been experiencing in the years before the fourth conference. Thus, the priority issues of 
a focus on poverty reduction through efforts in agricultural development and promotion 
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of sustainable growth found in Japan's revised ODA Charter from 2003 made their way 
into the proceedings of TICAD IV.211 
 
Human  security  was  once  again  a  topic  of  discussion.  The  declaration  and  the  action  
plan both approached this concept from the point of view of the MDGs. The declaration 
identified the millennium goals as “Economic and Social Dimension of “Human 
Security”. The Chair's Summary however handled the relation as parallel rather than 
intertwined, commenting on the correspondence of the targets and objectives set during 
the process with the MDGs.212 The persistence with which Japan had and continues to 
pursue the wider acceptance of 'human security' can be explained by the country's 
eagerness in representing itself as a viable candidate for aid leadership. The vague 
notion of promoting “freedom from want” as well as “freedom from fear”213, has been 
embraced by the Japanese with relative ease. The idea is not to limit the scope of the 
concept so that it means only one set of things but to rather use the concept 
pragmatically in implementing Japanese aid actions.214 These actions then would 
translate in the global aid community as a distinct Japanese approach. 
 
Accompanying the declaration, the participants also adopted the Yokohama Action 
Plan.215 In the plan Japan was once again placed at the “center” of the TICAD process 
and was commended on its dedication. The most significant aspect of the action plan, in 
regards  to  Japanese  credibility  and  standing  in  the  global  aid  community,  was  the  
confirmed  dedication  of  a  continuing  TICAD  process.  The  priority  areas  from  the  
declaration were outlined in terms of measures to be taken in the next five years. 
However, the actions to be taken remained quite ambiguous. For example, under the 
priority area of agriculture, in an effort to increase productivity, the action to be taken 
was for the TICAD process to seek alignment with NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). Concrete projects were thus replaced 
with a focus on expanding action a discursive level.  
 
                                               
211  MOFA 2003b. 
212  MOFA 2008c. 
213  CHS 2003 pp. 4. 
214  Edström 2008 pp. 258. 




Other measures in the same priority area emphasize the importance of technological 
solutions, such as developing new crop varieties and utilizing more efficient farming 
technologies. Japan's input is easily detected here as the country had been an ardent 
advocate of New Rice for Africa (NERICA), a variety of rice that combines the high 
yields of an Asian parent and the ability to survive in harsh conditions found in an 
African parent.216 NERICA was singled out among the actions, embodying not only a 
key to African prosperity, but also the Japanese aid philosophy of 'partnership' and 
improved South-South cooperation. 
 
Throughout  the  declaration  Japan  was  singled  out  as  a  significant  partner  in  various  
sectors. This prominence could be attributed to the announcements the Prime Minister 
had made of both doubling ODA to the African region by 2012, a feat it had announced 
and completed once over during the three previous years217, and increasing efforts for 
doubling direct investments from the Japanese private sector between 2008 and 2012. 
Japan went as far as allowing the ODA and investment pledges to make their way into 
the Yokohama Action Plan, thus exposing them to more concrete peer pressure in case 
of unfounded optimism. These signs of commitment to the African cause, including the 
Cool Earth Programme with its 10 billion USD fund for developing countries, should be 
considered as feats of strength from a country that had had to rely on economic prowess 
in diplomatic affairs. Although emphasizing at every turn that the TICAP process would 
not be a platform for additional aid pledges, Japan had utilized the conference platform 
on several occasions, either directly or indirectly, for its own announcements on 




The post-war success story of Japan in building its economy was highlighted in a joined 
symposium titled “TICAD IV International Symposium on “Economic Development in 
Africa and Asian Growth Experience”218, the results of which were brought to the main 
conference. Attended by such prominent figures as Donald Kaberuka, the president of 
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the  African  Development  Bank  (AfDB),  Meles  Zenawi,  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Joaquim Alberto Chissano, former President 
of the Republic of Mozambique, Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, the President of the United 
Republic  of  Tanzania  as  well  as  the  then  current  Chair  of  AU and headed  by  Sadako 
Ogata, the President of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the symposium 
held discussions on the state's role in maintaining sustained economic growth and as a 
result inducing development.  
 
After an opening address by the president, the symposium was opened by a video 
greeting  from  Joseph  E.  Stiglitz,  a  Nobel  laureate  in  economics  and  a  professor  at  
Columbia University. During his video message, professor Stiglitz regretted the fact that 
African  economies  had  not  heeded  the  lessons  to  be  learned  from  the  East  Asian  
experience in formulating their economic policies. Although admitting that the role of 
the state can also be harmful, professor Stiglitz also reminded the participants that the 
free market can cause disasters on a very different scale, as had started to become 
evident in the sub-prime crisis originating from the United States. 
 
From there the symposium heard the presentations of the aforementioned panel 
members. President Kikwete of Tanzania started by expressing a common view in 
Africa of Japan being dependable friend of the continent. He then continued by 
describing Tanzania's path in industrialization since its independence and how the state 
had influenced, or rather through ill-choices, had stifled growth. He concluded by 
reiterating the need for industry promotion in Africa along the lines of the Asian and 
Japanese experience.  
 
Prime Minister Zelawi used his turn to deride the prescription solution offered to the 
African continent in the last two decades, an unyielding free market ideology that had 
led to economic stagnation. Referring to professor Stiglitz, Zelawi criticized the 
'Washington Consensus' of ignoring the active role the state had had in promoting 
growth in East Asia and Japan. Being mindful of not stepping into the same hole of 
policy orthodoxy, Zelawi admitted that Asia as well as Africa consisted of a huge 




the role of the state, according to him, would nonetheless be essential in building 
infrastructure, a prerequisite of sustained economic growth. He concluded by expressing 
his desires for an expanded uptake on lessons from Asia. 
 
Former President of Mozambique, Mr. Albert Chissano focused in his speech on his 
country's experience in rebuilding a civil war torn nation. Emphasizing the need for an 
all-inclusive approach that incorporates not only the public and private sector but civil 
society and individuals as well, Chissano stresses the importance of partnership that 
goes beyond national borders. Putting the concept of partnership into context, Chissano 
mentions the construction of an aluminium smelter plant by the Mitsubishi Company as 
an example of North-South-South cooperation, as the initiative gathered together not 
just Japan and Mozambique but also neighbouring countries. 
 
The last presenter, president of the AfDB Donald Kaberuka summed up the preceding 
discussions by reiterating the important lessons to be learned from them. Firstly, the 
African development agenda should be constructed on a pro-growth basis. In order for 
growth to emerge, the state’s role would need to be more substantial than it previously 
had  been  for  the  state  is  the  only  body  that  has  the  resources  to  ensure  stability  and  
encourage the private sector to operate efficiently. Secondly, infrastructure is not only 
essential for large scale projects but also for individuals who want to take advantage of 
opportunities not available in their immediate surroundings. All of this is tied to the path 
of development, or as Mr. Kaberuka calls it “sequencing issue”. African development 
could be a success if it tried to follow the sequence of providing the agricultural sector 
all the support of the state and with that output, would follow a course of trading and 
strengthened institutions on a secure infrastructure basis. 
 
The results of the symposium, with its impressive list of participants, illustrate the way 
Japan was able to take advantage of this rare opportunity. Hosting two major 
conferences almost back to back enabled Japan to showcase rarely seen leadership 
skills. The tenacity with which Japan has continued to pursue the validity of its 'Asian 
miracle' narrative is a testament to the country's clear vision of its place within the 




presentation, the 1997 Asian financial crisis dealt a serious blow to the narrative.219 
Before the crisis, the economic success story of the East and South East Asian region 
had engendered a positive response from developing countries, especially on the 
African continent, regarding the kind of development path they should follow. Japan's 
involvement in the success story, through yen loans and focus on economic 
infrastructure, had imbued the country with a sense of purpose regarding the rest of the 
developing world.  
 
The TICAD-related Asia-Africa Forums were established for the purpose of creating a 
more enabling environment for the transfer of economic lessons emanating from 
Asia.220 Added to this, the country's own experience in rebuilding a devastated nation in 
the post-war era, the development vision of Japan had become fused with notions of a 
strong state managing the course of a country's development path. This sentiment 
resonated strongly with the members of the developing countries from African region, 
who had been seeking recognition for their own agency since the 1980s. During that 
time they had had to conform to outside pressure embodied in the structural adjustment 
programmes. This is contrasted with Japan's vision of a continent that could and should 
take charge of not only its development but also the economic policies needed for it. 
Japan's vision is also a refreshing change in the current climate of MDGs and poverty 
reduction narrative that utilizes imagery of absolute poverty from a region long seen as 
nothing but a drain on international resources.221 
 
The symposium was a chance for Japan to validate it's somewhat discredited approach 
to development. The promotion of the 'Asian miracle' narrative is an indication of how, 
within the multilateral framework of the TICAD, Japan has started to take more and 
more bold steps. The perfect example is the inclusion of a need for UN reform within 
the official conference items, an agenda Japan has pursued feverishly the past two 
decades.222 Under the heading “5.0 Consolidation of Peace and Good Governance” the 
Yokohama Declaration calls for reform at the UN, singling out the Security Council 
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among the main bodies. In this way Japan is trying to create a supportive environment 
for regime change through the medium of conference diplomacy. 
 
3.5.5 G8 and Beyond 
 
As  promised  by  Japan,  the  results  of  TICAD IV were  carried  over  to  the  G8 Summit  
held  in  Hokkaido,  July  of  that  year.  As  the  year  2008  had  been  dedicated  as  the  
midpoint for realising the MDGs, development and African issues would have been 
highly relevant topics for the Summit even without a TICAD. In the Chair's Summary, 
the participants highlighted the importance of a private sector-led economic growth in 
Africa, the dominant theme of the fourth conference.223 
 
The summit also held an outreach session focused solely on development and Africa.224 
The  leadership  of  Japan  was  evident  in  the  session  document  as  all  the  staples  of  
Japanese aid philosophy are present in it: pro-growth bias, mention of 'human security' 
and  calls  for  a  more  broad  partnership.  Issues  of  global  health  are  also  named  as  a  
priority  area.  Japan  had  been  a  key  player  in  the  establishment  of  the  Global  Fund to  
fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in 2002 as, at the 2000 G8 Kyushu-Okinawa 
Summit, the country had announced the Okinawa Infectious Disease Initiative through 
which Japan not only implemented health-related assistance but also raised awareness 
on the importance of disease control.225 The most striking feature of the outreach 
session was however the section on Africa. Taking the title from the Yokohama 
Declaration, the section basically reiterated the proceedings of TICAD IV. Japan was 
thus successful in integrating a process it had increasingly taken control of, into the 
proceedings of the world’s leading economies. 
 
Through the latest conference Japan was able to overcome some of the fatigue that had 
set on the domestic foreign aid field. Taking an active stance and promoting the African 
cause in multiple forums following the period from the third conference marked Japan's 
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attempts at diverting criticism from its declining aid budget. This focus on quality on 
the expense of quality has unfortunately distinguished Japan from the rest of the donors 
in the years following 9/11, breaking the narrative of Japanese exceptionalism.226 Part 
of this focus has been the formalization of TICAD with its ministerial meetings and 
conferences. As a part of the latest TICAD, the participants of the conference also set up 
a follow-up mechanism for the TICAD process. As fiscal constraints have remained in 
place, thus inhibiting Japan from assuming the economic leadership in aid for the 
foreseeable future, TICAD has been essential in acting as a bridge in linking Japan's aid 























                                               






The documents coming out the TICAD process reveal the evolution of Japanese foreign 
aid policy at the turn of the 21st century. By the first conference Japan had emerged as 
the top donor among the members of the DAC. At the same time however, the 
bewilderment caused by the international community's reaction to Japan's inaction 
during the Gulf War sent shock waves throughout the relevant ministries.227 The shock 
was compounded by criticism of Japan not following its financial contributions in ODA 
with appropriate development vision.228 Thus  the  first  conference  showcased  the  first  
attempts by the Japanese to define a distinct model. Timing ensured maximum 
exposure: the conference was held during a time when aid fatigue towards the African 
region was at an all-time low. 
 
At the turn of the millennium Japan had to come to terms with its declining ODA 
budget. Looking at the conference documents it becomes evident that Japan made every 
effort to offset the decrease in aid disbursements by maintaining a momentum in both 
the process itself as well as with the items on discussion during the individual 
conferences. Thus the process carries an overall theme throughout, emphasizing donor-
recipient cooperation and changes in development discourse are integrated into the 
proceedings. At the height of Japan's reign as the top donor, the country had a chance to 
influence the development community but failed to impart any recognisable features to 
the new paradigm of poverty reduction. The predecessor of the MDGs, the International 
Development Goals of the mid-90s, was that chance. Having missed that opportunity, 
though not because of lack of effort, Japan opted to promoting the concept of 'human 
security'. 
 
The Japanese view on development has come about due to part disillusionment, part the 
desire to step forth on the international stage as willing and responsible member. 
Around  this  view  Japan  has  attempted  to  create  a  narrative  where  the  country  has  
emphasized its special nature among the other donors of foreign aid. Not only is Japan 
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the sole non-Western donor but its post-war economic history has been a source of 
validity for its approach to development. The significance of offering the 'Asian model' 
to the developing countries of Africa was not as a solution for the problems plaguing the 
region. Rather it was the fact that it embodied a “voice of dissent” against the dominant 
discourse that undermined the agency of aid receiving countries.229 
 
The creation of a narrative has taken its impetus from the often mentioned 'Asian 
miracle'. As the lead goose of the flying geese of Asia, Japan has had to struggle with 
gaining international recognition for its narrative, especially within the powerful 
financial institutions. The TICAD process has been used as a medium for gaining 
international prestige, as other venues have proven resistant to Japanese persuasions. 
The multilateral nature of the conferences has diluted the Japanese approach to the 
extent that Japan has been able to exhort the participants to validate the narrative within 
the process. The best example of this is the symposium on African and Asian economic 
development from TICAD IV during which prominent figures expressed views highly 
complementary of the Japanese approach. 
 
The TICAD process has enabled Japan to manoeuvre within the developmentalist 
regime. As foreign political constraints have necessitated Japan to rely on foreign aid as 
a  central  pillar  of  foreign  policy,  the  country  has  come  face  to  face  with  conventions  
that frame the discourse on development. These include conforming to existing 
practices, such as a preference on grant aid. Japan has utilized the TICAD process for 
both integrating existing discourses within its own foreign aid policies and also for 
carving out a distinct agency. The first can be seen in the way Japan has reacted to 
changes in the development regime, such as the rise of MDGs as well as adjusting the 
TICAD approach itself.  After the first conference, Japan responded to criticism 
concerning the ambiguous nature of the Tokyo Declaration. The Tokyo Agenda for 
Action that was adopted five years later laid down more concrete measures for 
international cooperation towards Africa. The same happened with the latest conference 
that added a more institutionalized follow-up mechanism. 
 
                                               




As the TICAD process has evolved, it has become more and more a platform for 
promoting a Japanese agenda on development. This might reflect the declining 
importance of the process itself. Although participation in numbers has grown steadily, 
changes in the global economic and political climate have made it poignantly clear that 
a development forum that focuses solely on expanding dialogue without concrete 
measures, such as new financial flows, cannot justify its existence. At every turn Japan 
has emphasized the non-pledging nature of the TICAD process having all the while 
used the opportunity offered by high-level international forum to gain diplomatic points 
by announcing TICAD -related projects or ODA increases. This unpredictability gets 
lost in the overall continuum that emphasizes the twin concepts of 'ownership' and 
'partnership'. 
 
The concept of 'ownership' warrants some additional discussion. Donor conditionality 
had harmed the receivers of foreign aid during the adjustment period so a solution was 
sought in increasing agency on the receiving side. Ownership means not only increased 
say  but  the  concept  also  changes  the  nature  of  development  discourse  from  
interventionist to cooperative. In the Japanese context however, ownership is 
understood through the developmental state paradigm where a country's sole purpose is 
to promote development. The key is self-help and the medium for it is preference on 
loans. According to the reasoning, using loans to finance projects creates a virtuous 
cycle of economic growth and independence as having to pay back the loans requires 
more effort than receiving grant aid. This philosophy is distinctly Japanese as it draws 
from the country's experience in the post-war era. Sharing these mutual experiences of 
nation-building with developing countries has been met with some success but 
convincing other donors of the validity of Japan's approach to ownership is another 
story. At the same time however, the concept is used to remove some accountability 
from the Japanese side by insinuating that any failure in achieving development will be 
due to lack of effort by those receiving aid. Whether or not Japan has been successful in 
defining how 'ownership' is understood in the global aid community will be for 





The distance created by a multilateral approach has had its benefits and drawbacks for 
Japan.  The inclusion of different UN bodies and financial institutions has made the 
TICAD process part of the emergent developmental regime of the new millennium. The 
exact bodies involved in TICAD are worthy of noting. The fact that UNDP became one 
of the co-organizers of the process is significant in that the body's approach converges 
more  with  that  of  Japan's  on  key  issues  than  with  those  of  the  IMF  or  WB.  On  the  
debate on market versus state relevant UN bodies have questioned the free market 
policies as a viable solution for achieving development. However, Japan has had to 
sacrifice part of its prestige by going multilateral. By not taking on the African issue on 
its own Japan has raised doubts concerning the country's dedication and resolve.  
 
On the whole, the TICAD process has become yet another notch on Japan's belt in its 
bid  to  become a  member  of  the  United  Nations  Security  Council.  The  mention  of  the  
need for UN reform in the Yokohama Declaration has clear motives behind it. The 
African group in the UN consists of 54 member states and is the largest regional 
grouping. Japan is well aware of the voting potential found in the group, noting that 
“since the establishment of the African Union (AU), Africa increasingly tends to vote as 
a single bloc, which further adds to Africa’s influence.”230 
 
Unfortunately, Japan is not alone in recognizing the importance of a developing Africa. 
China has not only expanded its economic presence in the region but has also taken up 
holding similar high-level diplomatic forums since 2006. What is even more detrimental 
to the Japanese agenda is how China has followed its ever increasing financial 
contribution to the region with a political agenda that emphasizes commonality of goals 
and solidarity between the countries of the South. These common goals include the 
reform of the UNSC, a move that would certainly make any plans of Japan's inclusion 
void.231 Working from an intermediary level, as it doesn't belong to the G8, China is 
able to assert a sense of equality that is lacking in the donor-recipient relationship 
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between the rich North and poverty stricken South and this has been noted within 
Africa.232 
 
There is an opportunity for Japan to raise its profile in the coming years. The next 
TICAD is to be convened in 2013, according to schedule. The UN Millennium 
Development Goals that have been integrated into the process have their deadline in 
2015. While progress has been made practically everywhere, Africa and especially Sub-
Saharan Africa might not be able to reach the targets by 2015.233 Japan has seized the 
opportunity provided by two decades of focus on Africa. During the Third Ministerial 
Follow-Up  Meeting  of  TICAD  in  Dakar,  Senegal  in  May  of  2011,  Japan  was  able  to  
create a continuum for the upcoming MDG follow-up meeting in June of that year in 
Tokyo.234 But  if  the  fifth  conference  turns  out  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  gathering  of  
state officials and empty rhetoric, Japan might have to relinquish its precarious hold on 
African development to the same countries on whose development legacy Japan has 
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Tokyo Declaration 1993  
 
At the first Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD I), the 
entire gathering of over 1,000 participants from 48 African countries, 13 donor 
countries, international organizations, observer countries and other groups, including 
civil society organizations, adopted the Tokyo Declaration on African Development. 
 
The Declaration was the conference's expression of agreement on the search for 
dynamic international cooperation for development in Africa. 
  
The Tokyo Declaration, subtitled "Towards the 21st Century," states: 
  
We, the participants of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development 
(TICAD), consisting of African countries and Africa's development partners, declare 
with one voice our continued dedication to the development of Africa towards a new era 
of prosperity. We, therefore, solemnly adopt the present Declaration, in the firm belief 
that it will serve to strengthen an emerging new partnership for sustainable development 





1. Africa's economic and social crises of the 1980s highlighted the development 
challenges faced by this Continent. To address these challenges, many African countries 
have embarked on far-reaching political and economic reforms. We, the participants of 
TICAD, are encouraged by signs in recent years of both positive macro-economic 
performance  and  political  development  resulting  from  those  reforms.  In  so  doing,  we  
nevertheless recognize the continued fragility and vulnerability of Africa's political and 
economic structures and situations that inhibit the achievement of sustainable 
development. TICAD intends to give further impetus to these reforms, taking into 
account the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s 
(UN-NADAF). 
 
2.  With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  African  countries  and  the  international  community  
now have an opportunity to share a broader common understanding of the need for 
dynamic development cooperation. The development of the Continent has emerged as 
an imperative in our search for a better future. 
 
3. While special consideration should be given to obstacles confronting Africa, we are 
determined to strengthen our collective forward-looking efforts for the development of 
the Continent. This has been the spirit in which we have conducted our deliberations on 





4. These issues include the on-going process of simultaneous political and economic 
reforms, the necessity of increased private sector participation in domestic economic 
activity, the promotion of regional cooperation and integration, and the detrimental 
effects of humanitarian emergencies on Africa's socio-economic development. We 
recognize that the Asian experience of economic development and the catalytic role of 
international cooperation offer hope and provide a challenge for African economic 
transformation. 
 
Political and Economic Reforms  
 
5. Convinced of the advent of a new international era, we, the African participants, 
reaffirm our commitment to pursue and further strengthen political and economic 
reforms, in particular democratization, respect for human rights, good governance, 
human and social development, and economic diversification and liberalization. To 
achieve sustainable, broad-based economic growth, we, the participants of TICAD, 
believe that more open, accountable and participatory political systems are vital, 
including a stronger role for civil society. We recognize that political, economic and 
social reforms must be initiated and carried out by African countries themselves, based 
on their visions, values and individual socio-economic background. Africa's 
development partners should therefore support African initiatives in these areas.  
 
6. We, the participants of TICAD, recognize that simultaneous implementation of 
political  and  economic  reforms,  while  conducive  to  development,  may  often  entail  
painful transition processes. The interaction between political and economic reforms, 
which over time should be mutually reinforcing, is a complicated process which 
requires support to bring about progress. We, Africa's development partners, reaffirm 
our commitment to providing priority support to countries undertaking effective and 
efficient political and economic reforms. We, the participants of TICAD, also reaffirm 
our commitment to enhancing constructive dialogue to facilitate the reform processes. 
 
7. We, the African participants, reaffirm our commitment to improving the quality of 
governance, in particular, transparency and accountability in public administration. We 
recognize that criteria for public expenditure should aim at enhancing overall socio-
economic development and reducing non- productive expenditures. The building of 
human and institutional capacities for sustainable development is essential for all of 
these objectives. We commit ourselves to creating the enabling environment for 
training, retaining and effective utilization of human resources and improving 
institutional capacities. We, Africa's development partners, will enhance our support for 
African capacity building including improved technical assistance. 
 
8.  We,  the  participants  of  TICAD,  reaffirm  that  structural  adjustment  programmes  
should take more actively into consideration the specific conditions and requirements of 
individual countries. We reiterate that political and economic reforms should ultimately 
lead to the alleviation of poverty and enhanced welfare of the entire population. To that 
effect, structural adjustment programmes should contain, more than in the past, 
measures to improve the access of the poor, in particular, to income-earning 
opportunities and to effective social services, while seeking to shield them as far as 




investment in human capital through nutrition, health and education programmes, 
especially to improve the situation of women and children. Additionally, noting that the 
overall economic development in Africa has not kept pace with Africa's rapid 
population growth, we recognize the importance of sound population policies and call 
upon African Governments and the international community to address this issue within 
the socio- economic development process. 
 
Economic Development through Activities of the Private Sector  
 
9. The private sector is vital as an engine for sustainable development. 
 
We, the participants of TICAD, agree that though foreign aid has an impact on 
development, its role is only supplementary in magnitude and catalytic in nature. We 
recognize that a workable and practical cooperation between government and the 
private sector is a key factor for development. A climate of trust between these two 
actors should be encouraged and interaction promoted. We realize that political and 
economic stability is a pre-requisite to commitments for long-term investments. 
 
10. We, the African participants, are determined to continue policies which foster a 
greater role for the private sector and which encourage entrepreneurship. While stepping 
up deregulation measures, we will provide and maintain, in cooperation with our 
development partners, physical infrastructure and viable administrative, legal and 
financial institutions.  
 
We consider in general the informal sector as a source of vitality for African economies 
which deserves support in order to further mobilize entrepreneurial capacity, generate 
employment, and to facilitate the transition into the formal economy.  
 
11. We, the participants of TICAD, are convinced that further improvements in 
financial systems and practices are needed to stimulate domestic savings investment, 
and to prevent and reverse capital flight. 
 
12. In support of these efforts, we, Africa's development partners, shall continue to 
provide assistance in order to improve the enabling environment which requires 
economic reforms and privatization, the building of human and institutional capacities, 
and the development of financial intermediation. We recognize the importance of 
appropriate insurance and guarantee schemes to protect private enterprises investing in 
Africa from political and economic risks.  
 
13. We, the African participants, affirm the central importance of international trade to 
our future development prospect. We, Africa's development partners, will work to 
facilitate market access for African products globally and to assist in upgrading and 
diversifying African exports. We, the participants of TICAD, support the vital role of 
private associations such as the African Business Round-Table and confirm the 
usefulness of investment and trade-promotion initiatives within Africa and between 
Africa and the rest of the world. 
 





14. We, the African participants, reaffirm our vision and aspiration for ultimate regional 
integration and cooperation goals as embodied in the Abuja Treaty establishing the 
African Economic Community. We, the participants of TICAD, realize that although 
these goals have been, since the early years of independence, a logical development 
strategy for African countries, most of which have small national markets, greater 
efforts must now be made in promoting inter-regional trade and investment. 
 
15. We, the African participants, will ensure that our commitments to regional schemes 
are fully incorporated in our national development plans, policies and programmes. 
 
16. We, Africa's development partners, welcome and support the renewed commitment 
to regional cooperation and integration as has been recently demonstrated by African 
countries. These regional arrangements should continue to be consistent with the 
multilateral open trading system, and contribute to trade expansion. We will continue to 
extend our support to African countries' efforts aimed at reducing obstacles to 
integration through measures such as reduction of trade and investment barriers and 
policy harmonization, and to viable regional endeavours particularly in the area of 
infrastructure development and capacity building. We, the participants of TICAD, 
believe that regional integration should also be pursued by encouraging private sector 
initiatives, adopting consistent and gradual approaches for broadening exchanges and 
rationalizing existing schemes. 
 
Emergency Relief and Development  
 
17.  We,  the  participants  of  TICAD,  note  with  great  concern  that  over  the  last  two  
decades, and particularly in recent years, that a large number of African countries have 
suffered and are still suffering from natural and man-made disasters. The international 
community has responded generously to these situations since the early crises in the 
1970s. 
 
18. These disasters have constrained development in many African countries, destroyed 
the very basis for development, increased the number of refugees, and diverted human 
and financial resources that otherwise could have served development purposes. 
 
19. We, the participants of TICAD, realize that man-made disasters are the result of a 
complex interplay of political, economic and social factors. In this context, lack of 
democratization and respect for human rights and the rights of minorities are among the 
root causes of these disasters.  
 
20. We, the participants of TICAD, accept that responsibility for disaster prevention and 
management rests primarily with Africans themselves. We, the African participants, are 
therefore determined to devote our efforts to addressing the root causes of these 
disasters.  We also confirm the critical  role of regional cooperation as demonstrated in 
the past. We, the participants of TICAD, underscore the need to establish effective 
mechanisms for prevention, preparedness and management of man-made and natural 
disasters  in  general,  and  to  strengthen  food  security  schemes  in  particular.  We,  




Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and pledge our 
support to strengthen the effective functioning of this mechanism. 
 
We also reaffirm our willingness to assist victims of disasters, and urge the removal of 
all hindrances to effective distribution of relief supplies. 
  
21. We, Africa's development partners, having recognized that there is a continuum 
between emergency relief and development, will ensure that the humanitarian assistance 
for the affected communities continue to be provided for resettlement, rehabilitation and 
reconstruction. 
 
Asian Experience and African Development 
 
22.  Over the past  30 years,  in contrast  to Africa,  the countries of East  and South-East 
Asia have achieved high rates of growth in per capita income. We, the participants of 
TICAD, are mindful that in view of the differing international and internal conditions 
no one model of development can be simply transferred from one region to another. 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge some relevance of the Asian experience for African 
development. The very diversity of successful Asian countries gives hope that lessons 
can be drawn for African development. 
 
23. We, the participants of TICAD, have noted that as demonstrated by the successful 
examples of the Asian development experience, the backdrop of development success 
lies in the combination of a strong commitment by the leadership and the people to 
economic prosperity, appropriate long-term development strategies and functional 
government administration to pursue these strategies coherently. 
 
24. We have also noted that the policy factors which contributed to the remarkable 
performance of East and South-East Asia have included 
(1) the rational application of macro-economic policies and maintenance of political 
stability, (2) the promotion of agricultural production through technological research 
and innovations as solid basis for socio-economic development,  
(3) long-term investment in education and human resource development as priority of 
development strategy,  
(4) market-friendly and export-led policies to advance and adapt modes of production in 
order to increase opportunities for trade and economic growth,  
(5) measures to stimulate domestic savings and capital formation by developing 
financial intermediation and by expansion of banking services at the community level,  
(6) policy emphasis on the private sector as an engine of growth and development, and  
(7) early implementation of land reform. 
 
25. We, the participants of TICAD, recognize that development achievement in East 
and South-East Asia have enhanced opportunities for South-South cooperation with 
Africa. We welcome the interest shown by some Asian and African countries in 







26. We, the participants of TICAD, have concluded that the current situation in Africa 
calls for increased solidarity among us to act in full partnership to address this situation. 
This new partnership should be based on Africa's objective to achieve self-reliance on 
the one hand and responsive support by Africa's development partners on the other. 
 
27. We, the participants of TICAD, agree that stability and security are pre-requisites to 
sustainable development, and that it is essential to make efficient use of scarce resources 
and to minimize military and other unproductive expenditures. 
 
28. We, the participants of TICAD, realize that development calls for full participation 
by the people at all levels, who should be galvanized toward action as agents for 
progress. In this regard, we acknowledge the dynamic and diversified role of African 
women in various sectors of the economy and recommend that special measures be 
taken to promote their rights and roles in order to enhance gender equity and to remove 
all legal, social and cultural barriers for advancement of women. Furthermore, we 
recognize the need to enhance cooperative efforts with local NGOs and other 
institutions of civil society which play constructive roles for African development. 
  
29. We, Africa's development partners, will make all efforts to enhance development 
assistance to Africa, despite current global economic difficulties. This assistance will be 
increasingly oriented toward the priorities set by African countries. In making 
commitments  to  continued  and  enhanced  cooperation,  we  will  take  into  account  the  
expectation of our constituencies that resources be spent where they are most efficiently 
utilized for the greatest development impact. 
 
30.  As  African  countries  are  at  various  stages  of  development,  and  have  different  
cultural and historical backgrounds, we, Africa's development partners, may take 
differentiated approaches as we plan and implement our development cooperation, with 
due regard to aid coordination. 
 
31. We, Africa's development partners, will apply a comprehensive approach covering 
aid, trade, debt strategy and investments. We, the participants of TICAD, reaffirm that 
debt and debt service still pose serious difficulties to many African countries. We 
emphasize the necessity to urgently address the debt issue within the overall context of 
debt relief and flows of new financial resources for development. We confirm the 
validity of the international debt strategy and invite the Paris Club to continue reviewing 
the question of debt relief for the poorest highly-indebted countries, especially with 
regard to earlier reductions in the stock of debt on a case by case basis. We urge creditor 
countries to take into account the difficulties that heavily indebted African countries are 
now facing. 
 
32. We, the participants of TICAD, reiterate the importance of a successful conclusion 
to the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and will make all efforts to remove trade 
barriers and other trade practices that prevent the expansion of African exports 
including exports to other African countries. We underscore the importance of primary 
commodities for many African countries' export earning and the need for diversification 





33. We, the participants of TICAD, confirm that United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) agreements should be steadfastly 
implemented with a special emphasis on balanced relationships among agriculture, 
population and environment policies, particularly drought and desertification. 
 
34. We also recognize that many of the gains made in Africa are threatened by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic and related diseases which are already of a disastrous proportion 
in some countries. There is a need for a much stronger response by Africa and its 
development partners, for preventing and controlling these diseases including caring 




35. We, the participants of TICAD, pledge to take, in our respective spheres of 
responsibility, measures aimed at advancing the spirit of this Declaration through 
effective  policies  and  actions.  We  have  entrusted  the  three  co-  organizers  of  TICAD  
with evaluating and reviewing progress made towards the implementation of this 
Declaration. Ultimately, we intend to hold a conference of a similar magnitude and 
membership at the latest before the turn of the century. 
 
By virtue of the deliberations, guidance and consensus of the conference we believe that 
prospects for significant development of Africa have been greatly enhanced. 
 
Tokyo, Japan 
























Tokyo Agenda for Action 1998  
I. Introduction  
1. Africa is undergoing a profound transformation. Since the first Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD-I) in 1993, a number of countries have 
emerged as open and democratic nations, which are beginning to achieve significant 
economic growth. Sound political and economic reforms that promote democratic 
principles and facilitate market-driven economic activity have encouraged this 
resurgence.  
2. Nevertheless, widespread poverty and inadequate policies stunt individual potential 
in a sizeable number of countries. In most cases, the poorest segment of the population 
has yet to benefit from overall economic growth. Poverty and inequality contribute to 
political instability. Violent conflicts ravage the lives of many, and the foundations for 
durable peace and security remain fragile. Conflicts have to be settled by peaceful 
means using existing mechanisms of conflict management provided by the United 
Nations system, the OAU, and African sub-regional organizations.  
3. We are therefore determined to build on the progress made since TICAD-I, and 
renew the resolve to meet the remaining challenges in African development. To this 
end,  we,  the  participants  of  TICAD-II,  have  gathered  here  in  Tokyo  to  adopt  this  
Agenda for Action. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the actions identified here, 
which will be followed up by African countries with support and assistance from their 
development partners in the spirit of true partnership, building on the ownership and 
priorities of African countries themselves.  
II. Primary theme and underlying principles  
1. Primary theme: Poverty reduction and integration into the global economy  
4. The primary theme of this Agenda for Action for African development is poverty 
reduction through accelerated economic growth and sustainable development, and 
effective integration of African economies into the global economy. The challenges of 
poverty reduction, with a goal of reducing the proportion of the population living in 
extreme poverty by at least one-half by the year 2015, underscore the importance of 
economic growth that is equitable, with all segments of the population participating in 
economic activities and sharing in the benefits. Political and social stability, as well as 
good governance, is essential for sustainable development. Equally without 
development, peace and stability are not durable.  
5. Poverty reduction requires a multi-sectoral perspective and should be integrated as an 
objective into all development efforts. It is estimated that the real GDP of African 
countries would need to grow significantly more than 5 per cent annually for 
meaningful poverty reduction. Poverty-reducing economic growth requires sound 
macro-economic policies for financial stability, increased national savings and resource 
mobilization for productive investment and employment generation to rationalise public 
expenditures, particularly reducing non-productive activities and concentrating on 
priority areas, such as infrastructure and social sectors. Improving income distribution, 




development of micro, small, and medium enterprises, revitalise the rural economy, 
increase the level and quality of government spending on social services, and provide 
safety net programmes to protect those in extreme poverty. Lessons can also be drawn 
from the relevant experience of Asian development, especially its focus on human 
development and institutional capacity building.  
6. In 1996, Africa’s share of total world trade was less than 2 percent and its share of 
total foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing countries only 2 percent. Both need 
to be increased substantially to sustain high rates of growth and facilitate the integration 
of African economies into the global economy. Promoting trade reform and increasing 
the inflow of private capital will require African countries to create enabling conditions, 
including critical infrastructure, legal instruments, and enhanced human capital.  
7. Africa’s development partners are encouraged to support the development efforts of 
African countries inter alia by providing adequate levels of ODA, promoting (FDI) 
foreign direct investment flow to Africa, opening markets to African exports, seeking 
lasting solutions to Africa’s external debt burden, and facilitating the transfer of 
technology.  
2. Underlying principles  
8. Ownership and partnership are the underlying principles of the Agenda for Action. 
These principles are embodied in the Cairo Agenda for Action for the economic and 
social development of Africa. They have also been endorsed in the 1996 strategy of the 
Development Assistance Committee of the OECD for "Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Cooperation." TICAD-II provides, therefore, an 
opportunity to reflect on the implementation in Africa of this strategy, concentrating 
efforts on achieving specific and measurable goals based on African priorities, as 
endorsed in various international fora.  
(i) Ownership  
9. The 1995 Cairo Agenda for Action defines the economic and social development 
priorities for Africa as determined by Africa itself, and the TICAD-II initiative is in 
supports of these priorities. Ownership is derived when development priorities, as set by 
Africa, are pursued. This ownership should be based on a continuous dialogue between 
government, the private sector and civil society.  
(ii) Global partnership  
10. African development should be pursued on the principle of global partnership that 
creates a common framework for cooperation among all development actors, which 
include African governments, private sector, civil society, and Africa’s development 
partners comprising donor countries, and regional and international organizations. In the 
spirit of true partnership and mutual commitment, African leadership should guide these 
concerted development efforts.  
III. Approaches and cross-cutting themes  
1. Approaches  
(i) Strengthening coordination  
11. Strengthening coordination among external partners is essential to improve the 




that are available. Enhanced coordination between external and national partners and 
among all actors of society is also vital for reinforcing ownership and partnership. First, 
improved coordination supports coherent national development strategies that establish 
clear objectives and targets. Second, strong coordination among external and national 
partners throughout the process of programme and project planning and implementation 
would help eliminate duplication among donors and reduce the strain on the scarce 
human resources of African countries. Third, existing approaches and mechanisms for 
coordination at the field-level, including the sector investment programmes, 
Consultative Group meetings, and Round Tables, need to be refined. For African 
countries to exercise leadership in coordinating external assistance, it is essential to 
strengthen African capacity to lead the coordination process.  
(ii) Regional cooperation and integration 
12. Since the adoption in 1980 of the Lagos Plan of Action, African countries have 
emphasized regional cooperation and integration as important tools for pursuing their 
development. In an increasingly integrated world, sub-regional and regional groupings 
provide higher visibility to global investors, promote cross-border trade and investment, 
and reduce production and marketing costs. African countries and their development 
partners recognise the importance of regional cooperation for liberalising trade 
arrangements, developing regional physical infrastructure and institutions, including 
regional capital markets and research institutes, tackling common environmental issues, 
controlling infectious diseases, and preventing, managing, and resolving conflict. 
External support is essential to build and strengthen regional institutions’ capacity and 
further implementation of programmes of African sub-regional economic groupings.  
(iii) South-South cooperation  
13. In recent years, South-South cooperation, especially since the Asia-Africa fora in 
Bandung in 1994 and Bangkok in 1997, has demonstrated great potential through the 
sharing of Asian experiences by African countries. Since 1993, trade and investment 
between the two regions rose, and, resulting in increased trade and investment flows 
between the two regions, and growing institutional networking among research and 
training institutions, and chambers of commerce has been growing. The potential 
benefits to Africa of Asian-African and intra-African cooperation could be captured 
further by strengthening its African capacity to learn and apply lessons from other 
regions’ development experiences and by establishing effective mechanisms that 
promote South-South cooperation in various forms. In addition, triangular cooperation 
involving developed countries and international organizations can facilitate the 
expansion of South-South cooperation.  
2. Cross-cutting themes  
(i) Capacity building  
14. To reinforce African countries’ ownership of their development strategies, they 
must strengthen their capacity for the analysis, planning, implementation, management, 
and monitoring of development policies and programmes. This capacity must be 
widespread, residing in individuals, organizations, and institutions. To give this critical 
link new impetus, African countries have recently completed a proposal for a global 




capacity is to establish an effective cooperation mechanism among research and training 
institutions in Africa, Asia, and donor countries, as well as international organizations.  
(ii) Gender mainstreaming  
15. Women play significant roles in all spheres of economic and social life, and make 
vital contributions to household welfare. Yet, they suffer from lack of access to 
productive assets and essential social services. Therefore, mainstreaming gender 
perspectives in all development policies and programmes is critical for empowering 
women to fully and equally participate in economic and social activities and to better 
combat poverty. Promoting gender equality, which is an important element of 
democracy, and advancing women’s economic and social status would also increase 
economic efficiency.  
(iii) Environmental management  
16. Environmental management is essential for sustainable development, as high 
population growth continues to place a heavy burden on Africa’s natural resource base. 
Poverty reduction strategies should take into account that as the poor struggle for 
survival, they tend to rely increasingly on fragile natural resources. Therefore, policies, 
plans and decision-making processes for African development should reflect pressing 
environmental issues, including desertification, land degradation, water management, 
deforestation, biodiversity, and natural disaster prevention and mitigation.  
IV. Action plan  
1. Social development and poverty reduction: promoting human development  
17. Sustainable human development is the ultimate objective of all development. Social 
development, in turn, helps create enhanced capacity of the poor to participate 
productively in economic and social activities and improve income distribution. Poverty 
is  widespread  in  Africa,  with  the  majority  of  the  poor  living  in  rural  areas.  It  is  
estimated that women account for about two-thirds of the African poor, and the 
feminization of poverty is an issue that requires special attention. The experience of 
poverty reduction in East Asia demonstrates that rapid economic growth with equitable 
income distribution over a sustained period of time can help lift the poor above the 
poverty line. With regard to social development, sub-sector targets should be set and 
resources allocated for the priority areas of education, health and population, and special 
measures for the poor.  
1.1 Education  
18. Education is central to human capacity building, which was the key to accelerated 
growth and sustained poverty reduction in East Asian economies. Enhanced human 
capital is critical for African countries that aim to effectively participate in an 
increasingly integrated and knowledge-based world economy. The educational 
challenge is immense. Some African countries enrol fewer than one half of their 
children in school. And more than one-half of African women are illiterate. Constraints 
on public resources, inefficient utilization of existing resources, and persistent high 
population growth make drastic improvements in education difficult to achieve. 
Breaking the vicious development cycle triggered by a weak human capital base 




in the way education is financed and managed, and in the priorities, scale and speed of 
implementation of education programmes.  
19. Since educational attainment varies greatly in African countries, they should be 
considered in the following three categories, with different priority actions for each. In 
post-conflict countries, actions should focus on rapid resumption of education and 
rehabilitation of educational facilities. Countries facing low enrolments and low literacy 
should accelerate participation. Thirdly, countries that have achieved a more developed 
education system need to sustain education reforms and promote qualitative and 
quantitative expansion and institutional development.  
(a) Goals and objectives  
• by 2005, ensure that at least 80 percent of children complete primary education, with 
universal primary education by 2015;  
• by 2005, reduce adult illiteracy to half of the 1990 level, emphasizing improvements 
in female literacy;  
• eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005;  
• improve the quality of education, and strengthen linkages between education and 
employment;  
• enhance national and regional capacities in the area of science and technology.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. increase the share of total resources allocated to education, allocate a higher 
percentage of education expenditures to basic education programmes, broaden the 
resource base by mobilizing resources from communities and the non-governmental 
sources, including the private sector, and ensure efficient and effective utilization of 
resources;  
ii. enhance adult education and skill development programmes targeting women and the 
poorest segment of the population, including literacy programmes in local languages;  
iii. improve the quality and relevance of education by strengthening teachers’ training, 
providing improved school curriculum and teaching materials, and building necessary 
facilities;  
iv. promote technical and vocational training aimed at improving labor productivity and 
increasing the opportunity for employment;  
v. develop non-conventional methods, such as distance education and community 
management of schools, and establish better partnership with NGOs, to improve 
educational access in under-reached areas.  
Development partners will:  
i. provide financial and technical assistance to support African countries’ education 
priorities in the context of African governments’ sector-wide education programmes, 
particularly for basic education;  
ii. support national, regional, and sub-regional activities to introduce information 




iii. assist in developing national and local capacities for education policy analysis and 
programme implementation;  
iv. support multi-country collaborative programmes that facilitate sharing of 
experiences.  
1.2 Health and population  
20. In the African context of high population growth rates and pervasive poverty, health 
services and facilities in most countries are not only inadequate and in a state of decline, 
but they also tend to be biased towards urban centers and curative, rather than 
preventive care. Africa’s maternal and infant mortality, fertility, unmet family planning 
needs are the highest in the world, and its contraceptive prevalence rates the lowest. 
Improvements in human development and poverty reduction will require improved 
access by the poor to basic health and reproductive services, improved local health 
services that can reduce the burden of diseases, advances in the status of women, and 
involving men in reproductive health and population programmes.  
21. The burden of disease is enormous, especially infectious and parasitic diseases such 
as malaria, tuberculosis, polio, and HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS in particular has exacted a 
tremendous toll in human suffering, death, and lost productivity. Currently, of the 31 
million adults and children living with HIV/AIDS worldwide, 21 million of them live in 
Africa.  Eighty  per  cent  of  all  women  with  HIV/AIDS  are  in  Africa.  As  a  result  of  
HIV/AIDS, life expectancy is declining, infant and child mortality are on the rise, and 
individuals’ productivity and economic development are threatened. The insidious 
effects of HIV/AIDS affect the entire spectrum of economic and social activities.  
(a) Goals and objectives  
i. by 2005, reduce maternal mortality to half of the 1990 level, and in half again by 
2015;  
ii. by 2015, reduce the mortality rates for infants and children under the age of five 
years to one-third of the 1990 level;  
iii. provide access to reproductive health services for all individuals of appropriate ages 
by the year 2015;  
iv. strengthen preventive measures to reduce the incidence of infectious and parasitic 
diseases, including HIV/AIDS, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), malaria, 
tuberculosis, and polio; 
 v. by 2005, provide access to safe water supply and sanitation for at least 80 percent of 
the population; vi. by 2015, reduce by half the number of people who are malnourished.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. improve pre- and post-natal care facilities, nutrition, education, and immunization 
coverage against the major childhood diseases;  
ii. invest in district health infrastructure by expanding training programmes for primary 
care providers, building district level management capacity, and increasing the 





iii. create a legal and cultural environment that allows free and voluntary family 
planning methods, including child-spacing and contraceptives, and create behavioral 
change through improved information, education and communication activities for 
HIV/AIDS prevention in local languages;  
iv. promote the rights of adolescents to access to medical and scientific information 
concerning reproductive health, and target youth with education, information, and 
services aimed at preventing and stopping harmful traditional practices, such as female 
genital mutilation;  
v. increase the number of safe water supply points and strengthen the capacity of 
communities to maintain water facilities, and improve environmental health, 
particularly in densely populated urban areas, by improving waste disposal and 
sanitation facilities;  
vi. reduce health care costs through the increased use of generic medicines and the 
gradual introduction of health insurance.  
Development partners will:  
i. provide financial and technical assistance to support African countries’ efforts to 
improve primary health care facilities, particularly in the rural areas;  
ii. assure donor cooperation for a coordinated approach to population policies and 
programmes, reproductive health, and HIV/AIDS, including the integration of cross-
sectoral HIV/AIDS strategies;  
iii.  enhance  assistance  for  the  prevention  and  treatment  of  infectious  and  parasitic  
diseases, including malaria.  
1.3 Other measures to assist the poor  
22. While poverty reduction is an overarching goal of all the sectors addressed in 
TICAD-II, this section focuses on measures that directly assist the poor.  
(a) Goals/objectives  
i. by 2015, reduce at least by at least two-thirds the number of women currently living 
in poverty;  
ii. create employment opportunities and diversify the sources of income for the poor by 
increasing their access to productive assets such as land and credit, as well as markets 
for goods and services;  
iii. enhance the survival capacity of the most vulnerable, and provide assistance to those 
affected by social and natural calamities.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. establish poverty reduction strategies with time-bound goals and targets and annual 
benchmarks and social indicators, and strengthen the institutional capacity to operate 
appropriately targeted poverty reduction programmes particularly at the local level;  
ii. increase the access of the poor, especially women, to micro credit and employment 




iii. provide safety-net measures for the most vulnerable by providing supplementary 
income, including labor-intensive public-works schemes;  
iv. encourage and promote the participation of NGOs, private sectors and local 
community organizations in the design and implementation of poverty reduction 
programmes.  
Development partners will:  
i. jointly with African governments, actively monitor progress under poverty-reduction 
programmes and encourage appropriate policy adjustments;  
ii. encourage international financial institutions (IFIs) to give greater consideration to 
the impact of structural adjustment programmes on the poor;  
iii. assist the strengthening of training programmes that enhance the capacity of 
communities to plan and manage their development activities.  
2. Economic development: promoting the private sector  
23. A major challenge for African countries is to raise and sustain growth rates at much 
higher levels and to create employment and increase income for effective poverty 
reduction. At the same time, globalization presents additional challenges and new 
opportunities for African countries. Consequently, they have to devise national 
development strategies aimed at enhancing their international competitiveness in 
tradeable goods and services through the expanded application of appropriate 
technologies, including labor-intensive technology, to improve skills and productivity 
and provide essential services more efficiently. Development partners are encouraged to 
assist African countries in this endeavor.  
2.1 Private sector development  
24. African countries intend to strengthen support private enterprise, which covers a 
wide range of activities from the micro enterprises of the informal sector to the small 
and medium enterprises of the manufacturing sector, as a key stakeholder in economic 
and social development, as well as the principal engine of growth and generator of 
wealth and employment. The public sector should concentrate on those activities for 
which it is best suited, especially the efficient delivery of core public services, and 
should disengage from those activities which the private sector is better able to perform. 
For the private sector to realize its full potential as the main engine to stimulate growth, 
the government should remove actual and perceived constraints to business activity, so 
as to encourage the creative talents of actual and potential African entrepreneurs. At the 
same time, the capacity of public institutions that are critical to the functioning of a 
modern market economy needs to be strengthened. Support for the modernization of the 
informal  sector,  where  the  majority  of  the  growing  urban  poor  is  employed,  is  an  
essential component for poverty reduction.  
(a) Goals and objectives  
i. ensure a sound and conducive environment for the development and expanded activity 
of  the  private  sector,  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  development  of  domestic  
entrepreneurs; 
 ii.  promote  and  substantially  increase  foreign  direct  investments  and  trade,  with  a  




iii. develop micro, small and medium enterprises, including the informal sector.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. establish and maintain a sound macro-economic policy framework and an open 
economy based on continued and enhanced economic reforms, liberalized exchange and 
trade systems and investment regimes, strengthened institutional, legal and regulatory 
systems, reformed state institutions that operate with transparency, accountability, 
competence and professionalism, and rule of law;  
ii. ensure efficient physical infrastructure through regulatory reforms, privatization, and 
additional investments in key infrastructure (including road/rail transport, 
telecommunications, power, ports, shipping and transit facilities), harness modern 
information and communications technology, and encourage private sector participation 
in infrastructure financing and operation;  
iii. encourage and promote the growth, diversification, and deepening of the financial 
sector so as to facilitate savings mobilization to meet the investment and working 
capital requirements of business, within the context of a deregulated but prudentially 
supervised system of financial intermediation;  
iv. promote regional integration by removing obstacles to, and otherwise facilitating, 
cross-border trade and investment, including harmonizing tax and investment codes;  
v. undertake measures to enhance the entrepreneurial, managerial and technical 
capacities of the private sector;  
vi.strengthen national and sub-regional mechanisms for investment and trade promotion 
by disseminating information about business opportunities, identifying and targeting 
prospective investors and export markets, servicing investors, and providing export 
credit and insurance schemes; vi. strengthen chambers of commerce, trade and 
professional associations, and regional networks to provide market information and 
training for their members, in order to promote exports and investment;  
vii. organize dialogue between government and private sector to develop a shared vision 
of economic development strategy and remove constraints to private sector 
development;  
viii. strengthen and encourage the growth of micro, small, and medium-scale industries 
through appropriate technical support from service institutions and civil society, and 
improve industries’ access to capital by strengthening micro-financing schemes, with 
particular attention to women entrepreneurs;  
ix. provide assistance to improve technical and managerial capabilities of business 
enterprises by supporting technology acquisition, production improvements, and 
training and skills development.  
Development partners will:  
i. facilitate market access for African products in the world market;  
ii. encourage foreign direct investment in Africa by publicizing investment 
opportunities, extending guarantees and additional measures to mitigate investors’ risk 




contributions and accompanying long-term finance, as well as using concessional 
finance as a catalyst;  
iii. assist in capacity building in the private sector, as well as strengthening country and 
sub-regional capacity in trade negotiations, implementing the rules and regulations of 
the WTO, and identifying and exploiting new trading opportunities that emerge from 
the evolving multilateral trading system;  
iv. promote enhanced South-South and Asia-Africa cooperation, which can be a major 
contribution of TICAD-II, through the exchange of experiences, including in business 
management, and collaborative relationships to stimulate joint ventures, investment and 
trade; 
v. provide support for the establishment or strengthening of micro-financing schemes.  
2.2 Industrial development  
25. Industrial development is central to the structural transformation necessary for 
African economies to increase incomes and employment and diversify exports. In 
Africa, there is a growing consensus that accelerated economic transformation will 
depend on the synergies between industrial and agricultural development, as reflected in 
the programme of the Alliance for Africa’s Industrialization (AAI).  
(a) Goals and objectives  
Increase the production, competitiveness, and diversification of the domestic private 
sector, especially in the agro-industrial, mining and manufacturing sub-sectors, with 
potential for exports and employment creation.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. reinforce the links between industrial and agricultural development policies and 
harmonize the activities of relevant government agencies;  
ii. develop new industries, or upgrade existing ones, where African countries have 
comparative advantages, including agro-based industries and energy and mineral 
resource-based industries;  
iii. encourage an African-Asian dialogue on industrial development, based on the 
experiences of newly industrializing countries.  
Development partners will:  
i. facilitate partnership through the development of mechanisms, such as joint business 
councils, for information sharing between Asian and African firms, and for working 
towards the establishment of joint ventures and sub-contracting arrangements;  
ii. assist the strengthening of African training institutions for industrial development, 
particularly through the promotion of networking with Asian partners;  
iii. promote the transfer of technologies to African countries.  
2.3 Agricultural development 
26. Africa’s economic performance and poverty reduction are strongly linked to 
agricultural development, including fisheries, livestock, and forestry development. The 




exports, and 70 per cent of employment. In the short- and medium-run, Africa’s ability 
to achieve sustainable broad-based growth and development requires a revitalization of 
the rural economy. To this end, increased attention should be given to the smallholder 
sector and the role of women farmers. Strengthening the linkage between rural 
producers and urban markets also constitutes an important part of the strategy.  
27. In recent years, African agricultural production has grown and exports increased, 
due to better policies, new technologies, improved terms of trade in some commodities, 
and increased yields in some crops. Despite these gains, Africa’s agricultural production 
and productivity for both food and cash crops remain low. In particular, food production 
has not kept pace with population growth in a number of countries in Africa. Weak 
exports and the fluctuations in prices of raw materials threaten its ability to pay for 
needed imports of equipment and inputs for agriculture and industry. Moreover, the 
increasing demand for farmland due to rapid population growth has often resulted in 
considerable environmental damage, including soil erosion, loss of soil fertility, water 
degradation, and deforestation. Given the rapid migration of rural populations to urban 
centers, the rural economy also needs to be able to provide attractive income-earning 
opportunities.  
(a) Goals and objectives  
i. improve the productivity of agriculture with particular attention to small-scale and 
women farmers;  
ii. ensure food security for all people and increase the poor’s access to adequate food 
and nutrition;  
iii. promote measures against natural resource degradation and encourage production 
methods that are environmentally sustainable;  
iv.  integrate  the  rural  poor  in  the  market  economy  and  provide  them  better  access  to  
input and output markets.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. deepen agricultural sector reform with respect to producer and consumer prices, input 
and output markets, agricultural trade, and the restructuring of agricultural parastatals, 
in order to improve farm efficiency and profitability;  
ii. increase public investment and the participation of rural populations in building and 
rehabilitating rural infrastructure, and support the development of private sector in rural 
transport, marketing, processing and storage;  
iii. increase public investment in agricultural research, and ensure it addresses the needs 
of small-scale and women farmers, establish better linkages between Asian and African 
research institutions for capacity building, and promote access to modern technologies 
and production methods through improved extension services;  
iv. increase the security of water supply for agriculture by establishing small-scale 
irrigation facilities, improving local water management, and increasing the exchange of 
information and technical staff between Asia and Africa;  
v. improve land tenure security under traditional and modern forms of tenure, and 




vi. foster regional, sub-regional, national, and household food security via the increased 
production, transport, storage and marketing of food crops, livestock and fisheries, with 
particular  attention  to  the  needs  of  the  poor,  as  well  as  the  establishment  of  early  
warning systems to monitor drought and crop production;  
vii. strengthen intra-regional and Asia-Africa cooperation for the implementation of the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, and improve soil fertility with 
appropriate soil and crop husbandry techniques;  
viii. enhance agricultural credit and finance schemes and improve access to credit by 
small-scale and women farmers, taking advantage of the cooperation with Asian 
agricultural financial officials, cooperatives, and farmers’ groups;  
ix. strengthen the capacity of farmers’ organizations and cooperatives  
Development partners will:  
i. encourage access of African food and agricultural products, particularly processed 
products, to international markets;  
ii. support African networking with external partners, especially Asian partners, in the 
areas of agricultural technology and know-how, extension services, and rural 
infrastructure;  
iii. support investment in research in the areas of high yield crops and durable 
preservation and storage;  
iv. provide support for building national and regional capacity for multilateral trade 
negotiations, including food sanitation and other agricultural trade regulations.  
2.4 External debt  
28. The international community has implemented a series of measures to address the 
external debt burden of low-income countries, including concessional financial 
assistance from multilateral institutions, concessional rescheduling, debt forgiveness, 
and concessional new finance from bilateral creditors. Furthermore, the Heavily-
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, developed by the IMF and the World Bank, 
was adopted in September 1996. The HIPC Initiative aims at reducing to sustainable 
levels the debt burden of HIPCs that are pursuing strong programmes of adjustment and 
reform. The African Development Bank approved its contribution to the Initiative in 
1997. Nine countries, including seven African countries, have reached the decision 
points and seven (of which five African) have been found eligible for HIPC assistance. 
Several additional African countries are expected to reach decision points soon. In their 
recent review of the Initiative, IMF and the World Bank agreed to extend until end-2000 
the original deadline for countries to enter the HIPC Initiative through adopting 
adjustment programmes supported by the two institutions. This extends the opportunity 
for a group of African countries – many just emerging from conflicts – to begin building 
track record of good policy performance required under the HIPC Initiative. 
Furthermore, the IMF and the World Bank have agreed that programmes supported by 
IMF post-conflict emergency assistance could count —on a case by case basis— toward 
the HIPC track record, thus potentially bringing forward the delivery of assistance for 
some African countries to allow more countries to qualify. However, the debate about 
external debt goes beyond the HIPC Initiative, which was not intended to meet the 




(a) Goals and objectives  
The main objectives should be to achieve durable solutions to the external debt 
problems of African countries, including debt cancellation and debt service relief where 
appropriate.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. agree on and implement economic and structural reform programmes supported by the 
Bretton Woods institutions and the African Development Bank in order to establish the 
necessary track record needed to be considered for concessional stock-of-debt 
rescheduling from bilateral countries and/or for HIPC assistance;  
ii. reinforce social programmes and their execution, and direct the savings obtained 
from debt relief to the social sectors, with a view to reducing poverty;  
iii strengthen national accounting systems and build human capacity in debt 
management; iv. improve coordination with donors in the search for durable solutions; 
v. explore all available debt relief mechanisms.  
Development partners will:  
i. ensure the full financing of the HIPC Initiative and provide financial support for those 
multilateral institutions, especially the African Development Bank, that may not be able 
to cover their full share of the cost under the HIPC Initiative;  
ii. expedite, in a determined manner, the extension of debt relief to more countries 
within  the  terms  of  the  HIPC  Initiative,  taking  note  of  the  proposal  by  the  Secretary-
General  of  the  United  Nations  in  his  report  on  Africa  to  the  Security  Council  
(S/1998/318) of 13 April 1998 ; 
iii. search for approaches, including within the HIPC framework where appropriate, to 
solving the debt problem of post-conflict countries, especially those which have arrears 
with multilateral institutions;  
iv. continue providing debt relief with existing mechanisms and promote enhanced 
measures that go beyond debt rescheduling, including cancellation or measures 
comparable to cancellation of remaining ODA debts by bilateral creditors, taking note 
of the proposal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the recommendation 
by G-8 leaders at the Birmingham Summit in May 1998;  
v. continue providing appropriate concessional finance, including grant funding, to help 
improve the debt profile of African countries; and  
vi. search for creative new solutions, including debt swap options for the reconstruction 
of economic and social infrastructure; vii. support the capacity-building efforts of 
African countries in implementing sound macro-economic policies and debt 
management.  
3. Basic foundations for d Development  
29. Democracy and good governance, as well as peace and security, are essential to 
socio-economic development, in Africa. The fundamental principles of democracy and 
good governance are widely accepted, but their applicability to the African context 




circumstances and cultural realities. Violent conflicts in a number of countries constitute 
a major obstacle to sustainable development in Africa, potentially reversing its 
economic progress and impeding its future development.  
3.1 Good governance  
30. In recent years, many African countries have made significant progress in 
democratization. To consolidate this positive trend and achieve further progress in 
social and economic development on a sustained basis, African countries need to 
intensify their efforts to further strengthen good governance, taking into account their 
respective cultural and political circumstances.  
(a) Goals and objectives  
i. strengthen constitutional legitimacy and democratic systems based on the principle of 
separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers;  
ii. strengthen institutions that are essential components of good governance and 
democracy;  
iii. promote respect for human rights and the rule of law;  
iv. enhance accountability, and transparency and efficiency in public administration;  
v. promote a culture of tolerance, and promote broader participation in the decision-
making process, particularly participation by women and civil society;  
vi. promote social justice by encouraging equitable development across different ethnic 
groups and geographic areas.  
(b) Guidelines for action  
To achieve the above goals, African countries will:  
i. ensure that multiparty democratic elections are truly free and fair, and strengthen 
appropriate institutions;  
ii. establish an independent, impartial and adequately funded judiciary to ensure fair and 
effective enforcement of the law;  
iii. strengthen human and institutional capacities of the legislature and enhance its 
oversight functions in relation to policy-making and budget formulation;  
iv. establish a lean, competent, transparent, accountable, and merit-based civil service, 
with institutional support for anti-corruption measures;  
v. strengthen administrative capacity also at the local level and facilitate the process of 
decentralization;  
vi. facilitate the development of a strong civil society, including community-based 
organizations and women’ s groups, and forge a genuine partnership between civil 
society organizations and government institutions involved in socio-economic 
development;  
vii. consider the establishment of independent human rights and Ombudsman 
institutions, and promote civic education, with particular focus on human rights 
education.  




i. support efforts of African countries in strengthening human and institutional 
capacities of the legislature, judiciary, and executive branch of the government;  
ii. support sub-regional/regional exchanges of experiences on best practices relating to 
governance, including devising indicators for the effective delivery of public services.  
3.2 Conflict prevention and post-conflict development  
31. Over the years, a number of wars have been fought in Africa, undermining Africa’s 
efforts to pursue a durable peace stability and sustainable development. In recent years, 
Africa has made progress in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. In this 
respect, the establishment of the OAU mechanism is a significant step. Efforts by the 
OAU and sub-regional organizations need to be supported and consolidated to prevent a 
recurrence of conflicts and to initiate and strengthen post-conflict rehabilitation and 
reconstruction of the affected countries. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
has issued a report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and 
Sustainable Development in Africa (S/1998/318), which specifies actions to mitigate the 
potential for conflict.  
(a) Goals and Objectives  
i. strengthen African structures and capacities for conflict prevention, management and 
resolution;  
ii. develop and implement effective confidence-building measures at national, regional 
and sub-regional levels as part of preventive strategies;  
iii. provide a smooth and early transition from emergency relief in conflict situations, 
through rehabilitation and reconstruction, to post-conflict development;  
iv. ensure the security of refugees and internally displaced persons.  
(b) Guidelines for Action  
To achieve the above goals, African Countries will:  
i. intensify regional and sub-regional cooperation by exchanging information, 
monitoring and controlling illicit trafficking and stockpiling of small arms and light 
weapons. Towards that those ends, African countries may consider the possibility of 
conducting a study on appropriate measures for registering transactions of small arms 
and  light  weapons  within  the  framework  of  the  United  Nations  or  and  other  regional  
mechanisms, including the intensification of cooperation within OAU for the possibility 
of formulating a convention on the illicit possession and transfer of small arms;  
ii. provide vocational training to former and demobilized combatants and refugees; and 
develop programmes for effective management and eventual destruction of accumulated 
weapons, especially small arms;  
iii. make efforts, where appropriate, to invite accession to and early entry into force of 
the 1997 Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines, and assist in the rehabilitation of 
victims and strengthen programmes for skill development for de-mining;  
iv. ensure the protection and voluntary repatriation of refugees under international and 
humanitarian principles, such as those provided for in the United Nations and OAU 
refugee conventions, and work towards the establishment of international mechanisms 
to assist host governments in maintaining the security and neutrality of refugee camps 




v. promote the active participation and involvement of civil society including women’ s 
NGOs and women’ s groups in peace building and conflict prevention.  
Development partners will:  
i. support integrated approaches to security and development, including capacity-
building for police and internal security forces, and strengthening of border controls;  
ii. continue financial and technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of the OAU and 
sub-regional organizations for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, 
as well as African centers for training in conflict prevention and peace-keeping;  
iii. support the United Nations and OAU’ s efforts to develop an early warning and 
response system by enhancing their capacities to gather, analyze and disseminate 
necessary information through their communication and data bank systems;  
iv. provide the necessary assistance in land mine clearance for affected countries and 
demobilization of soldiers and their reintegration into civilian life, and increase the 
exchange of information between Asia and Africa on de-mining experience and 
technology;  
v.  take  necessary  action  to  monitor  and  prevent  the  export  of  small  arms  to  potential  
conflict areas;  
vi. support for emergency and post- conflict relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, and 
development, through mobilizing resources and coordinated efforts within a framework 
of  a  long-term  strategy,  so  as  to  facilitate  the  transition  from  emergency  relief  to  
development assistance;  
vii. provide assistance to ensure prevention of recruitment of children into armed forces 
and provide for productive social re-integration of demobilized child soldiers through 
support to their families and through provision of sound education, recreation, and 
employment opportunities;  
viii. assist countries hosting refugees in restoring the social and economic infrastructure 
which have been destroyed in the process of refugees’ movements and settlements.  
V. Follow-up  
32. The true measure of success of the Agenda for Action will depend upon how 
effectively  the  participants  can  translate  their  commitments  into  specific  actions  by  
integrating the Agenda for Action developed in the TICAD-II process into their 
development programprogrammes at national, regional and inter-regional levels. This 
national, regional and inter-regional integration of the Agenda for Action should be the 
main thrust of follow-up to TICAD-II. For this purpose, concrete steps should be taken, 
bearing in mind the value-added aspect of TICAD-II, namely South-South cooperation 
as a modality o development cooperation, particularly between Asia and African 
countries, with special emphasis on private sector cooperation. For this purpose, 
aAppropriate indicators should be used, taking into account in collaboration with the 
ongoing work in the UNUnited Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions and OECD, in 
order to measure progress in achieving goals and targets contained in the Agenda for 
Action. A series of review meetings will be organized to assess the achievement of 




33. Information sharing on the progress in the follow-up process will further be 
facilitated through the establishment of TICAD-II contact points among the participants 
and an internet Web site to disseminate information widely across all sectors of society. 



































TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration 
 
We, the participants of the Third Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD III) held in Tokyo from 29 September to 1 October 2003, having 
reviewed the achievements of the ten-year TICAD process and discussed the future 
direction it should take in light of the latest developments on the African continent and 
in the international arena, declare as follows: 
 
I. New Challenges for African Development 
II.  
We recall that the TICAD process was launched in 1993, a time when international 
interest  in  Africa  was  waning  as  a  result  of  the  end  of  the  Cold  War.  During  the  
following decade, the TICAD process has consistently promoted African development 
from the standpoint of African countries and peoples by assisting Africa to enhance its 
ownership of its development programs and reviving international partnership in 
support of such programs. These basic principles of the TICAD process, now widely 
shared  not  only  by  African  countries  but  also  by  the  international  community  as  a  
whole, have made a significant contribution to encouraging international commitment to 
African development within international frameworks such as the United Nations and 
the G8 process. 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, African leaders had already expressed the political desire to 
demonstrate Africa's ownership of its development process through the Lagos Plan of 
Action, and later agreeing to the establishment of the African Economic Community. At 
the dawn of the new century, the framework for realization has been established through 
the  transformation  of  the  Organization  of  African  Unity  (OAU)  to  the  African  Union  
(AU) and the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) as a 
programme of the AU. The international community welcomed this commitment by 
Africa and offered to provide its solid support for achieving sustainable development 
through various initiatives such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 
LDC's Plan of Action, the Monterrey Consensus, the G8 Africa Action Plan, and the 
Plan  of  Implementation  of  the  World  Summit  on  Sustainable  Development  (WSSD).  
This momentum in both Africa and the international arena thus evolved into an 
interactive process of ownership by Africa and partnership by the international 
community. Recognizing this positive international trend that can create a critical 
turning point in Africa's development process, the TICAD process, together with 
NEPAD, is now to embark on a new challenge to realize the African Vision that "Africa 
will claim the twenty-first century" by fully employing its abundant natural and human 
resources for self-sufficient and sustainable development and enjoying the benefits of 
trade, industry, and investment through integrating Africa into the global economy. 
 
We, the participants of TICAD III, hereby reaffirm TICAD's basic philosophy and 
renew  our  political  commitment  to  the  goal  of  African  development  on  this  




"TICAD Tenth Anniversary Declaration "constitutes another important step for major 
progress toward African development in the twenty-first century. 
 
II. Achievements of the TICAD Process 
 
We acknowledge that TICAD is not simply a series of conferences but an evolving 
process. The TICAD conferences have brought a general consensus on development 
philosophy and priorities for African development through the "Tokyo Declaration" and 
the "Tokyo Agenda for Action," adopted at TICAD I (1993) and TICAD II (1998), 
respectively. The TICAD process has also been playing a catalytic role in translating its 
philosophy and priorities into tangible projects in areas such as human resources 
development and socio-economic infrastructure. The ceaseless efforts under the TICAD 
process over the past ten years, thus, have steadily contributed to African development 
by presenting unique views on African development and new grounds for partnership. 
Its key achievements include the following: 
 
1. Raising Awareness of the Challenges Facing Africa 
 
It is noteworthy to recall that each TICAD conference has contributed toward 
maintaining the focus of the international community on African development during 
periods  when  global  attention  to  Africa  was  about  to  be  diverted  to  other  regions.  
TICAD I was convened in 1993 after the end of the Cold War; TICAD II in 1998 
coincided with the Asian financial crisis; and the TICAD Ministerial-level Meeting in 
2001 was held immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. 
At  those  critical  moments,  The  TICAD  process,  together  with  other  regional  and  
international initiatives, continually highlighted African development and provided the 
advocacy momentum to mainstream African issues on the international agenda in a 
series of international forums, including the International Conference on Financing for 
Development  in  Monterrey,  G8  Summits,  the  WSSD,  and  the  Third  World  Water  
Forum. This momentum successfully led to the concerted cooperation of the 
international community through the United Nations and the G8 process and 
complemented Africa's own efforts as manifested by NEPAD and the AU. The TICAD 
process thus significantly contributed to raising awareness of the challenges facing 
Africa and its tenth anniversary comes at a time when the circumstances for African 
development are more favorable than ever, both within Africa and externally. However, 
we  have  noted  with  regret  that  there  was  little  or  no  progress  in  advancing  the  Doha  
Development Agenda at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun. The creation of an 
equitable international trade system remains as a major challenge to African 
development. 
 
2. "Ownership" and "Partnership" 
 
The TICAD process has constantly advocated that "ownership" by African countries of 
their 
development processes and "partnership" by the international community in support of 
such 





among the international community including African countries. NEPAD, in particular, 
shares with 
TICAD its emphasis on African ownership and its focus on priority areas such as peace 
and 
governance, human resources development, infrastructure, agriculture, and private 
sector 
development.  The TICAD process thus welcomes the establishment of NEPAD, while 
NEPAD recognizes the TICAD process as a pivotal initiative in addressing the 
challenges of African development. It is therefore a natural consequence that the 
TICAD process and NEPAD support and complement each other. 
 
3. Expansion of Development Partnership 
 
The TICAD process is a unique international framework that has the active participation 
of diversified development actors, including African countries, African regional 
organizations, Asian countries, partner countries and international organizations, as well 
as the private sector and civil society organizations such as NGOs. This broad coalition 
expands development partnership, enriches ideas, and augments resources for African 
development.  In  particular,  it  is  of  great  significance  that  the  TICAD  process  has  
underscored the importance of South South cooperation, especially Asia-Africa 
cooperation that utilizes the successful economic development experiences of Asian 
countries. The enormous potential of Asia-Africa cooperation is illustrated by such 
examples as the development of NERICA (New Rice for Africa: a new rice variety 
developed by crossing Asian and African species) and private sector cooperation to 
facilitate economic linkages between the two regions, especially in trade and 
investment. As a result, the TICAD process, by suggesting additional ways to meet the 
challenges faced by Africa, has provided diversity and dynamism to the development 
process of the African continent. It is therefore of particular importance that Asian 
countries are more actively involved in supporting the implementation of NEPAD 
through the TICAD process. 
 
III. A Compass for the Future of the TICAD Process 
 
We,  the  participants  of  TICAD III,  note  with  satisfaction  that  the  TICAD process  has  
facilitated  the  synchronization  of  Africa's  efforts  and  the  commitment  of  its  
development partners, in other words, African ownership and international partnership, 
and synthesized the resources of both sides for a common purpose. Thus, the TICAD 
process has contributed to enhancing ownership and partnership to develop genuine 
solidarity that leads to expanded and multi-layered cooperation in support of African 
development.  Now  Africa  has  provided  a  powerful  vehicle  -  NEPAD  to  accelerate  
African development. The TICAD process provides the philosophies of ownership and 
partnership as wheels of the vehicle, the solidarity between Africa and its development 
partners as the engine and the globally combined resources as fuel. Furthermore, 
through TICAD high-level policy forums, Africa and its development partners seek the 
underlying philosophy and guiding principles of cooperation for African development, 
which can serve as a compass for African development. Reaffirming international 




"Tokyo Agenda for Action" of 1998, we, the participants of TICAD III, reconfirm that 
African development should continue to emphasize the following viewpoints: 
 
1. Leadership and People's Participation in the African Development Process 
 
To realize development based on ownership, it is imperative that the political leaders of 
African countries exercise committed and progressive leadership. It is also 
indispensable  that  the  peoples  of  Africa,  the  primary  beneficiaries  of  development,  
share the spirit of NEPAD and actively participate in the development process. 
Achieving a well-balanced and sustainable development of Africa that genuinely and 
directly benefits African people is too formidable a challenge to be addressed through a 
single approach. This challenge can best be met by adopting a mutually reinforcing 
combination of two approaches: state-led development based on leadership and 
democratic governance, on the one hand, and community-based development based on 
the  empowerment  of  individuals,  on  the  other.  It  is  essential  that  political  leaders  and  
their people share common values and work together to achieve their development 
goals. This national commitment upheld by strong leadership and grass-roots 
participation will ensure successful and sustainable development. 
 
2. Peace and Good Governance 
 
We note with appreciation the improved peace and security in some parts of Africa 
resulting from efforts by Africans themselves supported by the international 
community. However, it still remains critically important that African countries should 
consolidate such peace and put an end to remaining conflicts on the continent in order 
that States can devote all their capacity and resources to economic growth and 
sustainable development. Conflict is a serious obstacle to African development not only 
because it exhausts the States involved and wastes the resources of nations and peoples, 
but also because conflict leaves long-term consequences such as refugees and internally 
displaced  persons  (IDPs),  landmines,  and  the  proliferation  of  small  arms  and  light  
weapons that often exacerbates conflicts. It is encouraging that some African regional 
organizations and countries are playing key roles in the prevention and management of 
conflicts, but the consolidation of peace process including disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration of excombatants (DDR), the repatriation of refugees and IDPs, and 
demining still requires broad support from the international community, and measures 
to prevent the illegal proliferation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In 
order to prevent the recurrence of conflicts, it is also essential to address the root causes 
of conflicts and to promote steadily economic and social reconstruction based on good 
governance that entails democratization and the adoption of appropriate macroeconomic 
policies. Although African ownership should primarily take the lead in the African 
development process, international partnership also has an important role to play in 
extending comprehensive and integrated assistance to African countries and peoples that 
are hindered from exerting such ownership by conflict. 
 
3. Human Security 
 
Ensuring the security of States is a prerequisite for the development of African 




likewise imperative to protect the peoples of Africa from any threats to their survival, 
dignity, and livelihood, and moreover to empower all, including women, children and 
other vulnerable groups, to shape and fully own the process of building communities 
and nations. Such protection and empowerment are pivotal concepts underlying human 
security. The Millennium Declaration of the United Nations in 2000 and the report of 
the Commission on Human Security in 2003 underscored the fact that the peoples of 
Africa still face serious problems such as poverty, hunger, infectious diseases including 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic especially, and a lack of education, thus indicating that Africa 
is  the  continent  where  human  security  is  least  assured.  The  TICAD  process  therefore  
places great emphasis on the concept of human security with a view to relieving the 
African people of their present afflictions, providing them with peace and hope for the 
future, and engaging them in the development process. 
 
4. Respect for Distinctiveness, Diversity, and Identity 
 
In order for Africa to take full ownership of its development process, Africa needs to set 
its own development goals. Self-confidence and self-esteem, based on due 
understanding of and respect for the history and cultures of Africa as the cradle of 
humankind, constitute the main driving force of African-owned development. The 
international community should not only acknowledge Africa's distinctiveness, 
diversity,  and  identity  simply  from  cultural  and  historical  points  of  view,  but  also  
recognize them as indispensable to African development. This approach, consonant 
with the NEPAD development philosophy, helps Africans to become true pioneers in 
carving out their own destiny. The international community is encouraged to support 
this view and incorporate it into development cooperation policies toward Africa. 
 
IV. A New Partnership: Mutual Respect and Trust 
 
We, the participants of TICAD III, recognize that the challenges facing African 
development are pressing global issues that must be addressed by both Africa and its 
partners in the twenty first century. One of the ultimate goals of the TICAD process is 
to forge solidarity between Africa and the rest of the international community based on 
ownership and partnership because African development can be achieved only by the 
concerted efforts of Africa and its development partners. Africa should determine and 
own, with self-confidence and self esteem, the direction it will take in pursuit of self-
sufficient and sustainable development. The international community, at the same time 
respecting and trusting Africa's ownership, should deliver timely and substantial 
assistance to help Africa make the best use of its own resource, through enhancing 
current initiatives to promote market access and fair trade in order to support the efforts 
of African countries to gain a meaningful foothold in the global market place. It is also 
necessary to increase ODA and promote foreign direct investment. 
 
We recall that the African Union has stated that "today's investment in children is 
tomorrow's peace, stability, security, democracy, and sustainable development," and 
also that NEPAD declares that it aims to "give hope to the emaciated African child that 
the 21st century is indeed Africa's century" (NEPAD, paragraph 207). Affirming mutual 
"respect" and "trust," we, the representatives of Africa and its development partners, are 




despair, and their lives with peace, not instability. This momentous step must be one 
that is taken not by leaders alone but also by each individual in all African countries and 
throughout the international community. We firmly believe that such a step, taken with 
great confidence and shared conviction, will truly take Africa forward to a bright and 
hopeful future. We, the participants of the Third Tokyo International Conference on 
African  Development,  while  proudly  acknowledging  the  achievements  of  the  TICAD  
process, hereby pledge to support Africa's ownership, especially the implementation of 
NEPAD, by working together to address the new challenges set before us. 
 





































TOWARDS A VIBRANT AFRICA 
30 May 2008 
1.0 Introduction 
1.1 The Heads of State and Government, and delegations of Japan and 51 African 
countries, together with the representatives of 34 other countries, 75 international and 
regional organizations, and representatives of the private sector, academic institutions 
and civil society organizations from both Africa and Asia, met in Yokohama, Japan 
from 28 to 30 May, 2008, for the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development - TICAD IV. 
1.2 The Conference took place against the backdrop of a rapidly-changing Africa 
determined to take responsibility for and to assert ownership over its own destiny: and 
an Africa increasingly confident and capable, itself, of determining that destiny. 
1.3 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged that from its inception in 1993, the 
TICAD Process with Japan at its center and other co-organizers including the United 
Nations, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank playing a 
valuable role stressed the importance for Africa to exercise full "ownership" of its own 
development agenda and the need for a genuine "partnership" with the international 
community in pursuit of that agenda. In this regard, the TICAD Process has also served 
as  a  bridge  between  Africa  and  Japan  and  Asia  as  a  whole,  and  as  a  Forum  through  
which the Asian development experience can be shared with Africa. It is clear that the 
pursuit of an even closer relationship, based on shared concerns and common strategic 
interests, is of critical importance in terms of further enhancing global development and 
stability. 
1.4 The Participants at TICAD IV also recognized the need for Africa's diversified 
development partners, working together with the governments of Africa and with the 
African Union (AU) and its institutions and programmes - in particular the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) - to actively strive for far greater 
synergy and effective coordination between and among existing and future initiatives in 
support of the continent's development. 
2.0 Recent Trends and Challenges 
2.1 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged the positive trends which have 
emerged across the African continent in general since TICAD III in 2003. Increasing 
political stability and improved governance, buttressed by strong economic growth and 
rising levels of foreign direct investment - much of it coming from Asia - have helped to 
create a new awareness of trade, investment and tourism opportunities available across 
the continent. These opportunities present a hitherto unprecedented prospect for the 
countries of Africa to achieve real and sustainable economic growth, and to make, 
thereby, real and sustainable progress towards poverty alleviation, and genuine 




2.2 In this regard, the Participants at TICAD IV commended the birth in 2001 of 
NEPAD, the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into AU in 2002 and 
the increasing effectiveness of Africa's Regional Economic Communities (REC's) as 
further confirmation of Africa's determination, and enhanced capacity to exercise full 
ownership of its own development agenda. The Participants also welcomed the 
strengthening of cooperation between AU and TICAD, which is exemplified by the 
resolution adopted at the Tenth Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly held 
in Addis Ababa from 31 January to 2 February 2008. 
2.3 The Participants also took note of the outcome of this above-mentioned AU 
Assembly, which called, inter alia, for an immediate acceleration in the industrialization 
of Africa, a definitive shift away from dependence on primary products, and the 
development of Africa-based industries for local value-addition and processing. 
2.4 The Participants at TICAD IV noted the strenuous efforts being made by the African 
countries themselves towards improved governance across the continent, including the 
ongoing work of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). 
2.5 The Participants at TICAD IV recognized that, notwithstanding these very 
encouraging trends, the countries of Africa continue to face a number of serious 
challenges and that achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be a 
difficult task. The most immediate of these challenges includes continuing widespread 
poverty and unemployment in rural and urban areas coupled with rapid population 
growth. Other significant challenges are low agricultural productivity, together with 
generally poor agricultural infrastructure ,and the increasingly severe effects of climate 
change ; low levels of industrialization and inadequate generation of and access to 
energy across the continent; the scourge of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
infectious diseases which continues its ravages across much of the continent; inadequate 
access to education at all levels and a corresponding lack of adequate education-
infrastructure - specially in sub-Saharan Africa. The Participants emphasized the special 
needs of least developed countries, land-locked and small island developing states. They 
also paid special attention to the issue of soaring rise of food prices and its negative 
impact on poverty reduction in Africa. 
2.6 The Participants acknowledged that while African governments bear primary 
responsibility for the economic and social well-being of their respective peoples, the 
international community and , Africa's development partners in particular, have a 
crucial role to play in supporting Africa's own efforts to address and overcome these 
challenges. 
2.7 In this regard, the Participants stressed the importance for the G8 countries to honor 
the commitments already made in respect of support for African development and for 
all Africa's development partners, including emerging partners to work towards a 
greater coordination and strengthening of the broad international partnership with the 
African  continent  -  specifically  to  facilitate  a  greater  focus  of  effort  and  to  avoid  
duplication and any unnecessary wastage of scarce resources. 
2.8 Building on the positive trends in Africa and guided by the vision outlined in 
NEPAD, but also fully cognizant of the considerable developmental challenges which 
continue to confront the countries of Africa, the Participants at TICAD IV committed 




  Towards Boosting Economic Growth  
  Towards Ensuring Human Security, including achieving MDGs and 
consolidation of  peace and good governance 
  Towards Addressing Environmental Issues and Climate Change 
 
3.0 Boosting Economic Growth: Forging a Genuine Partnership towards a 
Vibrant, Prosperous Africa 
3.1 The Participants at TICAD IV stressed that it is essential to accelerate broad-based 
economic growth and diversification and acknowledged the enormous, as-yet largely 
untapped natural-resource potential across the continent. 
Human Resource Development 
3.2 The Participants at TICAD IV noted the enormous challenges facing African 
countries in the area of human resource development, especially in the field of science 
and technology. They noted the significant contribution being made in this regard by 
Japan and other development partners, and recognized the considerable potential for 
expansion in this critical sector of development cooperation.  
Accelerated Industrial Development 
3.3  The  Participants  recalled  the  conclusions  of  the  Tenth  Ordinary  Session  of  the  
African Union Assembly, with regard to the urgent need to accelerate the industrial 
development of Africa.  
Infrastructure 
3.4 The Participants emphasized the fundamental need to focus on the development of 
region-wide infrastructure. 
Agricultural and Rural Development 
3.5 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged the role of agriculture as a major 
component of economic activity across the continent,  and emphasized the urgent need 
to significantly enhance current levels of agricultural productivity, and increase support 
to this critical sector, including through provision and management of water resources. 
Agricultural and rural reform in the framework of the NEPAD Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) were acknowledged as effective means 
to achieve food security and poverty alleviation and major driving forces for economic 
growth. In this regard, it is important to provide assistance for rural entrepreneurs and 
local industries. 
Trade and Investment 
3.6 The Participants at TICAD IV noted that, although the current levels of international 
trade and investment with African countries, including trade and investment flows 
between Africa and Japan, and other Asian countries had certainly improved, Africa's 
share of global trade and investment flows was still insignificant. Accordingly, the 
Participants recognized the need to work together for the early, fair and balanced 
conclusion of the WTO Doha Round. They also acknowledged the importance of "Aid 
for Trade" initiative.  




3.7 The Participants stressed that Africa has enormous potential in this sector, and that 
tourism  has  the  dual  effect  of  positively  impacting  on  several  other  sectors  whilst  
building a positive image of Africa. They emphasized the importance, for African 
countries, to cooperate more closely in the tourism sector and, in this regard, recognized 
the need for sharing of experiences and know how as well as the promotion of technical 
cooperation programs. The specific importance of Eco-tourism was also underlined. 
Role of the Private Sector 
3.8 The Participants at TICAD IV noted, also, the important role of the private sector - 
both domestic and foreign - in the promotion and financing of sustainable economic 
growth in Africa, especially with regard to the effective exploitation of the continent's 
natural resources, and the development of industrial, energy and mineral, agricultural, 
financial and other services sectors, and, equally, in the development and management 
of Africa's considerable human resources. 
3.9 In this context, and spurred by the progress being made towards improving the 
overall business climate across the continent, the Participants welcomed the growing 
interest and activities of the Japanese and other Asian private sectors. They also 
welcomed Japan's initiative to strengthen closer Public-Private Partnerships by 
promoting trade and investment in Africa. 
4.0 Achieving the Millennium Development Goals - MDGs: Economic and 
Social Dimension of "Human Security" 
4.1 The Participants at TICAD IV noted that more vigorous impetus is necessary to 
attain the Millennium Development Goals by the year 2015. They acknowledged the 
inter-relatedness  of  the  MDG's  and  the  urgent  need  to  promote  a  more  fully-
comprehensive approach towards their general attainment. 
4.2 The Participants welcomed TICAD IV's focus upon and promotion of the concept of 
"human security", which underscores freedom from fear and freedom from want, and 
emphasizes the protection and empowerment of individuals and communities. 
4.3 Community Development: Building Safe and Healthy Communities 
The Participants acknowledged that strengthening a comprehensive and community-
based approach would help in achieving the MDGs. This approach encompasses human 
resource development, decent job-creation, in particular for the youth, income 
generation, expansion of access to primary health-care and basic education, as well as 
agricultural and rural development, including through promotion of the One-Village-
One-Product (OVOP) movement. 
4.4 Education: Realizing Education which opens up a New Future 
The Participants stressed the fundamental need to improve the quality of and expanding 
access to education for all African people, with special emphasis on youth, and to 
promote education linked to growth and self-sustainability, including technical and 
vocational training, science and higher education, while ensuring a cross-sectoral 
approach. 
 




In addition to tackling HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, polio and other infectious 
diseases, the Participants acknowledged the significance of strengthening health 
systems to effectively deal with major health challenges including maternal, new-born, 
and child health. The Participants highlighted the importance of human resource 
development of health workers and expressed concern regarding the brain-drain of 
skilled health professionals. 
 
The Participants warmly welcomed the creation of the Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize, the 
first ever of its kind. 
 
4.6 Gender: Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment 
Recognizing the significant role of women in development and peace consolidation, the 
Participants at TICAD IV reemphasized the importance of advancing and protecting the 
human rights of women and promoting women's empowerment. They stressed the need 
to address issues such as disparity in education, violence against women, and 
insufficient participation of women in all spheres of decision making, while taking into 
account the cultural specificities of different countries. 
5.0 Consolidation of Peace and Good Governance: Political Dimension of 
"Human Security" 
5.1 The Participants reiterated that development and peace must work in tandem with 
each other. They noted the significant progress made in this regard across the African 
continent and stressed that, to realize a Vibrant Africa, dividends of peace must spread 
to every corner of the continent. 
5.2  The  Participants  also  reemphasized  that  countries  coming  out  of  conflict  need  
special assistance to get on the path of reconstruction and sustainable development and 
to enjoy the fruits of prosperity. For this to come about, seamless peace-building efforts 
encompassing conflict prevention, early warning measures, conflict resolution, and 
preventing relapses into conflict, are critical as they will promote durable peace on the 
continent. To sustain peace acquired through these processes, sound vigorous 
democracy, continuous and inclusive dialogue, and strengthened governance need to be 
vigorously fostered. Furthermore, a smooth transition between one phase and another, 
and linkages between support for peace consolidation and other areas of development, 
are also crucial. 
5.3 The Participants put an emphasis on the importance of Africa's ownership and 
welcomed AU's initiatives such as the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to improve governance. The participants 
also welcomed the goodwill shown by development partners, especially to enhance 
Africa's peace-keeping capabilities. The participants also called attention to the 
significant  role  of  the  UN  and  its  bodies  such  as  the  Security  Council  and  the  Peace  
Building Commission as well as the AU, Africa's regional organizations and African 
countries themselves contributing to peace keeping operations. They commended the 
mediation efforts of African countries for the reconciliation and peaceful resolution of 
armed conflicts, as well as their engagement in peace-keeping operations. 
5.4 The Participants emphasized the importance of the early reform of the main UN 




the 21st century. The Participants reemphasized that the member states should exert 
efforts  on  the  Security  Council  reform  during  the  current  session  of  the  UN  General  
Assembly. 
6.0 Addressing Environmental Issues and Climate Change: To establish 
"Cool Earth Partnership" 
6.1 Climate Change: 
The  Participants  at  TICAD  IV  noted  that  African  countries,  which  emit  the  least  and  
embrace the Congo Basin, considered as the second largest ecological "lung" in the 
world, have generally been extremely vulnerable to the negative effects of climate 
change, including increased environmental degradation, deforestation, loss of 
biodiversity, and droughts and desertification that further threaten food security and 
health, as well as to increasingly frequent extreme weather patterns. African countries 
continue to be inadequately equipped in terms of their mitigation and adaptation 
capacities. 
 
The  Participants  at  TICAD  IV  recognized  the  need  to  assist  Africa  to  enhance  
environment protection initiatives and welcomed the initiatives taken by Africans 
themselves including the International Solidarity Conference on Climate Change 
Strategies for African and Mediterranean Regions held in Tunisia in November 2007. 
African countries appreciated Japan's "Cool Earth Promotion Programme" and 
acknowledged Japan's efforts in seeking to develop an international framework looking 
beyond the first steps taken in the current Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
In this regard, the Participants welcomed the announcement by the Government of 
Japan, in January 2008, of its intention to establish a "Cool Earth Partnership" with US 
$ 10 billion Financial Mechanism on the basis of policy consultations between Japan 
and developing countries - including African countries - to address the effects of climate 
change and to modernize their industries, by way of technology-transfer, to render them 
more energy-efficient and more environment-friendly. 
 
6.2 Water: Securing access to water and sanitation 
The Participants acknowledged the importance of water as an indispensable resource for 
addressing development needs such as health, agriculture/food production, disaster risk 
reduction, and peace and security. They also acknowledged that it was essential to 
promote the sustainable use of water resources. 
 
6.3 Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) 
The Participants acknowledged the importance of the Education for Sustainable 
Development initiative and its promotion to address environmental issues effectively. 
 
7.0 A Broadened Partnership TICAD within a Broadened Global 




7.1 The Participants at TICAD IV acknowledged that, since its inception in 1993, the 
TICAD Process has strengthened the twin concepts of "Ownership" and "Partnership" 
and has made a significant contribution to African development. 
7.2 The Participants recognized the importance of enhanced South-South cooperation 
within the context of TICAD Process and acknowledged the positive results of efforts, 
under TICAD Initiative, to promote trade and investment flows between Asia and 
Africa as well as encourage intra-Africa trade. 
 7.3 The Participants acknowledged the active involvement of African, Japanese and 
international  civil  society  organizations  in  the  TICAD  process,  and  the  importance  of  
further broadening the existing TICAD partnership using a participatory approach. They 
also stressed the need to achieve greater synergy and coordination between and among 
existing initiatives so as to attain greater coherence, focus and efficiency in the overall 
global development partnership for a vibrant Africa. 
8.0 The Way Forward 
8.1 The Participants at TICAD IV noted, with sincere appreciation, the continuing 
commitment of development partners including the Government of Japan, other TICAD 
co-organizers and the international community to the promotion of African 
development and, in particular, their championing of the TICAD Process. 
8.2 The Participants warmly welcomed the progress achieved so far by the TICAD 
Process, and also commended the action-oriented outcome of the Conference and 
appreciated that this was clearly captured in this Declaration and in the accompanying 
TICAD IV Action Plan. 
8.3 The Participants also welcomed the establishment of a TICAD Follow-Up 
Mechanism, tasked to continuously monitor and analyze the implementation of the 
TICAD Process as a whole, and the ongoing assessment of its impact upon African 
development across its many sectors of activity. 
8.4 The Participants noted that a successful and timely attainment of the overarching 
objective of sustained and accelerated African development would require the 
commitment and engagement of the entire international community, and the knowledge 
and resources of all of Africa's development partners to be mobilized in a more 
consolidated and synergetic manner. 
8.5 The Participants welcomed the commitment of Japan, as the G8 Chair, to reflect the 
outcomes  of  the  TICAD IV at  the  discussions  of  the  July  2008 G8 Hokkaido  Toyako 













Yokohama Action Plan 
30 May 2008  
Preamble  
1. This Action Plan, under the "Yokohama Declaration," is designed to provide a road 
map for the support of African growth and development under the TICAD (Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development) process. 
 
2. With robust economic growth of more than 5% per year and enhanced political 
stability, Africa is on the path toward the broad-based growth and development that will 
help it become a "continent of hope and opportunity." 
 
3. The TICAD process seeks to support this objective by mobilizing knowledge and 
resources to assist African countries accomplish clear development goals and achieve 
tangible outcomes. Since its inception, TICAD has been based on principles of 
ownership by African countries, partnership, and the expansion of South-South 
cooperation. 
 
4. This Action Plan lays out goals to be achieved and specific measures to be 
implemented through the TICAD process during the next five years to further the three 
TICAD priorities of Boosting Economic Growth, Ensuring Human Security (including 
the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Consolidation 
of Peace and Good Governance), and Addressing Environmental Issues/Climate Change 
under the Broadening Partnership. Progress will be monitored through the TICAD 
follow-up mechanism. 
 
5. The Government of Japan at the center of the TICAD process, has taken the initiative 
to show its strong commitment by announcing doubling ODA to Africa by 2012. This 
will contribute to the effective implementation of assistance so that the goals along the 
above-mentioned priorities can be achieved. The Government of Japan will also strive 
to actively mobilize all the policy tools it has to double direct investment from the 
Japanese private sector to Africa from 2008 to 2012. 
 
Boosting Economic Growth 
- Introduction - 
The TICAD process will promote a "Vibrant Africa" and its accelerated economic 
growth and diversification through support for infrastructure development, trade, 
investment and tourism, and agriculture. It will seek to advance self-sustainable 
economic growth that is effectively linked to poverty reduction and achievement of the 
MDGs, and encourage all stakeholders, including the private sector, to act together in 
support of the efforts African countries are making to broaden and accelerate growth 





It is essential to develop an infrastructure network to promote and support the expansion 
of industry, trade and investment as well as agriculture. The Commission for Africa 
report to G8 Gleneagles Summit indicated that additional assistance of 10 billion dollars 
per year would be required to meet Africa's infrastructure needs by 2010. African 
experts are now drafting a mid-long term strategic plan, which will necessitate both an 
expanded regional infrastructure and capacity building for maintenance and 
management. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process will focus on: 
1.Regional transport infrastructure, including roads and ports 
2.Regional power infrastructure 
3.Water-related infrastructure 
4.Enhanced involvement of regional institutions 
5.Promotion of public-private partnership (PPP) in infrastructure 
 
1. Regional transport infrastructure 
Provide financial and technical assistance for the planning, construction and 
improvement of regional transport corridors and international ports. 
 
Support capacity building for the management and maintenance of regional 
infrastructure. 
 
Promote facilitation of cross-border procedures such as One Stop Border Post (OSBP). 
 
Support technical cooperation for comprehensive community development along with 
infrastructure development. 
 
2. Regional power infrastructure 
Strengthen cooperation to provide a stable power supply for the whole region, and to 
build capacity to manage and maintain regional power networks. 
 
3. Water related infrastructure 
Support agricultural water-development initiatives to rapidly expand the share of land 
under irrigation, and other improved water control and management infrastructure. 
 
4. Enhanced involvement of regional institutions  
Support capacity building of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and regional 
development banks to better plan, finance and execute infrastructure programs, and 
provide technical assistance for regional infrastructure investment planning. 
 




Promote, support and strengthen PPP in infrastructure such as ports, railway and electric 
power plants to increase opportunities for the private sector by utilizing other official 
flows (OOF). 
 
Trade, Investment and Tourism 
African Governments, recognizing the importance of trade and investment to 
sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, are making efforts to promote trade 
and attract foreign investment, drawing on the experiences of the Asian economies. 
African Union (AU)/New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and RECs 
are also formulating common regional trade policies including improvements in the 
legal and regulatory framework and regional infrastructure, in order to promote intra-
African trade and facilitate Africa's integration into the world economy. In this context, 
the TICAD process aims to achieve a significant increase of trade with and investment 
to African countries in collaboration with the private sector. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD process 
The TICAD process will strengthen efforts to: 
1.Promote and expand trade 
2.Encourage foreign investment 
3.Assist private sector development 
4.Promote tourism 
 
1. Promote and expand trade 
Provide duty-free and quota-free market access for essentially all products originating 
from all African least developing countries. 
 
Scale up "Aid for Trade" to increase the global competitiveness of African countries by 
accelerating assistance including Japan's "Development Initiative for Trade" and 
support the early, fair and balanced conclusion of the WTO Doha development Agenda 
negotiations. 
 
Assist product development and export promotion in Africa, by further promoting One 
Village One Product (OVOP) initiative. 
 
Enhance infrastructure management capacity through projects such as the OSBP. 
 
Provide assistance to improve trading practices, and to build capacity in trade policy 
making and coordination of African countries and RECs. 
 
2. Encourage foreign investment 
Provide assistance to improve investment climate including the legal and regulatory 
frameworks in African countries. 
 
Support the establishment of an information and consultation platform on the business 





Utilize more effectively official funding sources such as investment credit, trade and 
investment insurance to enhance PPP and leverage private capital flows to Africa. 
 
Provide assistance for capacity building to improve economic and corporate 
governance.  
 
3. Assist private sector development 
Support African countries to plan and implement industrial development strategies and 
policies, drawing on Asian experiences as appropriate. 
Provide technical support to improve productivity, competitiveness and business 
expertise in promising industries, taking into account the effectiveness of information 
and communication technology (ICT). 
 
Expand assistance to support the development of small and medium enterprises and 
local industries. 
 
Collaborate with international financial institutions and regional development banks to 
strengthen the financial sector, including through the development of local bond 
markets and local currency financing mechanisms. 
 
Provide technical and financial assistance to promote self-reliant utilization of energy 
and mineral resources. 
 
4. Promote tourism 
Encourage and assist African countries' efforts to address security, hospitality 
management, infrastructure and environmental constraints to tourism development 
including through tourism training programs. 
 
Support tourism operators to increase familiarization with African destinations and 
improve knowledge of the continent and what it has to offer. 
 
Exploit the opportunity provided by the 2010 World Cup Soccer Tournament in South 
Africa to support long-term tourism promotion through events such as travel fairs. 
 
Agriculture and Rural Development 
Seventy percent of the poor in Sub-Sahara Africa or 230 million live in rural areas, and 
increase in food production and agricultural productivity are critical for food security, 
poverty reduction and economic growth in Africa. While the agricultural sector can be a 
driving force for the African economy, the continuing increase in food, fertilizer and 
fuel prices has become ever more threatening to food security. 
African countries have recognized the importance of the agricultural sector for 
development and are implementing NEPAD's Comprehensive Africa Agriculture 
Development Programme (CAADP) that seeks to improve agricultural productivity to 
attain an average annual growth rate of 6 percent by 2015. As part of that agenda, 




Declaration, to allocate at least 10% of national budgetary resources for agriculture and 
rural development within five years. 
Support for agriculture under the TICAD process will include attention to the 
environmental impact of agricultural activities, as well as the empowerment of women, 
who play a critical role in agriculture, and the encouragement of South-South 
cooperation including triangular cooperation. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process will seek alignment with the CAADP agenda to: 
1.Enhance capacity to increase food production and agricultural productivity 
2.Improve access to markets and agricultural competitiveness 
3.Support sustainable management of water resources and land use 
 
1. Enhance capacity to increase food production and agricultural productivity 
Provide assistance to expand agricultural research, extension and advisory services 
including for adaptation to climate change, development of new crop varieties and 
improvement of soil fertility and other farming technologies, and increase the number of 
agriculture professionals through support for agriculture-related education and training 
in a gender sensitive manner. 
 
Assist smallholders and farmers' organizations to adopt new technologies, expand 
agricultural land and the use of inputs and introduce appropriate machinery and 
equipment to raise productivity. 
 
Increase rice production through developing capacities to adopt systematic crop 
management,  and  new  methodologies  including  wider  use  of  New  Rice  for  Africa  
(NERICA), aiming at doubling the rice production in African countries in ten years. 
 
Strengthen regional networks for transboundary pest and animal disease control. 
 
2. Improve access to markets and agricultural competitiveness 
Increase investments in physical infrastructure, such as roads, ports and market facilities 
in order to reduce transport cost, improve the ratio of retail to farm gate prices, reduce 
the percentage of post-harvest losses, and increase the percentage of agricultural 
production that is sold. 
 
Provide technical and financial assistance to farmers to move up the value-chain and 
meet agricultural product and export standards. 
 
Expand provision of credit to smallholders, especially women, to facilitate their uptake 
of new technologies and inputs, and accelerate their integration into agri-business value-
chains. 
 
Support pilot activities to promote the participation of small scale farmers, associations 





3. Support sustainable management of water resources and land use 
Support reforms in land titling, ownership and use to increase smallholder decision 
making power over the use and disposition of land. 
Promote development, rehabilitation and maintenance of water resources management 
infrastructure to contribute to the joint efforts aiming at expanding the irrigated area by 
20% in five years. 
 
Enhance water resources management capacity through better tillage methods and water 
harvesting and storage, introduction of new technologies and capacity building of local 
governments and farmers' organizations. 
 
Provide finance for small-scale community-managed irrigation and water management 
schemes for local markets, and individual smallholder schemes for high-value markets. 
 
Achieving MDGs 
- Introduction - 
2008 is midway to the 2015 target for achieving the MDGs. Accelerated progress in 
Africa is crucial as statistics indicate that many Sub-Saharan African countries will fall 
short of attaining the goals, and that problems such as high maternal mortality rates and 
the prevalence of HIV/AIDS remain serious. While economic development is necessary 
in order to reduce poverty, it is also essential that the fruits of the economic growth 
reach all members of society, including the most disadvantaged, and are not restricted to 
a privileged few.  
 
In order to promote the achievement of the MDGs in Africa, the TICAD process will 
focus on the notion of "human security," which aims at building societies in which 
people are protected from threats against their lives, livelihoods and dignity and are 
empowered to realize their full potential. In enhancing "human security," a special 
emphasis will be placed on bottom-up, comprehensive, multi-sectoral and participatory 
approaches that encourage collaboration among national and local governments, 
international organizations, civil society, and other actors. Paying due attention to the 
inter-relatedness of each of the MDGs, the TICAD process will proactively focus on the 
areas of health and education, where the delays in achieving the MDGs are most 
conspicuous, and will encourage community development, gender equality, and the 
active participation of civil society.  
Community Development 
Community  development  and  empowerment  are  vital  elements  of  enhanced  human  
security, both in rural and urban areas. Gender perspective is indispensable as women 
play an important role in community development. Cultural consideration is also 
important to ensure sustainable community development. Furthermore, community 
based approach is indispensable for consolidation of peace during transitional phase. 
In the Declaration on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa, members of AU 
have recognized the importance to address social development, poverty reduction and 




empowering the poor and the vulnerable, particularly in the rural communities and the 
urban informal economy, the unemployed and the under-employed. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process will focus support on: 
1.Comprehensive "Glocal" (global and local) community development 
2.Community based approach building on functional hubs 
 
1. Comprehensive "Glocal" (global and local) community development 
Support a comprehensive community-driven development approach and build on 
experiences such as the African Village Initiative (AVI) and the African Millennium 
Village (AMV). 
 
Provide technical assistance, marketing skills and micro-finance for decent job creation, 
especially for young people, and income generation by collaborating with co-operatives. 
 
Expand the OVOP project. 
 
2. Community based approach building on functional hubs 
Provide a comprehensive package of services at schools and community learning 
centers, including water supply and sanitation, school meals, first aid and referral 
service, literacy, and life-skill education, in addition to basic education. 
 
Encourage involvement of local people in the school management ("School for All") in 
order to enhance their access to education and learning outcomes, and to strengthen 
linkages with local economy including through home grown feeding programmes. 
 
Support water resource management by local co-operatives to generate income for 
education, health and agriculture initiatives. 
 
Improve health centers as the core of support and provide training for health/medical 
workers. 
  
Improve human settlements by establishing community development committees to 
improve housing, sanitation, water supply and drainage facilities. 
 
Education 
To achieve Education for All (EFA) and the MDGs, African countries need to develop 
holistic education sector plans and allocate sufficient national budgetary resources to 
implement them and develop related capacities. The TICAD process will support not 
only these efforts but also promote education and human resource development that 
leads to growth and sustainable socio-economic development. In doing so, efforts to 
achieve gender parity in education and synergy with other sectors including health, 




"The Second Decade of Education for Africa" (2006-2015), adopted by the AU in 
November 2007, has identified gender and culture, educational management 
information systems, teacher development, education and training, tertiary education, 
technical and vocational education and training, curriculum, and teaching and learning 
materials, and quality management as priority areas for the sector. In this framework, 
African countries aim to develop functional national Educational Management 
Information Systems (EMIS), achieve full gender equality in primary and secondary 
education, and bridge the gender gap in participation in mathematics, science and 
technology at the tertiary level. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process in respect of the commitments and actions made by African 
countries, will focus on the African efforts as follows: 
1.Basic education - expansion of access and quality 




1. Basic education - expansion of access to and quality 
Support construction and rehabilitation of school buildings and related infrastructure. 
 
Provide assistance to train and ratain primary and secondary school teachers and support 
the establishment and expansion of teacher training systems and organizations. 
 
Promote capacity development of local education administration and community-based 
school management through "School for All" programme. 
 
Promote knowledge/experience sharing within Africa and between Asia and Africa on 
such themes as culture and gender sensitive curricula, learning materials and training 
manuals. 
 
2. Post basic education and higher education/research 
Promote human resource development in support of productive sectors by expanding 
institutions for technical and vocational education and training. 
Strengthen partnership among universities, colleges and research institutes through joint 
researches and the exchange of researchers and students to expand research and 
knowledge accumulation in science and technology. 
 
Promote high-level inter-governmental dialogues to strengthen science and technology 
cooperation. 
 
3. Multi-sectoral approach 
Establish child-friendly school environment through comprehensive packages of 
assistance including safe water and sanitation facilities with separate toilets for boys and 






Enhance life-skill education, including on prevention of HIV/AIDS and improvement of 
hygiene behaviors. 
 
4. Education management 
Support the efforts to better manage education including the collection and analysis of 
education-related information/data to understand and meet educational needs. 
 
Health 
Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, faces serious challenges such as the prevalence 
of infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis (TB), malaria and polio, and the high 
infant mortality rate and maternal mortality ratio. In addition, the emerging threats of 
climate  change  and  global  food  crisis  will  pose  new  challenges  to  achievement  of  a  
range  of  health  goals,  from  control  of  infectious  disease  to  alleviating  the  burden  of  
malnutrition. These challenges constitute a serious constraint to social and economic 
development, and a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach involving, inter alia, 
safe water and sanitation, nutrition, basic education, gender equality is required. 
It is against this background that the Meeting of AU Ministers of Health in April 2007 
adopted the "Africa Health Strategy," to promote the strengthening of overall health 
systems in Africa. AU has laid out regional strategies on major diseases and health 
issues including "Abuja Declaration and Framework for Action for the Fight against 
HIV/AIDS, TB and Other Related Infectious Diseases," in which African countries 
targeted to allocate 15% of public budget to the health sector, "African Regional 
Nutrition Strategy," as well as "Maputo Plan of Action for the Operationalisation of the 
Continental Policy Framework for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights," and 
"Strategic Framework for Reaching the Millennium Development Goal on Child 
Survival in Africa", and efforts are being made accordingly. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process, in respect of the commitments and actions made by African 
countries,will engage in: 
1.Strengthening of health systems 
2.Improvement of maternal, new-born and child health 
3.Measures against infectious diseases 
1. Strengthening health systems 
Promote training and retention of health workers to contribute to the joint effort 
achieving the WHO goal of at least 2.3 health workers per 1,000 people in Africa. 
 
Improve the provision of health services, including through expansion of health 
infrastructure and facilities. 
 
Promote establishment of monitoring and evaluation of health systems to enable policy 





Encourage and recognize medical research and exemplary medical service practices 
combating infectious diseases in Africa through the Hideyo Noguchi Africa Prize. 
 
2. Improvement of maternal, new-born and child health 
Support interventions focusing on reducing under-five mortality rate and maternal 
mortality ratio. 
 
Promote continuum of care for women and children across the span of pre-pregnancy, 
pregnancy, child birth and childhood via high impact intervention such as provision of 
immunizations and micro-nutrients for children. 
 
Support the international efforts to achieve universal access to reproductive health 
services. 
 
Contribute to the international efforts to raise the proportion of birth attended by skilled 
birth attendant in Africa to 75% in five years, as targeted by WHO. 
 
3. Measures against infectious diseases 
Support the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM). 
 
Strengthen central government institutions for HIV/AIDS and prioritize prevention of 
new infections. 
 
Support efforts to achieve the target of reducing by 50 % TB prevalence and mortality 
rates by 2015 relative to 1990 levels, including through prevention, testing, and 
treatment activities under Direct Observation Treatment, Short-course (DOTS). 
 
Promote effective implementation of anti-malaria activities by combining preventive 
measures including distribution of long lasting insecticide-treated bed nets, and 
awareness raising and provision of nursing care. 
 
Support comprehensive efforts to eradicate polio from Africa, through surveillance and 
vaccination campaigns. 
 
Make efforts to control or eliminate Neglected Tropical Diseases through awareness 
raising, treatment and access to safe water and sanitation. 
 
Consolidation of Peace, Good Governance 
- Introduction - 
Recently Africa has made great progress in ending conflicts and promoting 
rehabilitation, including efforts on building the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) and promoting African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). This is an 
unparalleled opportunity for Africa to consolidate peace and strengthen good 





Consolidation of peace encompasses different phases and a variety of actions, including 
preventing conflicts, mediating between parties and negotiating peace agreements, 
restoring and maintaining security and public order, providing humanitarian assistance, 
supporting rehabilitation, promoting social and economic development, and improving 
democratic governance. These processes require seamless and continuous support to 
make them irreversible. 
Conflicts easily spread in Africa where many countries share borders, and therefore, 
regional aspects should be taken into consideration in consolidating peace. Efforts in 
conflict prevention as well as risk management to minimize damages upon the outbreak 
of conflicts are also indispensable. Community-based and participatory approaches with 
an emphasis on enhancing capacities of local population help promote the ownership of 
African countries. The most vulnerable groups in society such as women, children, the 
elderly, and the persons with disabilities also need particular protection and support. At 
the same time, importance of strengthening coordination as well as sharing information 
and good practices among internal and external actors engaging in peacebuilding 
activities should be emphasized. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process will specifically focus on: 
1.Conflict prevention 
2.Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance 
3.Restoration and maintenance of security 
4.Promotion of good governance 
1. Conflict prevention 
Contribute to developing the effective operation of Africa's early warning systems 
including the planned Continental Early Warning System under the APSA. 
 
2. Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance 
Support early recovery and quick-impact interventions, including assistance to basic 
social infrastructure and services and to the return and reintegration of refugees and 
internally displaced persons. 
 
Support livelihoods through vocational training, job creation, and start-up assistance to 
small business and agriculture. 
 
Assist efforts to protect the most vulnerable groups in society, in particular, through 
improved access to education to reintegrate in society children and adolescents affected 
by armed conflict. 
 
Support efforts on disarmament of armed groups, de-mining, destruction of unexploded 
ordnance, stockpile management and collection of small arms which will contribute to 
both the restoration of safety, security and good governance and humanitarian and 
reconstruction efforts. 
 
Further promote mine action including mine risk education, victim assistance and de-





Encourage private sector contribution in peacebuilding efforts. 
 
3. Restoration and maintenance of security 
Enhance capacity of military, police, and civilians in African countries engaging in 
peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding. 
 
Strengthen PKO centers in Africa and encourage exchange of experience between Asia 
and Africa. 
 
Support the African Stand-by Force under the APSA. 
 
Assist efforts in strengthening cross-border control and regional cooperation to regulate 
the flow of small arms, smuggling and human trafficking. 
 
4. Promotion of good governance 
Support the implementation of the Programs of Action of the APRM Country Review 
Report. 
 
Provide assistance to build capacity in legal systems, financial control and the public 
service. 
 
Strengthen economic governance through the NEPAD-OECD Africa Investment 
Initiative. 
 
Addressing Environmental/Climate Change issues 
- Introduction - 
Addressing climate change is an urgent challenge for Africa, given its vulnerability to 
adverse impacts such as more frequent and intense droughts and floods. In order to 
realize a "global sustainable society", it is necessary for all countries, including those in 
Africa, to collaborate and develop an effective framework beyond 2012 on climate 
change, and take action toward the goal of reducing global greenhouse gas emissions. 
The TICAD process will promote policy dialogue in the field of climate change, support 
developing of an effective framework, and strengthen assistance to African countries 
that make efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve economic growth in a 
compatible manner, in the areas of policy planning, mitigation, access to clean energy, 
and  adaptation  to  climate  change.  With  regard  to  adaptation,  the  TICAD  process  will  
promote effective management of water resources, as well as efforts in related areas 
such as health, agriculture and food security. 
In this context, it is important to promote a participatory approach involving a wide 
range of stakeholders including central governments, international organizations, local 
governments and communities, private sector and civil society organizations. 
Furthermore, coordinated efforts are required under various initiatives including Japan's 




level as well as within international and regional frameworks developed by the United 
Nations, AU/NEPAD and RECs. 
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process will strengthen efforts, in the following areas: 
1.Mitigation 
2.Adaptation 
3.Water and Sanitation 
4.Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) 
 
1. Mitigation 
(1) Promotion of mitigation measures 
Support active participation by African countries in developing an effective framework 
beyond 2012 on climate change, in which all countries take actions and work together, 
based on the Bali Action Plan. 
 
Promote the formulation of projects and awareness-raising campaigns for further 
implementation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and support the 
institutional and capacity development of Designated National Agencies in each 
country. 
 
Support the development of and access to basic information on forest resources and land 
use to encourage sustainable forest management and promote conservation and 
reforestation projects in response to Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD). 
 
(2) Promotion of the use of clean energy and improvement of energy access 
Support the formulation of policies and plans to expand usage of renewable energy, and 
assist renewable energy programmes including facilitating transfer of management and 
maintenance technology. 
 
Support the development and management of electricity power grid to promote 
improved access to and efficient use of electricity, and promote better access of the poor 





Promote technical assistance such as establishing and updating the Global Map data for 
the entire Africa, describing the status of its environment in five years. 
 
(1) Measures against natural disasters 
Support the formulation of natural disaster prevention and emergency activity plans 
based on the assessment of risk and vulnerability of each region to disasters including 





Assist efforts to establish early warning systems and strengthen capacity at the 
community level to cope with natural disasters. 
 
(2) Measures to combat desertification 
Assist the development and dissemination of new and existing technologies for 
utilization of water resources, soil conservation and reforestation including utilization of 
drought-resistant plants. 
 
Assist  efforts  to  raise  awareness  to  combat  desertification  at  the  community  level  and  
introduce appropriate measures to reduce overgrazing, over-cultivation and 
deforestation. 
 
3. Water and Sanitation 
(1) Effective water resources management 
Assist formulation of water cycle management plans based on the assessment of 
potential water resources and specific local conditions and the improvement of 
administrative capacity to implement these plans. 
 
Promote the transfer of technology and expertise on water resources management with 
due consideration to the specific situation of each region. 
 
(2) Access to safe water and sanitation facilities 
Promote the development of water and sanitation facilities with affordable technologies. 
 
Support capacity building of managers and users of water and sanitation system and 
promote awareness raising campaigns to improve hygiene practices including hand 
washing. 
 
4. Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) 




- Introduction - 
The TICAD process has consistently embraced the concept of "Ownership" and 
"Partnership" and the scope of the "Partnership" with Africa has expanded steadily. 
Asia-Africa cooperation is one of the key elements of the TICAD process that 
progresses through mutual learning and sharing of best practices and technology 
between the two regions. African countries are in the process of integration, making 
strides towards the deepening of an intra-African partnership within the framework of 
the Abuja Treaty. They have also made significant achievements as embodied in the 




RECs as major pillars of continental integration. Broad-based partnership and a 
participatory approach involving private companies, NGOs and academia is crucial, and 
African countries are making efforts to engage as many actors as possible in the process 
of development. Better coordination among these partners under the African ownership 
is also of vital importance for these efforts to lead to maximum outcome and impacts on 
the ground.  
Actions to be taken in the next 5 years under the TICAD Process 
The TICAD process will strengthen efforts to: 
1.Promote South-South Cooperation, in particular Asia-Africa Cooperation 
2.Deepen Regional Integration 
3.Broaden Partnership 
 
1. Promote South-South Cooperation, in particular Asia-Africa Cooperation 
Transfer efficiently skill and technique, share knowledge and experience, and promote 
joint research within Africa and between Asia and Africa. 
 
Promote the exchange of people, trade and investment and services to strengthen the ties 
between Asia and Africa. 
 
Encourage the full use of existing institutions mandated in the field of South-South 
cooperation, such as the Asian Productivity Organization (APO) and National 
Productivity Organizations in both Asia and Africa. 
 
2. Deepen Regional Integration 
Encourage triangular cooperation, both in the context of intra-Africa and Asia-Africa 
cooperation, recognizing the important role of the AU/NEPAD and RECs. 
 
3. Broaden Partnership 
Promote PPP, in recognition of the important role of private sector in the African 
development. 
 
Enhance coordination with the civil society and encourage cooperation with the 
academia. 
